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Note: The Minnesota Pollution Control AgencyA Study in State Administrative Law
INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of writing on administrative law and procedure in Minnesota is unfortunate because the state relies
heavily upon administrative agencies for effective government.
While a general guide to Minnesota administrative law and procedure would be a great convenience, such a study is impossible
except in the broadest of generalizations since the substantive
law and procedural requirements vary greatly from agency to
agency-and in some cases even within agencies. Instead an exhaustive study of a single agency has been undertaken in the
hopes that it will be of value not only to those interested in
this particular area, but also to those dealing with related problems of Minnesota administrative law.
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (hereinafter PCA)
was selected as the subject of this study for several reasons.
First, the law governing the PCA is exceedingly complex and in
many instances internally inconsistent. It is therefore illustrative of many of the problems in state administrative law and
also demonstrates with great clarity the need for legislative reform. Second, it was selected because many of the central issues in administrative law are being developed in the area of
environmental control. And finally, since the PCA is a relatively young agency unencumbered by rigid bureaucratic customs, it is hoped that this study may be of some use in the development of better agency practices.
The study will first examine the powers and duties of the
PCA. These include the power and duty to make rules, to grant
permits and variances, and the power and duty to detect violations and enforce the laws and regulations in both formal and
informal proceedings. The study will then examine the controls
that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government exercise over the PCA.
Part 1-The Duties and Powers of the PCA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Water Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter
WPCC) was created in The Water Pollution Control Act of 1945
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(hereinafter WPCA).' In 1967, the legislature, believing a more
comprehensive pollution abatement agency was required, created the PCA. 2 The composition of the newly organized agency
included a director 3 and nine-member board,4 all of whom were
to be appointed by the governor to serve four year terms., The
old WPCC became a division of the new PCA0 and two new divisions, Air Quality and Solid Waste 7 were created. The powers
8
of the WPCC continue to be defined by the original statute
while those of the PCA are contained in the later enactment.0
II.

APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL STATUTES

Four bodies of statutes must be considered in determining
the law of administrative procedure applicable to the PCA.
First, the state Administrative Procedure Act I0 (hereinafter the
APA) applies generally to provide minimal procedural requirements." Second, Chapter 115 of the Minnesota Statutes 12 con1.
2.

MINN. STAT. §
MINN. STAT. §
MINN. STAT. §
MINN. STAT. §

115.02 subd. 1 (1965).
116.02 subd. 1 (1969).

3.
116.03 subd. 1 (1969).
4.
116.02 subd. 1 (1969).
5. The director's term runs coterminously with that of the Governor. MINN. STAT. § 116.03 subd. 1 (1969). Terms of the original board
were set to expire as follows: two in 1969, two in 1970, two in 1971,
two in 1972, and one in 1973. MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 2 (1969).
Thereafter the identical scheme of staggered four year terms was to
be followed. Id. See text accompanying notes 596-97 infra.
6. MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
7. Interview with Robert J. Lindall, Special Asst. Attorney General, in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb. 1, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Lindall
interview].
8. MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
9.
10.

MINN. STAT. § 116.07 (1969).
MINN. STAT. §§ 15.01-15.049

(1969).
11. That the APA was intended to provide only minimum requirements as contrasted with details of administrative procedure seems
clear from the statements of its draftsmen, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Their comment explains that the "act deals primarily with major principles, not with matters of detail." 1946 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS at 199.
Only the "basic principles of common sense, jus-

tice, and fairness ...

can and

should prevail

universally."

Id.

at

200 (emphasis added). See also Stason, The Model State Administrative ProcedureAct, 33 IOWA L. REV. 196, 200-01 (1948). These comments
constitute the only available evidence of the intent of the Minnesota
legislature in enacting the APA.
It is to be noted that the APA was patterned after a "model" act
of the Commissioners on Uniform Law as contrasted with a "uniform"
act. Model acts are drafted by the Commissioners in respect to subject
areas where conditions among the various states are so diverse as to
render inadvisable the drafting of a uniform act. See id. at 199.
12. MINN. STAT. §§ 115.01-115.53 (1969).
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tains the procedural provisions of the predecessor of the PCA,
the WPCC. These provisions now govern PCA proceedings 3
with respect to water pollution. Third, Chapter 116 of the Minnesota Statutes, 14 which created the PCA, and fourth, the recently enacted Environmental Rights Act 5 (hereinafter the
ERA) contain additional relevant provisions. When APA provisions differ from those in Chapter 115, Chapter 116 or the
ERA 16 as to the appropriate procedure, the approach herein employed is to assume that the strictest provision controls. Since
the legislature presumably intended to lay down "minimum requirements" in the APA, 17 the APA should govern when its
provisions are the most restrictive of agency action. When provisions of Chapter 115, Chapter 116 or the ERA are stricter
they should control on the theory that the legislature, by enacting them, has chosen to go beyond the APA minimum.
HI. RULE-MAKING
Under both Chapter 115, governing water pollution,1 8 and
Chapter 116, controlling air, noise and solid waste,10 the PCA
has the authority to issue rules and regulations2 0 for the purpose
of performing its duties. The provisions of the APA presumably govern PCA rule-making, since Chapter 116 incorporates
them by reference 2 ' and since the ERA and Chapter 115, with
13.

See MlIN.

STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).

14. M.rN. STAT. §§ 116.01-116.15 (1969).

15. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 952 [hereinafter cited by code section as
STAT. §§ 116B.01-116B.14].
16. See Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MIuN.
L. REv. 575 (1972).
17. See note 11 supra.
18. MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969).
19. MINN. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 4 (1969).
20. "Rule" includes every regulation, including the amendment,
suspension, or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency, whether
with or without prior hearing, to implement or make specific
the law enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure, but does not include (a) regulations concerning only the internal management of the agency or other agencies, and which do not directly affect the rights of or procedure
available to the public; or (b) rules and regulations relating to
the management, discipline, or release of any person committed
to any state penal institution; or (c) rules of the division of
game and fish published in accordance with Minnesota Statutes,
section 97.53; or (d) regulations relating to weight limitations on
the use of highways when the substance of such regulations is
indicated to the public by means of signs.
MAmi. STAT.§ 15.041-1 subd. 3 (1969).
21. MmN. ST-T.§ 116.07 subd. 4 (1969).
YmN.
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one exception, 2 2 are silent with respect to rule-making procedure. In addition to specifying requirements for hearings,
notice and filing of rules, the APA provides that such rules have
24
23
the force and effect of law and are entitled to judicial notice
after they have been submitted to the Attorney General, 2 i and
have been filed with the Secretary of State and the Commis26
sioner of Administration.
Rule-making procedures may be commenced either by the
PCA on its own initiative 27 or by petition of members of the
public when the PCA chooses 28 to honor such a proposal. 2D Regardless of who initiates the procedures, however, the same requirements apply for hearings on proposed rules, notice of such
hearings, and publication and filing of rules.
22. See text accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
It would seem clear that the "final order" provision of MINN.
STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969) is inapplicable since inasmuch as "rules"
are listed from "final orders" separately in MINN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 3
(1969), the statutes contemplate that they are distinct products of the
agency machinery.
23. Id.
24. MINN. STAT. § 15.049 (1969).
25. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969):
Every rule hereafter proposed by an administrative agency, before being adopted, must be based upon a showing of need for
the rule, and shall be submitted as to form and legality, with
the reasons therefor, to the attorney general, who, within 20
days, shall either approve or disapprove the rule. If he approves the rule, he shall promptly file it in the office of the secretary of state. If he disapproves the rule, he shall state in
writing his reasons therefor, and the rule shall not be filed in the
office of the secretary, nor published. If he fails to approve or
disapprove any rule within the 20 day period, the agency may
file the rule in the office of the secretary of state and publish
the same.
26. MINN. STAT. § 15.0413 subd. 1 (1969).
27. See notes 18-19 supra.
28. An agency is not bound to hold hearings upon receipt of a
petition. See Stason, supra note 11, at 203.
29. Recognizing the advantages of facilitating more interplay between administrative agencies and the public, Minnesota like other
states, has provided for petitions for rules from the public. MINN.
STAT. § 15.0415 (1969) provides:
Any interested person may petition an agency requesting the
adoption, suspension, amendment or repeal of any rule. Each
agency may prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and
the procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition.
See generally 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203-06 (1968).
The PCA has never received a formal petition for a rule although it
has received informal requests from environmental groups to take action in various matters. Lindall Interview, supra note 7. Moreover, the
PCA has not prescribed any forms or rules of procedure for the submission or consideration of petitions. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0415 (1969).
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IV. HEARINGS ON PROPOSED RULES

A. HEAuNGs ON PROPOSED RuLEs
The APA explicitly requires 30 a public hearing prior to the
adoption, suspension, amendment or repeal 31 of a rule except in
emergencies, thereby avoiding the difficulties of determining
whether due process requires rule-making hearings.3 2 Since the
APA allows agencies to promulgate rules without hearings
where the statutes 3governing
the agency allow it to exercise
"emergency powers" 3 the PCA apparently can issue emergency
rules without hearings under its emergency authority with respect to water pollution

4

as well as air and land pollution3 3

In

practice however the PCA has used this power infrequently,"
deeming the temporary restraining order procedure more expedient in emergency situations.
No provision of the APA explicitly governs the conduct of
a hearing on proposed rules other than to prescribe that it be
"public."3 7 However, the term "public hearing" has been held
to imply that the hearing need not be conducted with the for30. MNx. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 3, subd. 4 (1969):
Subd. 3. Prior to the adoption of any rule authorized by law,
or the suspension, amendment or repeal thereof, unless the
agency follows the procedure of subdivision 4, the adopting
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or otherwise crculate notice of its intended action and afford interested persons

opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing.
Subd. 4. No rule shall be adopted by any agency subsequent
to the effective date of sections 15.0411 to 15.0422 unless the
agency first holds a public hearing thereon, following the giving of at least 30 days prior to the hearing of notice of the intention to hold such hearing, by United States mail, to representatives of associationsor other interested groups or persons who
have registered their names with the secretary of state for
that purpose...
31. Although MINN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 3, subd. 4 (1969) seem
to allow in the case of suspension, amendment, or repeal of a rule
either a public hearing pursuant to Subdivision 4 or an "opportunity
to submit data or views orally or in writing" pursuant to Subdivision 3,
it is difficult to distinguish such an "opportunity" from a public hearing.
See note 30 supra.
32. For due process considerations, see generally 1 F. CooPER, supra
note 29, at 135-60; 1 K. DAvis, ADMwniSTTIVE LAw TaRATISE 407-512
(1958); 1 K. DAVIS, ADmnsrATIvE LAw TaRTISE 300-69 (Supp. 1971).
33.

Mlim. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 5 (1969).

34. See _mx. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 2 (1969).
35. See MTrNN. STAT. § 116.11 (1969).
36. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
37. Mum. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969). Chapter 116 also requires a public hearing for air and solid waste matters. See Minn.
Laws 1971, ch. 887.
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mality of a court trial but rather like a public meeting at which
the issue in question is openly and informally discussed and at
which interested persons freely may express their views.8 8 The
PCA holds such informal public hearings, whether rules are being adopted, suspended, amended or repealed. 39 No formal rules
of evidence 40 or procedure 41 are utilized and none have been
promulgated despite the PCA's authority to do so.42 Those present are given the right to express their views if they consent to
questioning by the hearing officer. 43 The hearing officer, usually the assistant director of the agency, 44 presides over the hearing and causes a transcript, statement of evidence and proposed
findings to be prepared. 45 These doucments are then forwarded
to the board of the PCA, which ultimately determines the dis46
position of the proposed rule.
B.

NOTICE OF INTENDED RULE MAKING

The APA expressly requires 47 some manner of notice of
all rule-making hearings, the specific manner depending upon
whether a rule is to be adopted or is to be suspended, amended or
repealed. No rule can be adopted unless at least 30 days prior
to the hearing notice is mailed to interested groups or persons
who have registered their names with the Secretary of State. 48
Where the issue is suspension, amendment or repeal of an existing rule, the APA allows two alternative notice procedures.
The agency either may "publish or otherwise circulate notice
of its intended action and afford interested persons opportunity
38. See, e.g., Wiley v. Town Council, 261 A.2d 625, 631 (R.I. 1970);
Lamb v. Town of East Hampton, 18 Misc. 2d 802, 805, 162 N.Y.S.2d 94,

96 (1957); Morton v. Johnson City, 206 Tenn. 411, 421-22, 333 S.W.2d 924,
928 (1969).
39. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
40. Id.
41. Id. Examples of formal rules dispensed with in PCA rule making hearings include those relating to cross examination and those relating to swearing of witnesses. Id.
42. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 1 (1969).

43. Lindall Interview, supra note 7. Query whether this condition
is consistent with the notion of a free and open public hearing. See
text accompanying note 38 supra.
44. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
45. Interview with Harold D. Field, Jr., PCA Board member,
Nov. 3, 1971.

46. Id.
47.

MiNN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 3, subd. 4 (1969).

supra.
48.

MINN. STAT.

§ 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969).

See note 30

See note 30 supra.
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to submit data or views orally or in writing" 49 or may hold a
public hearing preceded by the same manner of notice necessary
prior to the adoption of a rule.50 The APA states no requirements as to the content of the notice.
As a matter of practice the PCA goes well beyond the minimal APA notice requirements. Before promulgating a rule it
gives notice both to interested persons on the Secretary of
State's list and to any others it believes might be affected by
the rule.5 1 Regardless of whether a rule is to be adopted,
suspended, revoked or repealed, the agency mails notice at least
30 days prior to the hearing. 52 The notice includes the time and
place of the hearing, the name of the hearing officer and either

a copy of the proposed
rule or a statement that a copy can be
53
obtained on request.
C.

SuBIssioN OF RULES TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AMD FILING

The APA provides that rules must be filed with both the
Secretary of State and the Commissioner of Administration 5 '
and must be submitted to the Attorney General for his approval as to form and legality.5 5 While Chapter 116 incorporates the APA provisions by reference with respect to air and
solid waste,5 6 Chapter 115 provides that rules need be filed only
with the Secretary of State. 57 Since the APA provisions specify
the "minimum essentials" of procedure,58 it seems clear that its
provisions also should be deemed applicable for water pollution
49. Mrx. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 3 (1969). See note 30 supra.
50. See MANx. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 3, subd. 4 (1969). See note 30
supra.
51. Lindall Interview, supranote 7.
52.

Id.

53. Id.
54. I.M'. SmT. § 15.0413 subd. 1 (1969):
Every rule or regulation filed in the office of the secretary of
state as provided in section 15.0412 shall have the force and
effect of law upon its further filing in the office of the commissioner of administration ....

The secretary of state shall keep

a permanent register of rules filed with that office open to public
inspection.
55. M N. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969). See note 25 supra.
56.

MINN. STAT. §

116.07 subd. 4 (1969).

57. MnN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969) provides that
every rule or regulation affecting any other department or
agency of the state or any person other than a member or

employee of the commission [the old WPCC] shall be filed with
the secretary of state ....
58. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
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proceedings instead of the less demanding requirements of Chapter 115. Application of the APA also would create a desirable
uniformity of procedure within the PCA.
In practice the PCA follows the procedure of the APA. The
rules are first reviewed by members of the Attorney General's
staff assigned to the agency, then by the central office of the
Attorney General. 0 They are filed with the Secretary of State
and the Commissioner of Administration ° and then placed in
the permanent register of files kept by the Secretary of State."'
V.

PERMITS AND VARIANCES

The PCA derives its power to grant, modify and revoke permits and variances 62 from two separate statutory enactments.
Chapter 115, 6 3 dealing with the WPCC, and Chapter 116, establishing the divisions of Air and Solid Waste under the Pollution Control Agency. 64 The WPCC, now the Water Division of
the PCA, 65 has the statutory authority to issue, continue in effect, or deny installation and operation permits in order to abate
water pollution. 6 It also has been given the power to establish,6 7 and in fact has promulgated," substantive rules for such
granting, modification, and revocation. However, it is uncertain
whether the WPCC has express statutory authority 0 to grant
70
variances.
59. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
60. Id.
61. MINN. STAT. § 15.0413 subd. 1

(1969).

Furthermore, all

agency rules are published by the Publication Board. See MINN.
STAT. §§ 15.046-15.049 (1969).
62. A variance is a license to build or operate a disposal system
which will be in violation of substantive pollution standards. See Zylka
v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1969).
63. MINN. STAT. § 115 (1969).
64. MnN. STAT. § 116 (1969).
65.

MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5

(1969).

66. MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969).
There is also a grandfather clause which empowered the WPCC to grant permits to disposal
systems operating prior to the creation of the agency. MINN. STAT.
§ 115.07 subd. 2 (1969).
67. MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969).
68. See generally Minn. Reg. W'PC 1-32 (1971 ed.).
69. See text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
70. In the years 1945-67, the WPCC has granted approximately
6,000 permits. See Bound Volume of Permits Issued by WPCC (194567). However, the WPCC has granted formal variances; the following
is a partial list of variances granted:
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The Pollution Control Act contains the licensing"' authority
for the Air and Solid Waste divisions of the agency. The provision delegating to the Air and Solid Waste divisions the power
to grant, modify, or revoke permits was enacted in 1971,72 four

years after the agency had been created. This necessitated the
enactment of a grandfather clause, validating all permits issued
prior to the amendment. 73 Air Quality and Solid Waste Divisions have the power to issue variances and to establish the
procedures and conditions upon which the variances will be
granted.7 4 Although the regulations do contain a general policy
statement as to the various factors that will influence the grant70
ing of a variance, 75 no specific standards have been set.
Unlike the Air Quality and Solid Waste Divisions, there is
no express statutory provision in the WPCA authorizing the
Water Division to grant variances. The statutory scheme pro71. The words license and permit are used synonymously. See
Parsons v. People, 32 Colo. 221, 232, 76 P. 666, 669 (1904).
72. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 904, § 1, subd. 4a. The federal Environmental Protection Agency believed that the PCA could not rely on the
statutory grant of permit power contained in the WPCC enactment:
It is our opinion that since ch. 115 limits the state's authority to
situations involving only the water of the state, legal problems
could arise if an attempt were made to utilize these powers to
cover air pollution control.
Letter from Robert Walsh, Director of Division of Abatement, Federal
EPA, to Minnesota PCA.
73. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 904, § 2, subd. 2. To date, the Air
Quality Division has granted approximately 400 permits and the Solid
Waste Division has issued approximately 50. Interview with Ed Wiik,
Director of the Division of Air Quality, in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb. 15,
1971; Interview with Floyd J. Forsberg, Director of the Division of Solid
Waste, in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb. 15, 1971.
74. MINN. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 5 (1969). An attorney representing
a variance applicant must demonstrate one of the following:

a)

Regulation is unreasonable as applied to applicant;

Compliance with regulation would cause economic hardship; or
c) Compliance with regulation would be unreasonably difficult
to accomplish.
Address by Robert J. Lindali, University of Minnesota Law School,
b)

Oct. 16, 1970.
75. Minn. Reg. WPC 23(i) (1971); Minn. Reg. APC 2(d) (1969).
Minn. Reg. SW 1 (1971) is representative:
Whereupon written application of the responsible person or
persons the Agency finds that by reason of exceptional circumstances strict conformity with any provisions of the emission
standards contained herein would cause undue hardship, would
be unreasonable, impractical, or not feasible under the circumstances, the Agency may permit a variance.
76. Interview with Lane Fridell, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Minneapolis, Minn., Apr. 15, 1971. The Air Quality Division has issued no
formal variances and the Solid Waste Division has issued only one.
See note 73 supra.
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vides that an applicant for a permit submit his plans for a disposal system to the Water Division.77 The Water Division then
compares the proposed discharge level of the applicant's system
with the substantive standards the agency had promulgated. In
theory, if the applicant met the standards, he would be granted
a permit; if not, the permit would be denied. This has generally
been the practice.7 8 However, many disputes between an applicant and the agency have been settled by stipulation orders or
compliance schedules79 in which either time extensions or deviations from numerical effluent standards have been granted to
the licensee.80 Since these stipulation orders and compliance
schedules deviate from the agency's substantive pollution standards, in effect they are variances.
There is no section expressly granting the Water Division
power to issue these variances. However, an examination of
the statute as a whole supports the argument that the agency
does in fact have this authority. First, the Water Division has
power to "issue, continue in effect, or deny permits, under such
conditions as it may prescribe for the prevention of pollution .... 81s This mandate should be interpreted to suggest
that the agency need not be forced to choose between denying
a permit or trying to force compliance with standards that cannot be met, but instead may formulate a schedule by which
compliance will be obtained in time. Second, when the PCA
82
was created, it was delgated the power to grant variances.
8
3
Because the PCA is the successor to the WPCC and because
the PCA has the authority to control water, air, and land pollution,84 the variance power of the PCA arguably is applicable to
the water division as well as Air and Solid Waste Divisions. s
77. MIN. STAT. § 115.07 subd. 1 (1969).

78. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
79. A schedule by which a particular disposal system must become aligned with agency effluent standards.
80. The WPCC has issued 442 recommended schedules, 23 orders,
and 70 stipulations containing compliance schedules. Interview with
Richard D. Miller, Chief of Water Quality Enforcement in Minneapolis,
Minn., Apr. 1, 1971.
81. Mnm. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 2 (1969). This is also the PCA's
position. Interview with Jeffrey Jarpee, Special Asst. to Atty. Gen.,
Feb. 1, 197% in Minneapolis, Minn.
82. Mixx. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 5 (1969).
83. MNN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
84. MiNu. STAT. § 116.01 (1969).
85. A contrary argument may be advanced that MrNN. STAT. §
116.02 subd. 5, which transfers all powers and duties of the WPCC to
the PCA, is restrictive in its scope, so that the powers of the PCA in the
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The PCA derives its authority to establish the procedures
by which it regulates the licensing process from the WPCA 86
and the Pollution Control Act.87 Each statute contains a provision providing that the agency shall have the power to promulgate procedural regulations to effect its substantive powers. 88
However, the agency has only sparingly used its statutory power to promulgate procedural rules for the granting, modification, and revocation of permits and variances. The regulations
contain only one vague procedural guide in that anyone, upon
initial installation or undertaking modification of a disposal system, must submit his plans to the agency for approval.80 There
are no regulations which dictate when a hearing is required in
the licensing process.9 0 Although the WPCA contains a section 9 ' which may be construed to specify when a hearing is required for variance or permit application, modification, or revocation, 9 2 there is a complete absence of statutory guidelines for
the Air and Solid Waste divisions on the matter of required
hearings. With such vague standards the agency has been quite
flexible in determining actual procedures to be followed. Requests for permits and variances as well as negotiations for
stipulated orders and compliance schedules are handled informally through staff channels.9 3 Hearings on permits and variances are held only when the agency deems that the public interest level is high with respect to this particular applicant.9 "
There is uncertainty as to what procedures the PCA must follow
in modifying an existing permit when the agency upgrades its
substantive standards. There has never been a revocation hearing. 5 Disputes are settled informally, the applicant waiving
his "right" to a hearing in return for lenient compliance schedwater quality area should be determined solely by MINN. STAT.
§ 115. However, as a policy matter it seems unwise to have different
permit powers delegated to different divisions of the PCA where the
obvious intent of the legislature was to create one agency to coordinate
all pollution control efforts.

MINN. STAT.

§ 116.01 (1969).

86.

See note 83 supra.
87. MINN. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 3 (1969).
88. MLNN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969); MINN.

STAT. § 116.07(3)
(1969).
89. See Minn. Reg. SW 5 (1970); Minn. Reg. APC 3d (1969).
90. The PCA deleted from its regulations the hearing requirement
formerly necessary for granting a variance. Compare Minn. Reg. WPC
29 (1971), Minn. Reg. WPC 32 (1971).
91. MUNN. STAT. § 115.05 (1969).
92. See text accompanying notes 103-11 infra.
93. Lindall Interview, supranote 7.

94. Id.
95. Id.

ules.9 6
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Occasionally,

when

the

staff

disagrees

concerning

whether to grant a permit or variance, the Board of Pollution
Control Commissioners settles the dispute.97 Although the APA
requires that the PCA enact regulations establishing informal
procedures,9" the agency has not done so. This ad hoc approach
has resulted in a general vagueness as to what procedures must
be followed in the licensing process.
While this vagueness is not critical today, it presents potential dangers to the success of pollution control and to citizens'
rights in Minnesota. As a result of public concern over pollution and federal intervention, the PCA probably will begin to
enforce its substantive standards more stringently, granting permits only when the licensee is in strict compliance and revoking
them when repetitive violations occur. The more rigorously
substantive standards are enforced, the more important the procedural protections of a hearing will become to the applicant or
licensee. Moreover, environmentalists will begin to use the
hearing device to further their ends. Therefore, it becomes vital
to determine when a licensing hearing is required by statute or
constitution and what procedural rules will be and should be
employed for such hearings.
A. RiGHr TO A HEARING
1. Statutory Right to a Hearing
Since the PCA has no explicit section governing when a
hearing is required in air and solid waste permit proceedings9 o
and because the PCA in practice rarely employs hearings in its
permit procedure, 100 no practical administrative guidelines have
been developed on this issue. However, a rough guide as to
when a hearing is required by law as opposed to any constitutional requirement, may be ascertained by consideration of the
96.
97.

Id.
Id.

98. Section 15.0412 subd. 1 states that each agency may adopt
rules governing the informal or formal procedures, where § 15.0412(2)
states that "each agency shall, so far as deemed practicable," supplement its rules with descriptive statements of its procedures..."
Thus, there is some conflict within the APA as to whether the agency's
power to issue regulations governing its formal and informal procedures
is mandatory or at the discretion of the agency.
99. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
100. For a summary of PCA hearing practices see text accompanying note 93-97 supra.
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applicability of the WCPA requirements' 0' to the PCA and by
102
analysis of the regulations adopted by the PCA.
a.

Statutory Right to Hearing Within the Water Division

As noted above, the hearing provisions of the WPCA dictate
the stages at which the Water Division must hold hearings in
the licensing process. The WPCA states: 03 "No final order of
the agency shall be effective as to the vested rights of any person adversely affected thereby nor as to any disposal system
operated by any person unless the agency . . . shall have held
a hearing upon the matter therein involved ... " The statute
establishes two criteria, which, if satisfied, compel the Water
Division to hold a hearing: the agency action, when completed,
must be deemed a final order, and the person seeking a hearing
either must have a vested right adversely affected or must be
operating a disposal system.
(1.)

The Final Order Question

In order that the Water Division be required to hold a hearing, the action taken must result in a "final order.' 10° 4 A final
order has been defined as action which puts an end to the proceedings, affects substantial rights, and is appealable 05 Therefore, grants, denials, modifications and revocations of permits
or variances are final orders' 0 since: 1) no further agency action is contemplated after the grant, denial, modification, or
revocation of a permit or variance; 2) these actions'0 7 determine
the rights of an applicant or licensee to construct or continue to
operate his disposal system within the substantive regulations
established by the agency; and 3) the granting or revocation of
a permit is subject to judicial review. 0 8
101.

MINN. STAT. §

115.05 (1969).

102. Minn. Reg. SW 5 (1970); Minn. Reg. APC 3 (1969).
103.

MINN. STAT. §

115.05 subd. 1 (1969).

104. Id.
105. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 209 Minn. 67, 70, 295 N.W. 406,
408 (1940); Loochiching Co. v. Franson, 91 Minn. 404, 98 N.W. 98 (1904).
106. Some PCA officials contend that permits are not final orders.
They reason that MINN. STAT. § 115.03 refers to cease and desist orders
in a different subparagraph than permits and MINN. STAT. § 115.05
subd. 3 states that appeal may be taken from any final order or other
final decision. Therefore, the permit must be such other final decision. Interview with Jeffrey Jarpee, supra note 81.
107.
108.

1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 493 (1965).
MINN. STAT. § 115.05 (1969). The fact that the agency is re-

quired by statute to hold a hearing must be interpreted sensibly.
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Persons Who May Compel a Hearing Under the WPCA

The second criterion that a party must meet in order to
compel an agency hearing is a standing requirement. Only two
classes are granted a hearing under the statute: persons presently operating a disposal system that is adversely affected
and those persons whose "vested rights" are adversely affected.1 0 9
The grant of hearing rights to the former class (anyone operating a disposal system) guarantees a hearing to all applicants who were operating and continue to operate disposal systems built prior to the formation of the PCA in 1967.110 Therefore, under the statute all operators subject to revocation or
modification proceedings clearly have a right to hearing under
this standing requirement since they have a disposal system in
operation. Logically, then, those persons operating a water disposal system under a variance also should be entitled to an
agency hearing.
All others desiring a hearing must show that they have a
"vested right" which will be adversely affected by the final
order. "Vested right" connotes engaging in lawful activity until
the agency orders its cessation."1 Because the applicant for initial installation is prohibited by statute from operating a disposal system before obtaining a permit, it seems clear he has no
vested right which is adversely affected and therefore cannot demand an agency hearing under the WPCA.
Whether the environmentalists' right to a clean environment"1 2 is a vested right adversely affected such that a hearing
may be required under the WPCA is somewhat uncertain. The
ERA113 states that "in any administrative, licensing, or other
If an applicant is within agency substantive standards and there is no
question of fact to be determined, then no hearing is required because
there is no dispute. However, the granting of a permit is nevertheless
a final order.
109. I1wN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969).
110. Id.
111. Miller v. Johnstown Traction Co., 167 Pa. Super. 421, 428, 74
A.2d 508, 511 (1950). The Minnesota Supreme Court defines "vested
right" as "some right or interest in property that has become fixed or
established." Snortum v. Snortum, 155 Minn. 230, 233, 193 N.W. 304,
306 (1923) (dictum).
112. The Environmental Rights Act, Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 952, § 1
states that "each person is entitled by right to the protection,
preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other natural
resources...."
113. Minn. Laws 1971, CIL 952, § 1.
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similar proceeding ...
[Environmental Groups] may intervene as a party."u1 4 Whether this section of the ERA grants the
environmentalists the right to instigate an agency hearing upon
permit application depends upon the scope of the word "proceeding". Although it may be argued that the submission of plans
for initial application commences the licensing "proceeding",
and therefore the environmentalists may then request a hearing
if necessary, it is apparent that the term "proceeding" within
the ERA contemplates only formal hearings. 115 Thus, if an applicant for a permit has requested that a hearing be held, the
ERA assures that an environmental group may intervene into
the hearing as a party. However, in order for the environmentalists to compel an agency hearing in the first instance, they
must establish that they have a vested right adversely affected
under the WPCA. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that riparian land owners have a vested right that the stream
come to them in its natural state both as to quality and quantity." 6 The strongest argument for the environmentalists is
to expand this concept into one of a vested right for all persons
to a clean environment.
The policy considerations relevant to permitting environmentalists the right to instigate a hearing upon or prior to the
granting of any license depends upon the specific type of case
under consideration. In those situations where the granting of
a permit signifies that the applicant has conformed to the substantive pollution standards set by the PCA, it would be counterproductive to allow the environmentalists to instigate hearings in the licensing proceeding. Their objection would be concerned only with the substantive standards the PCA has
promulgated. 1' 7 To challenge these, appropriate means are provided in the rule-making hearing procedures."" However, in
cases where environmentalists desire to challenge the applicant's
discharge estimates, they should be given the right to instigate
a hearing upon initial application because it may well result in
administrative efficiency. That is, under the ERA, upon grant114. Id. at § 9.
115. This is apparent from the language of the act which allows the
environmentalists to file a verified pleading, which contemplates a
formalized hearing. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 952, § 1.
116. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 70 (1913).

117. It is possible to use the ERA as a private Attorney General
policing each permit that does not conform to PCA discharge standards.
However, the most effective remedy would be one suit against the
PCA, not intervention upon the granting of every unlawful permit.
118.

MINN. STAT. §

15.0412 subd. 4 (1969).
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ing of the license the environmentalists may sue the PCA on
the grounds that the "license, stipulation agreement, or permit
is inadequate to protect the air, water [or] land" 11 in which
event the court will remit the parties to the state agency to
compile a record.120 This will require the agency to hold the
hearing that it did not hold upon initial request by the environmentalists.
b. Statutory Right to a Hearing in Air and Solid Waste
Divisions
Because there is no requirement in Chapter 116 that the
agency hold hearings at any stage in the licensing process, the
Air and Solid Waste Divisions will be required to hold hearings
only if the statutory duty contained in Chapter 115 is found to
be applicable. The statutory scheme creating the PCA incorporates by reference the statutory duties of the Water Division:' 2 ' "The [PCA] is the successor of the [WPCC], and all
powers and duties now vested in or imposed upon said commission by chapter 115 . .. are hereby ... imposed upon . . .the
[PCA] ... ." Yet it is not clear if this imposes the relevant

hearing provisions of the WPCC on the PCA as a whole. Although in the interest of uniform procedure it would be advisable to have the same hearing requirements apply to the
whole agency, statutory construction clearly dictates that the
Water Division powers are delineated by Chapter 115, and Air
and Solid Waste by Chapter 116.122 In creating the PCA, the
legislature merely recast the WPCC, an independent agency,
into a division of the PCA. 12 If the legislature had intended
Chapter 115 to apply to all three divisions of the PCA, that intent would have been manifested. Instead, the clear implication is that Air and Solid Waste are governed only by Chapter
116.
Although the PCA does have the authority to enact regulations requiring that hearings be held, 2 4 it has not promulgated
any such regulations. Therefore, at present, in the Air and
Solid Waste Divisions, a hearing will be required only when due
process so dictates.
119.

1Vinn. Laws 1971, Ch. 952 § 10 (2).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at § 10 (3).
M1Vnw. STAT.§ 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
AMnN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
Mnm. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 3 (1969).
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ConstitutionalRight to a Hearing

As indicated in the preceding section, only those individuals
operating under Water Division discharge permits or variances
subject to modification or revocation proceedings have a statutory right to compel an agency hearing. Thus, an applicant for
a permit or variance in the Water, Air and Solid Waste Divisions and the permit or variance holder threatened with modification or revocation by the Air and Solid Waste Divisions
will have a right to compel an agency hearing only where constitutional due process requires it. Further importance is imparted to the inquiry because if the Constitution requires a
hearing at the agency level, even though the applicable statute
may not, then the procedural rules governing the hearing are
1 25
dictated by the "contested case" provisions of the APA.
The basic requirement of due process is that the individual
have a full opportunity to be heard and cross examine witnesses before agency decisions become effective which cause the
individual to cease some type of activity thereby depriving him
of a property right. 1 26 Thus, where implementation of the
agency action is stayed pending de novo review, there is no
deprivation of property before full opportunity to be heard and
1 27
therefore no due process violation.
Upon initial application for a permit or variance there is
no cessation of activity before the agency decision is subject
to judicial review because an individual cannot operate a disposal system without a prior grant of a permit 28 and therefore
under these principles, apparently no due process violation is
incurred by lack of an agency hearing on the issue. Therefore,
the agency need not hold a hearing upon initial applications in
the Water, Air or Solid Waste Divisions.
When the PCA upgrades its discharge standards, it is uncertain what due process requires in the way of procedures to
be provided by the Air and Solid Waste Divisions for modification of existing permits to conform with the new standards.1 20
125.
126.

MINN. STAT. §§

See 1 K. DAVIS,

15.0418-15.0422 (1969).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10 at 448
(1958).
127. See, e.g., Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281,
289 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
128. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 904, § 2(1); MINN. STAT. § 115.07 (1969).
129. There is also an issue as to whether the agency has the substantive power to revoke such a permit, the resolution of which depends
upon whether the doctrine of estoppel may be asserted against the
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Since the PCA is required to hold public hearings before it
promulgates new standards,1 3 0 the issue here is whether the opportunity to participate at the public hearing is sufficient due
process protection for the permit holder, or whether each operator is entitled to an individual trial-type hearing. The D.C.
Circuit held in American Airlines v. CAB1 31 that the Federal
APA rule-making procedural safeguards to which the licensee
was entitled prior to the alteration of his existing carrier certificate constituted adequate due process protection. Therefore
the licensee was not entitled to a hearing subsequent to the
promulgation of the rule. The state courts probably will hold
that due process is satisfied upon modification of a permit or
variance by the opportunity to participate in the rule-making
hearing.
When the Air and Solid Waste Divisions are contemplating
a revocation of a permit or variance, due process will require
the operator be afforded a full opportunity to be heard before
the order is to become effective because the agency is demanding cessation of activity it had previously sanctioned. 32 The
APA has partially obviated this problem in the provisions for
the review of licenses:
Where an appeal is taken or certiorari proceeding is instituted
to determine the right of a board ...

to revoke ...

a license

the term of such license... shall not expire until 30 days
after3 3final determination of such appeal or certiorari proceed...

ing.'

Under this provision, the permit holder threatened with immediate revocation has an opportunity for a full hearing by mandatory stay of proceeding upon application for judicial review.
state. The general rule is that estoppel may be asserted when the state
acts in its proprietory capacity but not when it acts in its governmental
capacity. Board of Ed. v. Sand, 227 Min. 202, 211, 34 N.W.2d 689, 695
(1948). The doctrine of estoppel will not apply especially where the
state action was taken pursuant to its police power to protect public
health and safety. Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312,
320-21, 24 N.W.2d 244, 250 (1946). Although there is a trend to apply
estoppel against the state even when operating in its governmental
capacity, estoppel will not bar government action where the public
interest is high and the state is acting pursuant to the police power.
Park Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 9 Wisc. 2d 78, 100 N.W.2d 571
See also 2 K. DAvis, ADmnsTRATVE LAw TREATsE § 17.04
(1960).
(1958). Under these principles the likely result is that the PCA does
have the power to revoke permits under such circumstances.
130. MINm. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 4 (1969).
131. 359 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 843
(1966).
132. See note 126 supra.
133. Mumx. STAT. § 15.0423 subd. 1 (1969).

1016

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:997

If the operator exercises his right to judicial review, therefore,

due process is satisfied because he will be accorded a full hearing before the order is to become effective. If the permit holder
has failed to avail himself of the opportunity to stay the order,
there is authority indicating that he will be deemed to have
18 4
waived his constitutional right to a hearing.
As a policy matter, although the Constitution does not require a trial-type agency hearing upon application or revocation
of a permit or variance, the agency still should afford a hearing in most situations. However, where, in the case of modification and revocation, there is a need for immediate cessation
of conduct which pollutes the environment in order to protect
the community from imminent danger, there is a necessity for
summary suspension pending an agency hearing.81
However,
in the case of denial of applications this public interest is not
present and a full hearing should be afforded. Moreover, the
alternative to fewer agency hearings is more judicial review.
Not only will this increase the burdens of the court system, but
more importantly, the courts, lacking the administrative expertise in the area, are less capable of adequately resolving the
substantive factual disputes that arise in licensing determinations.136
3. Recommendations for Legislative Action
The preceding sections have indicated that in the Water
Division, the Agency must grant a hearing upon modification
and revocation of a permit or variance. 18 7 In the Air and Solid
Waste Divisions, the agency is under no constitutional or statutory compulsion to grant a hearing in any licensing activity. 18
Environmentalists cannot instigate a licensing hearing in any
134. 150 East 47th St. Corp. v. Creedon, 162 F.2d 206, 210-11 (U.S.
Army Ct. App. 1947).
135. Due process dictates that where there is a high degree of danger to the public, summary suspension without a full hearing is permissible. See Reutzel v. State, Dep't of Highways, 290 Minn. 88, 186
N.W.2d 521 (1971).
136. The factual disputes often are of a very technical nature, e.g.,
the factual issue in one PCA hearing was the numerical value assigned
to K in the following formula, used to predict discharge levels: F = Fa
10-.0120KWD
Minn. PCA Hearings, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 41-

Q

182 (Sept. 22, 1969).
137. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 121-24 & 128-34 supra.
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division of the PCA.13 9 The PCA in practice has held only a
minimum number of hearings since the agency settles its disputes informally through stipulation and consent orders. It has
rarely denied a permit and has never revoked one. 14 0 To control
pollution more effectively, the agency will have to enforce its
standards more stringently. As it begins to enforce those standards, the procedural safeguards of the applicant and licensee
must be more clearly delineated. The legislative proposals that
follow are aimed at achievement of both these ends. The first
proposal reduces agency discretion in the granting of variances.
The second proposal requires that the agency hold hearings
upon denial and revocation of all permits.
If the legislature adopts the policy of requiring that
permits be granted only upon the basis of strict compliance
with PCA standards, then the procedures through which variances are granted must be more closely regulated. The legislature should enact a statute requiring the agency to hold a
hearing prior to the granting of a variance. To enact more
stringent substantive variance standards than the standards
now in force 141 instead of requiring a hearing would be impractical because the nature of a variance is discretionary. However, if variance hearings are required, environmentalists will
be able to intervene into the hearing as a party under Section 9
of the ERA.14 2 Conceivably their involvement in this role will
enable the presentation of arguments to the PCA against
granting the variance which the agency may not have considered. Further, to require a hearing on the provisional granting of a variance may have the practical effect of forcing the
agency to consider more carefully whether a variance is really
necessary in the particular case.
If the PCA begins to enforce its permit system vigorously,
the procedural rights of the applicant and licensee must be more
clearly protected by statute. In the Water, Air and Solid Waste
Divisions a disappointed applicant has no opportunity for an
agency hearing.143 Since the WPCA hearing requirements do
not apply to the Air and Solid Waste Divisions, the licensee
threatened with revocation similarly has no right to any type
139. See text accompanying notes 112-16 supra.
140. See note 95 supra
141. See note 72 supra.
142. Mn. Laws 1971, Ch. 952, § 9 subd. 1.
143. See text accompanying notes 110-11, 121-24 & 126-28 supra.
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of hearing at the agency level.14 4 This is an unfortunate result,
for the PCA, endowed with its expertise in the pollution area,
is the best medium through which technical evidentiary facts
may be ascertained. The uncertainty can be resolved favorably
by a legislative enactment stating that upon provisional denial
or revocation of a license an agency hearing is required.

B. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR LICENSING HEARINGS
Once it is determined that a hearing is required, the applicable notice requirements and the procedural rules to be followed at the hearing must be examined. What procedural safeguards will be afforded the parties will depend upon what statute, if any, is applicable.
The APA governs licensing procedures resulting in a "rule"
or a "contested case" involving air, noise, solid waste and, perhaps, also water. 1 45 Since the procedural requirements of the
APA depend on certain definitional distinctions, it becomes necessary to determine precisely how a licensing procedure fits
into this statutory framework.
0
The APA divides agency actions into two categories:",1
"rules," "contested cases" and by implication a third category
including informal actions that are neither rule-making proceedings nor contested cases. A "rule" is "every regulation, including the amendment, suspension, or repeal thereof, adopted
by an agency, whether with or without prior hearing, to implement or make specific the law enforced or administered by
it . . . . 14
A "contested case"'148 is "a proceeding before an
144. See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
145. The APA will govern water if it is held to control where it is
in conflict with the WPCA. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
This would be the desirable interpretation. As to air, noise and solid
waste, see text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
146. These categorizations are significant because they dictate the
procedural rules the agency must follow in a given agency action.
Therefore these distinctions are discussed in other sections of the note.
Specifically, for a detailed analysis of the rule making provisions of the

APA see text accompanying notes 18 & 61 supra. For an examination of
the contested case provisions in the formal enforcement area see text
accompanying notes 304-22 infra. Analysis of how all three distinctions affect the court's powers of judicial review is given with text
accompanying notes 397-402 infra.
147. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411 subd. 3 (1969).
148. Although the provision defining rules and contested cases (Sec-

tion 15.0411) limits its application to Sections 15.0411-0422, excluding
its relationship to Sections 15.0423-.048 which include the judicial review provisions, this should be viewed as a mere oversight since Sec-

tions 15.0423-.048 were enacted subsequent to the definitional section.
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agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are required by law1 49 or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing."'"
An agency action is,
therefore, a "contested case" if it applies to specific parties and
requires a prior hearing; and it is a "rule" if it is a legislative-type
rule of general applicability.151 An action which does not meet
the requirements of either the "rule" or "contested case" provisions is neither, and as a result is not governed by the APA.
This result is necessitated by the practicality of agency decision
making. The APA requires hearings in both its contested case
and rule-making categories. The many informal actions that do
not require hearings are therefore not governed by the APA.
The two definitional requirements of a contested case are
(1) agency action which determines rights or privileges of specific parties and (2) which may be determined only by agency
hearing required by law or constitutional right.15 2 A permit
confers a right or a privilege upon the specific applicant or
licensee, and therefore, in granting or revoking a permit, the
first criterion will always be met. Thus, any PCA licensing case
in which a hearing is either constitutionally or statutorily required will be a contested case under the APA.
As previously noted, 53 the Water Division, under the authority of the WPCA, is required to hold hearings upon modification and revocation of permits and variances. Therefore these
stages of the licensing process are contested cases. Because the
Water Division is not required by constitution 5 4 or statute' 55
to hold hearings upon denial of permits or variances, and because the Air and Solid Waste Divisions are not required by
149. The term "law" should include not only the relevant statutes
but also agency regulations, where those regulations are to have the
force of law. The PCA has the power to enact procedural regulations
which have the effect of law. Therefore, if the PCA were to enact a
rule requiring an agency hearing, it could be deemed a contested case
where the action was between specific parties. For example, the PCA
conceivably could enact a regulation giving a denied applicant the right
to demand a hearing.
150. M.u. STAT. § 15.0411 subd. 4 (1969).
151. For the distinction intended by at least two of the drafters of
the Model Act see Fuchs, Rule Making and Contested Cases, 33 IowA
L. REv. 210 (1948); Stason, The Model Administrative Procedure Act,
33 IowA L. REv. 196, 202 (1948).
152. MNN. STAT. § 15.0411 subd. 4 (1969).
153. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
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constitution' 5 6 or statute' 57 to hold hearings upon denial, modification, or revocation of permits and variances, 15 8 these stages
of the licensing process are not contested cases. Also, since
permits and variances are not of general applicability, they are
rules and therefore must fall within that third category not subject to the provisions of the APA.
There are two additional areas in the licensing process in
which agency hearings are not required. The first is upon initial application for installation or operation permits when the
applicant submits his plans for approval along with his civil
engineer's estimates of discharge levels.5 0 If the plans and
estimates meet agency regulations, then the permit is granted
and a contested case never develops. The second area involves
PCA inquiries pursuant to a complaint on a supposed violation.
Here the agency has the discretion to investigate and determine
whether revocation proceedings need be instituted before the
contested case sections apply. 160
Once it is established that there is a constitutional or statutory right to a hearing, the following matters of hearing procedures must be examined: notice requirements, the right to
present evidence and to cross examine, the right to counsel, the
rules of privilege and evidence, the rules of discovery, the rules
of intervention, and requirements of findings and record.
1. Notice
While Chapter 116 is silent with respect to notice requirements, Chapter 115 requires that 30 day notice specifying the
time and place of the hearing be served personally or by mail on
all persons directly affected by a final order. 161 The APA, on
the other hand, which clearly governs matters of air and solid
156. See text accompanying notes 128-34 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
158. Where the permit holder contends that his discharge is within
the upgraded standards, analogy to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) may arguably indicate that these modifications require a hearing. This hearing requirement would dictate that these modification
proceedings be classified as contested cases. But see text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
159. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMmnISTRATIVE LAW 127 (1965).
160. See Miller v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Comm'n, 340 Mass. 33, 162
N.E.2d 656 (1959) where an inquiry pursuant to a complaint from citizens on alleged violation by a liquor licensee was held not to be a contested case which allowed the agency the discretion to investigate
first and make a determination whether a formal hearing need be held.
161. MINN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969).
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waste pollution, 162 requires that "reasonable notice"'0 3 of the
hearing be afforded all parties, specifying time, place, and issues
involved. With respect to the proper period of notice, whether
30 days or "reasonable notice" is the more restrictive and therefore controlling provision 8 4 seems impossible to determine
apart from the context of a particular case, although 30 days
would likely be "reasonable" in most cases. The "reasonable"
time requirement of the APA arguably might be more suitable
to the licensing process because more time would be required
in a denial hearing where new plans must be made than in a
revocation hearing where the only data that need be obtained
by the licensee is a discharge test.
With respect to the contents of the notice, the APA in requiring notice of issues involved is clearly the more restrictive
and therefore should be regarded as the applicable provision. 0 5
The APA requirement of notice of issues is desirable for three
reasons: it will enable the parties to more efficiently prepare
their case; the hearings will be more organized; and the facts
that control decisions will be more fully developed in the record,
thereby facilitating judicial review. 0 0 Where a party has actual notice of an issue he will not be allowed to urge that proceedings be set aside for failure of notice. 0 7 Neither will failure
of notice invalidate an otherwise full and fair hearing in which
the objecting party has appeared voluntarily and has taken a
position on the merits of the controversy.1 0 8
162. It will clearly govern because Chapter 116 is silent as to notice requirements.
163. Mm. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969). "Reasonable notice" presumably contemplates a consideration of the individual case in assessing the
adequacy of notice.

See 1 F. CooPER,

STATE

ADm,STRATVE

LAw 277

(1968); Shroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (publication and posted notice inadequate in condemnation case where, although appellant's address could have been easily located, no attempt
was made to notify appellant other than the publication and posting.)
See generally 1 F. COOPER, supra, at 274-78 (reasonableness of notice).
164. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
165. Id. It has been held, moreover, that due process requires notice of claims to be investigated or litigated. See State v. Duluth,
Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 246 Minn. 383, 400, 75 N.W.2d 398, 410
(1956).
166. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 163 at 278-79.
167. State v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 246 Minn. 383,
401, 75 N.W.2d 398, 411 (1956).
168. The objector in such circumstances is said to have "waived"
notice. See State ex rel. Berland Shoe Stores, Inc. v. Haney, 208 Minn.
105, 292 N.W. 748 (1940); Peterson v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Minn.

455, 272 N.W. 391 (1936).
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The practice of the PCA seems fully consistent with these
requirements. Parties are notified of the time and place of the
hearing, the name of the hearing officer and the issues which
will be the subject of the hearing.' 09 The PCA has not utilized
its authority' 70 to promulgate procedural rules as to notice.
2.

The Right to PresentEvidence and Cross Examine

Although Chapter 116 is silent with respect to evidence
and cross examination, Chapter 115 provides that all persons
directly affected by a final order shall have the right to be
heard and to submit evidence. 1 71 The APA provides that in
addition to the right to be heard and to present evidence,1 72 including rebuttal evidence,' 7 3 there also exists a right of cross
examination. 17 4 Therefore, the APA should govern not only
air and solid waste but also water discharges. The PCA in
practice always affords parties the right to cross examine wit75
nesses, submit evidence and to argue issues.
These are valuable rights, not only to the licensee but also
to environmentalists who may intervene. 76 Where the question is estimating the effluent level of discharge, the issues are
likely to be extremely technical and complex and subject to
disagreement between expert civil engineers.1 7 7 Only through
an opportunity to cross examine and to introduce opposing expert testimony before the agency are such esoteric questions to
be correctly adjudicated.
3.

Right to Counsel

While the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is not applicable to proceedings of administrative agencies
since they are not criminal prosecutions, 7 8 due process has been
169. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
170.
171.
172.

See

MINN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969).
MINN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969).
MINN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969).
The

agency may use its experi-

ence, technical knowledge and specialized knowledge in evaluating evidence. MINN. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 4 (1969).
173. MINN. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 3 (1969).
174. Id.
175. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
176. See text accompanying notes 214-17 infra.
177. See, e.g., Minn. PCA Hearings, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant,
41-182 (Sept.22, 1969).
178. See, e.g., Angilly v. United States, 199 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1952);
Fallis v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595, 264 Cal. App. 2d
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held to forbid denial of the assistance of counsel in administramay result in an order affecting a party's
tive hearings which
9
rights.1'
property
The APA, Chapter 115 and Chapter 116 are all silent with
respect to right to counsel. In practice, the PCA never denies
anyone the assistance of counsel 8 0°
4. Rules of Privilege

Both Chapters 115 and 116 are silent with respect to privilege. The APA, however, requires that administrative agencies
in contested cases "shall give effect to the rules of privilege
While by its literal terms the selfrecognized by law."18'
incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment applies only to
criminal cases,' 8 2 it has been held to have effect in administrative proceedings.18 3 The self-incrimination privilege has in fact
been invoked and recognized in PCA hearings.18 4 While invocation of the privilege does not, at this point in the agency's short
history, seem to have frustrated it in gathering information at
hearings, it might be wise to amend the PCA statutes to 1in85
clude an immunity provision. The PCA, like federal agencies,
373 (1968); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.2d 199
(1969). See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 229, 242-43 (1970).

179. Brown v. Air Pollution Control BcL, 37 Ill. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d

754 (1967)

(cease and desist order of Illinois Air Pollution Control

Board). See also Note, Representation by Counsel in Administrative
Proceedings, 58 COLmV. L. REv. 395, 404-05 (1958) (suggesting that a
right of counsel may be inferred from a requirement of a hearing).
Cf. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 247, 32
N.W.2d 574, 579 (1948) (construing the word "appeal" to contemplate a
full hearing with a right of counsel). See generally Annot, 33 A.L.R.
3d 229 (1970).

Compare Haaland v. Pomush, 263 Minn. 506, 117 N.W.2d

194 (1962) (finding that there is no right to counsel in a rule makingpublic meeting, legislative type hearing).
180. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
181. MrNlq. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 1 (1969).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. 5 (in relevant part): "No person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .....
183. See 1 YKDAvis, ADInmTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 3.07 (1958).
See generally, Wiley v. Shanahan, 289 Minn. 463, 185 N.W.2d 523 (1971)
(finding the privilege applicable as respects individual questions
asked a party by the Minneapolis Commission on Human Relations but
finding that the privilege did not justify the party's refusal to take the
stand altogether); LIVERMoRE, MINNESOTA EvmENCE (Minnesota Practice Manual 22) 187-92 (1968). The privilege against self-incrimination
imposes restrictions on an agency's investigatory powers as well. See
text accompanying notes 227-49 infra.
184. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
185. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1971). A state may not, however, grant
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could by means of such a provision compel a party to testify by
conferring upon him immunity from prosecution.
All other privileges recognized by courts of law, including
those required by statute in Minnesota, 18 are also applicable.
Included among those required by statute are the attorneyclient, 187 the clergyman-penitant, 8 8 the husband-wife, 189 the
physician-patient, 90 and the public officer' 9' privileges. In
practice, however, the PCA has not yet encountered situations
92
in which such privileges could be invoked.
5.

Rules of Evidence

While neither Chapter 115 nor 116 deals with rules of evidence, the APA prescribes that administrative agencies need
not be bound by strict legal rules of evidence in their hearings,
stating that agencies "may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonable prudent men in the conduct of their affairs."' 8
1 4
This fully in accord with the general trend of state law.
However, in Minnesota, as elsewhere, 19 5 whether the general
rule is to prevail in a particular situation is "in part a question
of practical convenience and policy, and is affected by the charimmunity from a federal prosecution. See, e.g., Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1944); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2258
(McNaughton rev. 1961). But the federal government can grant immunity from state prosecution. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 322, 424-36 (1956); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2258 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
186. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1969).
187. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. 2 (1969). See generally LIVERMOmE,
supra note 183, at 120-23.
188. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. 3 (1969).
See generally LIVERMORE, supra note 183, at 126.
189. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. 1 (1969).
See generally LIVERMORE, supra note 183, at 123-26.
190. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. 4 (1969). See generally LIVERMORE, supra note 183 at 116-20.
191. "A public officer shall not be allowed to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure." MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. 5 (1969).
192. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
193. MINN. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 1 (1969). The language of this
section is permissive, suggesting that an agency may admit or exclude
incompetent evidence at its option. Clearly the agency is not required
to admit incompetent evidence.
194. See generally CooPER, supra note 163, at 379-404; 1 J. WImWOE,
EVIDENCE § 4a (3d ed. 1940).
195. See 1 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 4a (3d ed. 1940).
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acter of the administrative body and the question under consideration by it."'196 Some court decisions suggest that as the
nature of the proceeding begins to assume some of the characteristics of a criminal proceeding, i.e., where a violation by a
specific individual is at issue, the tendency to apply the rules of
evidence increases more stringently. 197 The freedom in the
agency to admit or refuse to admit incompetent evidence, however, does not extend so far as to enable it to exclude competent
evidence from the hearing. 198 Although the PCA has been authorized by statute to formulate procedural rules governing admission of evidence in hearings, 99 it has not formally exercised
its power. In practice, most evidence will be admitted. However, the opportunity to object to its admission is afforded200 in
order to assure that evidence not admissible in a court of law
will be recognized and accordingly given its appropriate weight.
Judicial notice of certain facts may be taken by an agency.
These include facts ordinarily judicially cognizable 2 01 and also
"general, technical or scientific facts within their specialized
knowledge. ' 202 With respect to either, however, parties must
be notified of the agency's intention to take notice of particular
facts. 203 In practice, the PCA has not usually taken such notice 20 4 but as the administration of the agency gains experience
and sophistication, it probably will do so.
196. State ex Tel. Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce,
174 Minn. 200, 203, 219 N.W. 81, 82 (1928). See Sabes v. Minneapolis,
265 Minn. 166, 173-75, 120 N.W.2d 871, 876 (1963). See generally Annot.,
36 A.L.R.3d 12 (1970).
197. The cases deal principally with the hearsay rule. See generally
Armistead v. Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (1957)
(proceeding to declare building a public nuisance and to order its destruction); Nelson v. Department of Corrections, 110 Cal. App. 2d 331,
242 P.2d 906 (1952) (dismissal proceedings against public employee);
DiMatteo v. State, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 130 N.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1955);
Annot., 36 A.I.R.3d (1970). But see Note, Administrative Law
-Evdence-Evidence Before Administrative Tribunals in Minnesota,
23 ADN. L. Rgv. 68 (1938).

198. See Walker v. Minnesota Steel Co., 167 Minn. 475, 478, 209
N.W. 635, 636 (1926) (dicta). Moreover, the APA provision that agencies
"may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and repetitious evidence" (MINN. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 1 (1969)) prevents them by
negative implication from excluding competent, relevant, material or
nonrepetitious evidence.
199. MrN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969).
200. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
201. Mumi . STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 4 (1969).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Lindall Interview, supranote 7.
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6. Rules of Discovery
While the legislature has given substantial investigatory
powers to the PCA, 205 corresponding provisions for prehearing
discovery procedures for parties are not found in the statutes.
This situation is typical of that in many other states.2 0 0 While
statutes granting prehearing discovery have often been proposed, 20 7 only Wyoming, 208 Arkansas 20 9 and Colorado 2 10 mention the word "discovery" in their general administrative procedure acts. 211 However, the California Supreme Court has
found that irrespective of the absence of statutes granting parties rights of discovery, the courts can fashion common law
rules of discovery where such appear necessary to "promote
fair hearings and effective judicial review. ' 212 Commentators
have suggested that the need for pre-hearing discovery becomes
greater in those proceedings in which sanctions having a punitive effect may be imposed, in which the agency is acting as an
adversary or the outcome depends upon the adjudication of
213
facts by the agency.
205. See MINN. STAT. §§ 115.03 subd. 1, 115.03 subd. 2 (1969). See
also text accompanying notes 227-49 infra.
206. See Note, Discovery in State Administrative Adjudication, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 756 (1968).
See 1 K. DAVIS, ADm NISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 8.15 (1958) (regarding federal agencies).
207. See, e.g., Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why
Agencies Should Catch Up With The Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960);
Note, Discovery Priorto Administrative Adjudications-A Statutory Proposal, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 823 (1964).
208. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.25(g) (1) (Supp. 1971) (applying
generally to license adjudications). See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.19(b)
(1)-(4) (Supp. 1971).
209. ARK.STAT. ANN. § 5-709(c) (5) (Supp. 1971).
210. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-4 subd. 4 (1963).
211. Note, supra note 206, at 795. However, in many states discovery (usually by deposition) is allowed with respect to certain proceedings such as license revocation proceedings (Id. at 804) and workmen's
compensation hearings (Id. at 814). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411
subd. 2 (1969) (workmen's compensation).
212. Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 476, 479, 421 P.2d 65, 67, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 219 (1966). In Shively the California Supreme Court held
that two doctors before the State Board of Medical Examiners in
disciplinary proceedings for allegedly performing illegal abortions were
entitled to prehearing discovery of certain statements by women and
were also entitled to the production of certain bills, letters and documents. The court emphasized the similarities of the disciplinary proceeding to a criminal proceeding (rights of discovery which were clear
from precedent): the agency was acting as an accuser; the agency has
the resources of the state behind it; and its action would be of a punitive character (disqualification to practice medicine). Moreover, the
court noted that prehearing discovery encourages full preparation.
See generally Comment, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1068 (1967).
213. Note, supra note 206, at 826.
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7. Intervention

Intervention in PCA enforcement and licensing hearings is
governed by the recently enacted Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act.214 Resident natural persons, the attorney general,
political subdivisions of the state, instrumentalities or agencies
of the state or of a political subdivision of the state, any partnership, corporation, association or organization or other legal entity having shareholders, members, partners or employees residing within the state may intervene. 215 The intervenor must
file a verified complaint asserting that the proceeding involves
conduct which has or is likely to cause "pollution, impairment,
or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources
located within the state. ' 210 Since an intervenor intervenes "as
a party" 21 7 his rights and obligations with respect to the hearing

will be the same as those of the original parties.
8.

Findingsand Record

While Chapter 116 is silent as to the record and findings of
the proceeding, Chapter 115 provides that the record shall consist of
a copy of any application, petition, or other material paper
whereon the action of the commission appealed from was based,
a copy of the order, rule, regulation, or decision appealed from,

214. MINN. STAT. § 116B.Ol-116B.14 (1971). MWN. STAT. § 116B.09
subd. 1 provides that
in any administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding
... any natural person residing within the state, the attorney
general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision
thereof, or any partnership, corporation, association, organization
or other legal entity having shareholders members, partners,
or employees residing within the state shall be permitted to
intervene as a party upon the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding ... involves conduct that has
caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruction
of the air, water, land or other natural resources located within
the state.
Contested cases are surely within the broad "any administrative,
licensing or other similar proceeding" language. Moreover, this phrase
is employed in another section of the Environmental Rights Act where
it is clear that a contested case situation is contemplated. MINN. ST.T.
§ 116B.08 subd. 1 (concerning "remittitor") provides that "If administrative, licensing, or other similar proceedings are required to determine
the legality of the defendants' conduct, the court shall remit the parties
to such proceedings." (emphasis added).
MynN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 4 provides only for intervention, by the
state or a person affected by a final order, in an appeal of the order.
215. MiN. STAT. § 116B.09 subd. 1 (1971).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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a statement of any findings of fact or rulings or conclusions of
law made by the agency in the matter, and such other statements, admissions, or denials upon questions of law218 or fact
raised by the appeal as the agency may deem pertinent.
In that the reference to findings is couched in nonmandatory
terms, it would not seem that Chapter 115 requires written
findings. The APA, on the other hand, requires that "[t]he
agency shall prepare an official record, which shall include testimony and exhibits, in each contested case. ' 219 The purpose of
this provision is mainly to preserve a record of the hearing to
assure proper judicial review. The APA further provides that
the final order "be in writing or stated in the record and shall
220
be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefore.
A statement of fact findings is required by the APA since "the
statement of reasons shall consist of a concise statement of the
conclusions upon each contested issue of fact necessary to the
decision."' 22 1 Since the APA requirements are the more inclusive it would seem that they should govern not only air and solid
222
waste but also water discharges.
The evidence upon which the findings are based must be
"ascertainable."' 2 23 Moreover, it is clear that the decision must
be based upon the evidence in the record 22 4 rather than upon
evidence obtained outside the hearing. 22 3 The current PCA
practice as to record and findings is to include in the record the
full transcript of the hearing, a statement of all evidence and
exhibits, the findings of fact and the final order of the agency. 220
VI.

MONITORING AND INSPECTING

The PCA has three statutory means of gathering information on disposal systems operating under license: (1) the right
218. MAm-N. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 6 (1969).
219. MimN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969).
Shorthand notes need not be
transcribed unless requested for purposes of rehearing or court review.
Id.
220. MmN. STAT. § 15.0422 (1969).
See also Bryan v. Community
State Bank, 285 Minn. 226, 232, 172 N.W.2d 771, 775-76 (1969).
221. Id.
222. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
223. Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 325, 19 N.W.2d 795,
799 (1945) (facts essential to the decision must be stated with "clarity
and completeness."). See also Bryan v. Community State Bank, 285
Minn. 226, 233, 172 N.W.2d 771, 775 (1969); Morey v. School Bd., 271
Minn. 445, 450, 136 N.W.2d 105, 108 (1965).
224. MINN. STAT. § 15.0419 subd. 2 (1969).
225. In re Amalgamated Food Handlers, Local 653-A, 244 Minn. 279,
70 N.W.2d 267 (1955).
226. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
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to request information from the operator relevant to pollution
discharges, (2) the right to examine books, papers, or records
pertaining to the operation of a disposal system and (3) the
right to enter upon the premises of the licensee for the purpose
of obtaining information or conducting surveys. 227 Despite this
power, the PCA's monitoring and inspection activities have been
restricted by practicalities.
A.

INFORMATION REQuESTS

The right of an agency to compel a licensee to provide information relevent to compliance and to enable the agency to
examine records has been upheld against Fourth and Fifth
Amendment challenges 228 for the following two reasons: first,
agencies have the right under the police power to assure that
the licensee's behavior is consistent with its rules; 220 and second,
the licensee has consented to these methods of regulation upon
obtaining the license. The only restrictions on requests for information and the right to examine records are that the inquiries be within the authority of the agency and the informa23 0
tion requested is reasonably relevant..
The Air Quality Division of the PCA has utilized its information gathering power in the form of a questionnaire sent
out to all air discharge sources known to emit over 25 tons of pollutants a year.2 31 The questionnaires were devised to enable the
agency to determine which disposal operators were in violation
of the standards. 232 Although the use of questionnaires is open
2 33
to criticism as an effective means of achieving compliance,
the practice certainly would be upheld as constitutional because the action was taken pursuant to statutory authority and
23 4
the inquiry was relevant to the agency's functions.
227. Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 904 § 3.

228. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).

See

229. There is no requirement that the agency show probable cause

in the form of suspected violation. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S.186 (1946).
230. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 653 (1950); State
ex Tel. Railroad & Warehouse Commn v. Mees, 235 Minn. 42, 53, 49
N.W.2d 386, 393 (1951).
231. Lindall Interview, supra note 7.

232. Id.
233. Approximately 75 per cent of the disposal operators have re-

turned the questionnaires. Id.
234. See note 230 supra.
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EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS

The PCA's right to request information and examine records is delegated by Chapter 115 for the Water Division2 30 and
by Chapter 116 for the Air and Solid Waste Divisions. 230 If the
licensee refuses to deliver the information to the Water Division voluntarily, the Agency can assert its subpoena power
granted under the WPCA. 237 However, there is no specific delegation of subpoena power to the Air and Solid Waste Divisions.
Possibly the PCA can infer the authority to use the subpoena
power from its stated statutory purpose, to meet the "variety
and complexity" of pollution problems. 23 8 If so, the PCA should
act to assure this power by adopting a substantive regulation
to that effect.
C.

ENTRY UPON PREMISES

The PCA is also authorized to enter the licensee's property
in order to obtain information or to conduct investigations. 2 3
This power is essential to the PCA in order that it may conduct
stack tests240 and gather water discharge data concerning its
licensees. Because of the Fourth Amendment mandate that
there be no unreasonable search or seizures, the United States
Supreme Court has held that even under a civil regulatory

scheme, an agency cannot search premises without the consent
of the owner, unless it has obtained a warrant. 24 1 However, the
standards that the agency must meet in order to obtain a warrant are less than probable cause and a showing of specific
knowledge of violation is unnecessary. 24 2 In practice the PCA
has always obtained a warrant if the licensee refuses entrance
243
to PCA investigators.
Despite the Agency's broad authority, its detection activities

are limited. The PCA system of monitoring and inspection of
discharges is on a complaint basis, a result of insufficient man115.04 subd. 2 (1969).

235.

MINN. STAT. §

236.
238.

See note 227 supra.
MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 2
MINN. STAT. § 116.01 (1969).

239.
240.

Minn. Laws 1971, Ch. 904, § 3.
A test to determine the amount of pollutants discharged into

237.

the air from smokestacks.

(1969).

Lindall Interview, supra note 7.

241. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (applied to business premises).
242.

Id.

243.

Lindall Interview, supra note 7.
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power and funds. 244 The Air Quality Division and the Solid
Waste Division are still in the process of completing state-wide
inventory surveys to pinpoint those who discharge substantial
amounts of pollutants into the air or operate land-fills. 2 "5
Although the PCA apparently lacks funds for a sufficient
number of inspectors, the real cost problem is the expense of
testing itself. Laboratory costs for scientific tests to determine
water quality and engineering reports to assess the structural
soundness of solid waste sites are high. The expense of stack
tests for air quality is especially prohibitive since a single stack
test costs between $1,000 and $2,000.2 41 To alleviate the problem, two methods 247 of shifting the cost of inspection onto the
licensee are proposed. The first is to charge a licensing fee for
granting the permit and yearly surveillance fees thereafter.
Minnesota law supports the legality of such an approach. 24
The second solution is to require yearly renewal of the permits.
Upon renewal the applicant would have to give evidence of
compliance which would require that he conduct the tests in
order to prove that he is within standards. This approach has
the advantage of allowing the PCA inspectors to utilize their
time investigating complaints by reducing the time required for
general surveillance.
Part 2-Enforcement Activities
I. INTRODUCTION
The enforcement procedures employed by the PCA to secure
compliance with pollution control provisions are pursued both
through the judicial system and through formal and informal
agency channels. The Minnesota legislature has established a
duty on the part of every person affected to comply with the
statutory provisions concerning water, air, land and noise pollution and to comply with all regulations, orders, permits and
standards adopted or issued to implement the statutory pur244. Id.

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Note, Air Pollution Control in Minnesota, 54 MMN,. L. REV.
953, 969 (1970). Also, the suggestion has been made that penalties for
noncompliance be substantially stiffened from the $100 fine or 90 days
imprisonment presently in force. Id. 974-77.
248. The Minnesota rule is that a license fee may cover the cost of
granting and inspection. Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 241 Minn. 439,
63 N.W.2d 585 (1954). The burden of proving that the fee charged is
excessive rests on the licensee. Id. at 589.
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pose.249 The PCA is vested with the power and duty to enforce
the laws relating to pollution, assisted by the Attorney General
249. MINN. STAT. § 115.45 subd. 1 (1969) provides:
It is the duty of every person affected to comply with the
provisions of Laws 1963, Chapter 874 and of Minnesota Statutes,
Sections 115.01 to 115.09, comprising the state water pollution
control act, as now in force or hereafter amended, and all regulations, orders, and permits adopted or issued by the commission
thereunder, and to do and perform all acts and things within
his or its power required to effectuate, carry out, and accomplish the purposes of such provisions, regulations, orders, and
permits.
MmNi. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 1 (1969) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of every person affected to comply with
the provisions of sections 116.01 to 116.09 as now in force or
hereafter amended, relating to sources of air contamination or
air pollution, emissions, emission facilities, treatment facilities,
storage facilities, and other means, operations, acts or omissions
causing air contamination or air pollution, or any thereof, and
with the provisions of every regulation or standard of the pollution control agency relating thereto.
It shall also be the duty of every person affected to comply
with the provisions of sections 116.01 to 116.09 as now in force
or hereafter amended, relating to the pollution of land originating from the collection, transportation and disposal of solid
waste or other means, operations, acts, or omissions causing land
pollution, and with the provisions of every regulation or standard of the pollution control agency relating thereto, and the
deposit in or on land of any other material that may tend to
cause pollution.
Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727, § 6, amending MINN. STAT. § 116.08(1) (1969)
provides in part:
It shall also be the duty of every person affected to comply
with the provisions of sections 116.01 to 116.09 as now in force
or hereafter amended, relating to sources of noise pollution,
emissions, emission facilities, treatment facilities, and other
means of operation, acts or omissions causing air contamination or air pollution or any thereof, and with the provisions of
every regulation or standard of the pollution control agency relating theretq.
The water pollution provision refers to laws, regulations, orders and
permits; whereas the air, land and noise pollution provisions refer to
laws, regulations and standards. Needless to say, in the absence of these
provisions, the obligation would still exist to obey the statutes and the
lawful acts of the PCA.
For the purposes of the water pollution laws, MINN. STAT. § 115.01
subd. 10 (1969) defines "person" as follows:
[T]he state or any agency or institution thereof, any municipality, governmental subdivision public or private corporation, individual, partnership, or other entity, and.. .any officer
or governing or managing body of any municipality, governmental subdivision, or public or private corporation.
However, for the purposes of the air, land and noise pollution provisions, MINN. STAT. § 116.06 subd. 8 (1969) provides that "person" means:
[A]ny human being, any municipality or other governmental
or political subdivision or other public agency, any public or
private corporation, any partnership, firm, association, or other
organization, any receiver trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal
representative of any of the foregoing, or any other legal entity,
but does not include the pollution control agency.
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and the enforcement officials of the several political subdivisions of the state. 250
The relevant statutes and regulations do not provide a complete picture of the enforcement procedures of the PCA because, in addition to the various formal enforcement measures,
the PCA has developed informal enforcement procedures to
deal with the myriad violations of pollution control provisions
which it constantly must handle. These informal enforcement
procedures are those actions taken by the staff of the PCA after
detecting a violation of a regulation, standard, order or permit,
but prior to initiating formal agency hearings or court proceedings. Such measures include letters requesting voluntary compliance, informal conferences between the violator and the
staff or the agency members at their monthly meetings and
stipulations with violators. The available formal enforcement
measures include formal agency orders after hearing and notice,
court proceedings to enforce stipulations and final orders and
civil actions and criminal prosecutions on the basis of detected
violations of statutory and regulatory provisions.
The PCA disposes of all but a handful of violations informally through the "twilight zone"2 51 processes of seeking voluntary compliance and negotiating stipulations.2 52 The PCA re250. See, e.g., Mnmr. STAT. §§ 115.03 subd. 1, 115.06 subd. 3, 115.47
subd. 1, 116.08 subd. 1 & 2 (1969). PCA enforcement duties regarding
cleaning agent and chemical water conditioner pollution and disposal
and reuse of abandoned motor vehicles are outside the scope of this
note. See Mlinn. Laws 1971, ch. 896 & 734.
For a discussion of similar enforcement procedures, see Comment,
Water Pollution Control in Texas (Part II: The Texas Water Quality
Board) 48 Tsjx. L. REv. 1029, 1071-85 (1970). See also Hines, Nor Any
Drop to Drink: PublicRegulation of Water Quality-PartI: State Pollution Control Programs,52 IowA L. REv. 186, 227-30 (1966).
251. P. WOLL, An
ISRAT
LAw, THE INFomvAL PRocrss at vii
(1963) (Woll's terminology).
[E]ven where formal proceedings are fully available, informal
procedures constitute the vast bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the administrative process.
252. This is consistent with experience in federal agencies: Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 35 (1941). See also W. GiT. oRN & C.
BysE,Ai
~sTRAgivE LAw 639 (4th ed. 1960). Cooper concludes that
[w]hile statistics are not available, the probability is that the
percentage of cases concluded by negotiation of an informal settlement is as high in the state agencies as in the federal agencies.
1 F. CooPsn, STATE AimamTURTmxTI LAw 292 (1965). Davis comments:
Probably the typical regulatory agency accomplishes more
through use of its supervising power than through use of all
other powers in combination.
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lies on the inherent power of an administrative agency to utilize
informal enforcement methods, for the Minnesota pollution control statutes provide no explicit authority for such negotiation
253
and settlement.
II. STEPS IN THE INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
The following steps constitute the procedures customarily
employed by the enforcement personnel of the PCA in seeking
compliance with the various pollution control provisions. These
procedures were developed in the oldest and busiest division,
the Water Division. As the activities of the Air and Solid Waste
Divisions have increased, they have adopted the same enforce25 4
ment procedures.
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIS- § 4.12, at 284 (1958). The
"supervising power" is defined as:
the power of an administrative agency to coerce a regulated
party by methods other than adjudication or rule making. It
is a concomitant of, an outgrowth from, and a substitute for
the prosecuting power. In some of the most effective regulatory agencies, perhaps nine tenths or more of the desired results are produced through exertion of the supervising power.
Id. at § 4.01, p. 233. Although the Attorney General's Committee Re-

port was quoted in the 1958 edition of Davis'

ADMINiSTmATVE

LAW

with apparent agreement (Davis was on the staff which produced the Report), by 1970 Professor Davis had second thoughts:
The statement never should have put administrative adjudication at the center; the lifeblood is informal procedures, but
informal procedures far transcend administrative adjudication.
Id. at § 4.13, p. 208 (Supp. 1970). This last statement was occasioned
by Davis' concern that many administrative agencies are abusing their
discretion through informal processes. See Id. at § 4.01 et seq.
253. The only statutory mention of informal enforcement procedures
in the administrative process is found in the state APA:
Informal disposition may also be made of any contested case by
stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order or default.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969).
The ERA clearly recognizes the informal
enforcement process insofar as it results in a stipulation by making the
violation of a "stipulation agreement" of the PCA subject to an enforcement suit. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 subd. 1 (1971).
However, actions
are not allowable for conduct taken in compliance with stipulation agreements. Id. The ERA also provides for challenges of stipulation agreements in district court. Id. at § 10 (1). The Governor's Committee on
Air Resources recommended to the legislature in 1966 that
[tihe agency should be directed to use all available means of
persuasion, conciliation, and informal contact to achieve compliance before resorting to enforcement procedures.
Minnesota Governor's Committee on Air Resources, Minnesota Air
Pollution 27 (1966).
254. Telephone interviews with Edward Wiik, Director, Division of
Air Quality, PCA, in Minneapolis, November 8, 1971; G. Blaine Seaborn, Chief, Enforcement Section, Division of Solid Waste, PCA, in
Minneapolis, November 3, 1971.
TREATSE
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LETTEis REQUESTING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE

Upon report or detection of a violation 255 the PCA staff
usually issues a letter to the suspected polluter.2 5 6 Typically
the letter informs the recipient of the provision violated and
requests that corrective action be taken. It may suggest appropriate remedial measures and a compliance schedule and often
it subtly threatens future legal action if the warning is not
25 7
heeded.
These letters are used both where the violation is minor and
in those cases involving serious infractions. Where the violation
is minor, technical or inadvertent, the letter will probably be the
only action contemplated by the enforcement officers. However, where the violation is serious, the letter often will be only
the first step in a continuing effort to arrive at a mutually
agreeable solution. The former category generally consists of
PCA responses to complaints about motor vehicle exhaust vio-

lations25 8 and cases of individual septic tank pollutio. 2 59 While
the PCA considers the aggregate of such violations to be a serious problem, given the present staff and budget shortages,
minor individual violations are of a lower priority than pollu255. A polluter may be in violation of regulations, standards, permit provisions, stipulations or orders as described in Part 1 supra.
256. Of course there may be some informal conversation prior to the
first letter. This is particularly the case when a division of the PCA
is just developing its procedure. Apparently the Solid Waste Division
tends to do more conferring before sending a letter. Seaborn Interview, supra note 254.
257. Interview with Richard D. Miller, Chief, Enforcement Section,
Division of Water Quality, PCA, in Minneapolis, August 26, 1971; Interview with Robert J. Lindall, Special Assistant Attorney General assigned
to PCA, in Minneapolis, October 22, 1971.
258. Motor vehicle exhaust violation letters are sent in response to
complaints made to the Agency. The letter to the violator, or suspected violator, informs him of the date and place of the alleged occurrence and the content of the regulation violated. It asks that remedial
action be taken, and that the PCA be informed of such corrective actions. Three such letters were sent by the PCA during June 1971.
259. When the PCA acts directly in septic tank cases, it sends letters not to the alleged violator, but rather to the local government official having responsibility in the matter. The approximately 100 septic
tank complaints received by the PCA in a year are handled in this
manner if an investigation by Department of Health personnel pursuant to an interdepartmental agreement shows that there is a violation.
The letter to the town, county or municipal officials informs them of the
nature of the complaint received by the Agency, the provisions being
violated and the need for cooperation in achieving corrective action.
Telephone Interview with William Sachleben, Section of Enforcement,
Division of Water Quality, PCA, in Minneapolis, Minn., Nov. 8, 1971.
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tion by industrial plants and municipalities. 200 Minor, technical
or inadvertant violations by an industry or municipality are
handled similarly, particularly in cases where the violator is
261
willing to cooperate.
In the latter category, involving more serious violations by
an industry or municipality, the letter generally is only the
beginning of the negotiation process. In effect, it serves as notice of the violation. Even though the violator might indicate
his willingness to take corrective measures at this point, when
the violation is serious or the needed abatement program is complex, the enforcement officials in the water pollution area generally require him to agree to a stipulation rather than depend
262
solely upon his good intentions to comply.
The staff frequently sends a second letter to the recalcitrant
violator, phrased in stronger language and with more emphasis
on the possibility of formal legal action. 263 This letter also may
include a proposed stipulation, particularly when the violation
26 4
is obvious and the remedy simple.
The success of these letters is difficult to estimate, since the
PCA compiles no record of their number or effect. 2 5 The letters alleging serious violations play an unidentified role in the
entire negotiation process and their individual effect is impossible to ascertain. In cases of individual and minor industrial or
municipal violations (where the letter is the only action taken
by the PCA), it would be a waste of the PCA's limited time and
260. Interview with Robert J. Lindall, Special Assistant Attorney
General assigned to the PCA, in Minneapolis, August 26, 1971; Miller In-

terview, supra note 257.
261. Lindall Interview, supra note 260; Miller Interview, supra
note 257. In the case of the less serious violations, the PCA may recommend a compliance schedule in this letter. Telephone interview with
Richard Kable, Section of Enforcement, Division of Water Quality, PCA,
in Minneapolis, November 8, 1971.
262. Miller Interview, supra note 257.
263. Lindall Interview, supra note 260; Miller Interview, supra note
257.
264. Miller Interview, supra note 257.
265. The PCA correspondence for the month of June 1971 includes more than 20 enforcement letters sent to various types of violators for many kinds of violations-private motorists for exhaust violations; farmers for potentially hazardous feedlot runoffs; grain elevator operators for excessive airborne chaff; railroads for running noisy
and odorous diesel engines and illegal trash dumping; landfill operators for improper burning and packing; municipalities for improper snow
disposal and drainage of treatment ponds; and a large industrial plant
for several uncontrolled waste disposal practices.
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personnel resources to attempt to find out in each case what
corrective action was taken 0 0 and hence there is generally no
way of knowing whether the letter achieved its objective. However, to the extent that the letter requesting voluntary compliance is in fact successful, it is surely the cheapest and most efficient of the PCA's means of enforcement.
B.

INFOIaMAL MEE

GS WTH THE

PCA STAFF

The second step in the PCA's informal enforcement procedure is a meeting between the violators and the staff of the
appropriate division. Typically the staff summons the polluter
to Agency offices in Minneapolis to confer about the detected
violation. Here again, in cases involving inadvertant or technical violations, the meeting may be sufficient to achieve the
voluntary compliance and thereby terminate the enforcement
process. In most cases, however, the meeting is the preliminary
negotiation for drafting the terms of a stipulation acceptable to
both sides. The conference serves to clarify the nature of the
violation, to detail the steps the staff considers necessary to
remedy it and to inform the staff of the problems anticipated
2 67
by the violator.
266. Many of the PCA regulations require monthly reports. Minn.
Reg. WPC 10(c)(2), 11(c) (8), 12(c) (11), 13(c) (10), 15(c) (14), 16(c)(2),
17(c) (2), 18(c), 19(c), 20(c), 21(c), 23(g), 26(d), 27(d), 28(d), 29(d),
30(d) and 31(d) (most of the water pollution control regulations);
Minn. Reg. SW 6(2)(s)(6), 6(5), 7(5) and 8(6) (solid waste regulations);
Minn. Reg. APC 3 (d) (air pollution regulations-at the discretion of the
Director). However, compliance with the report requirements is less
than satisfactory. For example, by June 1970, 124 municipal treatment

plants were reporting monthly and 320 were not; 72 industrial sources
were reporting monthly, 13 seasonally, and 855 were not reporting at
all Creative Research Services, Inc., Progress Report on Water Pollution Control in Minnesota: January 1969-October 1970 in 1 Progress
Report Biennial Programand Long-Range Plan for Water Pollution Control at 24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Progress Report]. Obviously the
PCA is not able to rely upon the reporting requirement (which does not
apply to all polluters in any event) for information regarding the effect
of enforcement letters. Nor does the agency have the personnel to
inspect even the major sources of water pollution on a frequent basis.
For example, in fiscal 1970 the PCA inspected 217 municipal treatment
plants and 50 industrial sources, but did not inspect 257 municipal and
890 industrial sources. Id.
267. Lindall Interview, supra note 260; Miller Interview, supra
note 257. Miller made the rough estimate that such meetings are about
90% successful in achieving agreement to a stipulation. Id. Meetings
between a representative of the violator and the staff also may be arranged at the instigation of a violator desiring to alter an existing stipu-
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The success of these informal meetings is difficult to ascertain. Certainly the conferences serve an important function in
convincing the violator of his unlawful activities and in moving
the parties toward an agreement. The actual frequency of such
meetings is uncertain. An examination of the correspondence
of the PCA during the month of June 1971 reveals that the
which
staff requested meetings with nine violators, eight 20 of
8
involved water quality violations and one air pollution.
C.

INFORMAL APPEARANCES BEFORE THE AGENCY

A violator may wish to appear before the nine agency members at their monthly meeting in order to "appeal" staff decisions regarding his activities, or perhaps merely to justify the
violation. The violator may seek a variance from the regula269
tions or demand a formal hearing.
This informal appearance before the Agency differs from a
formal hearing in that there is no notice, no transcript and, of
course, no formal rules of evidence and procedure. Moreover,
the result does not constitute a final order. An examination of
the minutes of the PCA monthly meetings for the first eight
months of 1971 indicates that most appearances are made by
municipalities seeking to support a request for a time extension.
Such requests are generally granted, 27 0 although a personal appearance by a suspected polluter rarely results in Agency re2 71
versal of actions recommended by the PCA staff.
lation.

For example, he may wish to change some aspect of the agreed

remedy or seek staff approval of a time extension. Id.
268. During this same month when nine meetings were sought, over
20 initial enforcement letters were sent. See note 266 supra. June's
correspondence also shows that approximately 20 stipulations and
changes in stipulations were sent to violators for their signatures, while
about 25 discontinuance and abatement orders and orders to comply
were sent. See text accompanying notes 304-22 infra.
269. Lindall Interview, supra note 260.
270. A survey of the PCA Minutes from January through August
1971 [hereinafter cited as PCA Minutes] shows that more than 15 representatives of violating municipalities or industries appeared at Agency
meetings. At least 10 requested and received time extensions. Two
mayors were refused extensions and a third such request was held in
abeyance. Two other mayors appeared in order to request formal
hearings. Minutes of the monthly Agency meetings are available for inspection at the PCA offices in Minneapolis.
271. It does not appear that any of the actions taken by the
Agency members as discussed in note 270 supra were reversals of
staff recommendations.
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D. SIP=ULATIONS 272
Stipulations are the final step in the informal enforcement
process. A stipulation may be simply the formal embodiment of
a voluntary compliance agreement where, for example, the violator wishes to comply but the violation requires complex remedial steps. In such "friendly" stipulations, the process of negotiation is merely intended to achieve mutually agreeable terms
and time schedules. However, in the more strongly contested
situations the agreement often results only after threats of im27 3
pending formal enforcement actions.
The standard stipulation is composed of three major parts.
The first consists of a list of "whereas" clauses reciting the obligation of the PCA to control pollution, 74 the duty of all persons to obey pollution control provisions, 27 5 the specific regulation or other provision violated,2 7 6 the noncompliance of the
party to the regulation,2 77 the agreement to take certain re272. The term "stipulation" is used here rather than "consent order"
to conform with the PCA's usage.

273. See Davis' definition of "supervising power" at note 252
supra. See also text accompanying notes 302-03 infra.
274. E.g., a water pollution stipulation of April 17, 1970 between the

PCA and a city [hereinafter cited as WQ Stipulation):
WHEREAS, the Pollution Control Agency of the state of Min-

nesota, hereinafter referred to as the Agency. is vested with

the responsibility of abating and controlling pollution, grouping
the waters of the State into classes, and adopting classifications
and standards of purity and quality therefor...
A similar clause from a solid waste stipulation with a village [hereinafter SW Stipulation]:
WHEREAS, the [PCA] .

.

. is vested with the responsibility of

abating and controlling pollution and adopting standards and
regulations for the collection, transportation, and disposal of
solid waste and the prevention, abatement, and control of water,
air and land pollution which may be related thereto, and the
deposit in or on land of any other material that may tend to
cause pollution. ...

275. See. e.g., SW Stipulation, supranote 274:
WHEREAS. it is the duty of every person to do and perform
all acts and things within his or its power required to effectuate, carry out, and accomplish the provisions of Minnesota Statutes 1969, Chanters 115 and 116, and the regulations, orders and
permits issued by said Agency....
276. See. e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:
WHEREAS, the Agency, after due and legal notice and hearing
thereon, in the matter entitled 'Standards of Quality and Purity
for Effluents Discharged to Intrastate Waters.' (Regulation
WPC 23) adopted and established effluent standards relating to
said waters.
277. See. e.g., id.:
WHEREAS, the City... is not in compliance with said standards in that its existing secondary treatment facilities are inadequate....
Similarly, SW Stipulation, supra note 274 provides:
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medial steps in exchange for freedom from PCA legal action, 27 8
and the need for time to correct the violative behavior. 27 9 Second, the stipulation describes the measures to be taken by the
violator to correct the violation, the technical criteria to be met
and the time schedule for the completion of the various stages of
the task. 280 Third, several clauses provide for time extensions
WHEREAS, the Village ... is presently and has in the past
conducted a solid waste facility which does not conform with
solid waste regulations of the Agency ...
In his discussion of § 9 (d) of the Revised Model State Act of Administrative Procedure (set out at note 253 supra), which is almost identical to MINN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1969), Cooper comments:
The breadth of this language, hopefully, may help to discourage,
any tendency on the part of agencies to insist that as a condition of settlement the respondent must admit a violation of law.
1 F. COOPER, supra note 252, at 292. This tendency is to be discouraged
because it is often the case that a party will enter into a stipulation, but
will not admit his guilt. Id.
278. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:
WHEREAS, the City in consideration for the Agency not initiating any of its statutory procedures for the abatement of the
pollution or noncompliance of the City with said Standards of
Quality and Purity, agrees to institute and complete a voluntary
program to eliminate said noncompliance...
In SW Stipulation, supra note 274, in exchange for Agency agreement,
the Village:
[A]grees to voluntarily cease operation of said [solid waste]
facility and so modify the site as to prevent the general public
from further using the facility for disposal of solid waste ....
279. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:
WHEREAS, the City needs a period of time to correct such
noncompliance and whereas the Agency recognizes the necessity for such additional time...
280. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, id.:
NOW THEREFORE, for the purpose of eliminating such noncompliance, it is hereby agreed and stipulated between the
parties hereto, that the City and Agency will accomplish the
following procedures:
1. The City will by May 30, 1970 retain an engineering consultant to prepare a design engineering report to serve as a
basis for improving or replacing its existing inadequate secondary treatment facilities. Said secondary treatment facilities
shall be designed to provide one hundred eighty days storage
and controlled release. Effluent shall be released only during
periods of adequate stream flow and in such a manner as to
maintain applicable water quality standards and to produce an
effluent having the following limiting concentrations:
Coliform Group Organisms 1,000 Most Probable number per
100 milliliters (MPN/100 ml)
5-day Biochemical Oxygen
Demand
Suspended Solids
Unspecified toxic or
corrosive substances

25 milligrams per liter (mg/l)
30 mg/l
None at levels acutely toxic to humans or other animals or plant life,
or directly damaging to real property.
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when there is unavoidable delay,2 ' reserve the right of the
2. In the event that the City should desire to maintain a continuous discharge to Buffalo Creek in lieu of providing secondary treatment works with 180 days storage and controlling release, the City shall provide secondary treatment works capable
of producing an effluent having the following limiting concentrations:
Coliform Group Organisms 1,000 MPNI100 ml
5-day Biochemical Oxygen 5 mg/1
Demand
Suspended Solids
5 mg/1
Unspecified toxic or
None at levels acutely toxic to hucorrosive substances
mans or other animals or plant life,
or directly damaging to real property.
3. Without regard to whether it determines to employ a 180-day
storage concept pursuant to paragraph 1, above, or a continuous
discharge concept pursuant to paragraph 2, above, the City will
submit a design engineering report complying with either of
said paragraphs to the Agency for approval, by November 30,
1970.
4. The Agency will review and comment on said engineering
report, by December 31, 1970.
5. The City will file a Federal Water Quality Administration
Grant application to the Agency, by January 31, 1971.
6. The City shall submit construction plans and specifications
pursuant to said engineering report to the Agency by May 31,
1971.
7. Assuming the adequacy of such construction plans and specifications, the Agency will grant approval thereof, by June
30, 1971.
8. The City will receive bids and award contracts for construction of said improved or new secondary treatment facilities, by July 31, 1971.
9. The City will complete construction of said facilities and
place them in operation, by November 30, 1972.
The corresponding part of SW Stipulation, supra note 274, calls for the
following actions:
By November 30, 1971, the Village is to stockpile earthen fill, notify
the public of the discontinuation of the disposal area, solicit bids for
collection service contracts, and complete a rat eradication program.
By December 15, 1971, the Village is to close access to the site and
further advise the public of its closing, and complete covering the site
with six inches of clean earth.
After December 1, 1971 the Village is to transport solid waste to
an approved facility.
By January 1, 1972, the Village is to file with the County Register
of Deeds a notice describing the extent of the use of the land as a solid
waste disposal site.
By July 1, 1972, the Village is to complete a 'Disposal Site Closure
Record" and file it with the PCA.
281. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:
IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND STIPULATED between the
parties hereto that the schedule set forth above shall be extended by any period of time by which, after the date of this
stipulation, said schedules are delayed because of approval required by any federal, state or local governmental agencies other
than the Pollution Control Agency. In the event that the City
cannot comply with the foregoing time schedules due to circumstances beyond the control of the City or its engineering con-
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Agency to take legal action if the violator fails to perform the
agreement, 28 2 recite that the stipulation shall not affect the liability of the violator for damages arising from its performance
or non-performance, 28 3 and reserve the right of the PCA to
make further regulations in the future if the need arises.

284

Newer stipulations also contain a clause by which the violator
explicitly waives his rights to demand a hearing and to appeal
28 5
from Agency approval of the stipulation.
Once a stipulation has been accepted by the PCA staff
and the particular industry or municipality, it is submitted to
the Agency at its monthly meeting for approval. Rarely have
the nine Agency members rejected a stipulation which has
reached this stage.

28

sultant other than such failure to receive approvals of other

agencies, the Agency will grant extension of the time schedules
stated above by amounts commensurate for the delays involved
upon the City appearing formally before the Agency and proving adequate justification therefor. Should the City fail to prove
such adequate justification, the foregoing term schedule shall
remain unchanged.
282. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:

IT IS FURTHER AGREED and stipulated between the parties
hereto that in the event city fails to make timely compliance
with the terms of this Agreement, the Agency may avail itself
of all administrative and legal remedies, including, but not
limited to the obtaining of necessary injunctive relief from any
court having jurisdiction thereof.
Similarly, the SW Stipulation, supra note 274, provides:
The Agency agrees that it will take no legal actions for any of
the violations recited herein so long as the Village completes
the actions above specified.
The Village acknowledges that nothing contained in this Agreement shall operate to preclude or estop any future administrative or other legal action against the Village, its officers, agents,
or employees except as specifically set forth herein....
283. See, e.g., SW Stipulation, supra note 274:
This Agreement shall not be construed as estopping or limiting
any claims against the Village for damage or injury to person or
property or to any waters of the state resulting from any acts,
operations, or omissions of the Village, its agents, contractors or
assigns, nor as estopping or limiting any legal claim of the state
against the Village, its agents, contractors or assigns for damage to state property or any other violation of any pollution
statute, regulation, standard, permit or order.
284. See, e.g., WQ Stipulation, supra note 274:
IT IS FURTHER AGREED and stipulated that this agreement
does not estop subsequent establishment of further pollution
control requirements or the applicability thereof to the City.
285. See, e.g., SW Stipulation, supra note 274:
The Village hereby waives, for the purpose of this agreement,
formal institution of proceedings against them, the right to a
hearing before the Agency, and the right to appeal from the
approval of this Agreement by the Agency.
286. According to the PCA Minutes from January through August
1971, at least 41 water pollution stipulations and two air pollution
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The Air and Solid Waste Divisions only recently have begun using stipulations, whereas the Water Division has been
utilizing this process for approximately three years. At the
end of 1971 the Air Division had about 30 or 40 stipulations with
violators in effect; 28 7 the Solid Waste Division had concluded
three stipulations and approximately 11 more were under consideration by the violators;28 8 and the Water Division had more
28 0
than 100 effluent sources under stipulation agreements.
As of October 1971, the Water Division estimated that approximately 15 of more than 100 stipulations were being violated, five of them seriously.29 0 Standing alone, this data would
seem to indicate that the stipulation and enforcement programs
are moderately successful. Unfortunately this is not the case,
for there are many effluent sources which are not under any
compliance schedule, and there are others which are violating
compliance schedules specified in discontinuance and abatement
orders. 291 Many of the approximately 50 cases in which compliance schedules were ordered represent cases in which stipulations were violated in the past and in which the violator and
the PCA could arrive at no compromise 2 92 thereby necessitating
2 93
the employment of these formal enforcement procedures..
There are an estimated 1470 industrial and municipal sources of effluent in Minnesota. 2 4 A consultant's report covering
PCA activities from January 1969 through October 1970 in the
stipulations were approved. None were disapproved although there was
some disagreement on several of them. PCA Minutes, supra note 270.
There is nothing in the statutes which specifically states that the
Agency members must approve stipulations. However, the Agency
members probably should make the final decision regarding any settlement since they are vested with the responsibility for carrying out
the pollution control laws of the state. While the Agency perhaps may
delegate the authority to approve stipulations to the Executive Director,

Agency member approval is required if the stipulations are to have the

status of orders or variances. See MINN. STAT. §§ 115.03 subd. 1; 115.05
subct 1; 115.43 subd. 3; 116.07 subd. 5 (1969). Whatever the theoretical
possibilities, the uniform practice of the staff of the PCA is to seek
Agency member approval. Miller Interview, supra note 257, Seaborn
Interview, supra note 254; Wiik Interview, supra note 254.
287.

Wiik Interview, supra note 254.

288.
289.

Seaborn Interview, supra note 254.
Kable Interview, supra note 261.

290.

Kable Interview, supra note 261.

291.

These orders are discussed in text accompanying notes 304-22

infra.
292.
293.
panying
294.

Kable Interview, supra note 261.
Formal enforcement procedures are discussed in text accomnotes 304-76 infra.

ProgressReport, supranote 266, at 23.
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water pollution control area concluded that 58% of interstate
sources and 64% of intrastate sources were in compliance with

PCA regulations then in effect. 295

By October 1971 more than

560 of the 1470 sources were considered to be under compliance
schedules specified in letters, stipulations or orders. However,
computer data indicated that, on the basis of October 12, 1971
information, approximately 495 of these 560 sources would have
been delinquent in some stage of their compliance schedules as
of December 15, 1971, assuming no sources came into compliance
during this time period. 29 6
295. Id.

Conclusions drawn from this data

The Progress Report also lists 25 stipulations concluded

from March through September 1970, 12 of them with industries and 13
with municipalities. Id. at 16-18.
296. The Division of Water Quality keeps a computerized record of
the reported compliance of over 560 sources of effluent which are currently under some sort of compliance schedule contained in a stipulation, an order or a letter. Most of these schedules (60 to 70%) are
based on letters from the PCA to the violator. Over 50 of them are
specified in Agency orders and, as indicated in the text accompanying
note 289 supra, over 100 of them are stipulated schedules of compliance.
The computer prints out a master list of all 560 sources and a second
list of delinquent sources as of a specified date. Both these lists are
divided into three groups: interstate sources, intrastate sources, and
"UMREC" (Upper Mississippi River Enforcement Conference) sources.
The current printout is kept in a folder entitled "UMREC-Interstate-Intrastate Compliance Schedules" at the PCA office in Minneapolis.
The sources are listed alphabetically and under the name of each
one is a short description of the task or tasks to be completed, such as
construction of secondary treatment facilities, treatment works expansion, sewer system improvements, phosphorus reduction, etc. The
printout records the scheduled completion dates for each of seven stages
in the process of performing the particular task and notes whether the
particular date has been missed. The seven stages are: retain engineer, engineering report, initiate plans, submit final plans, arrange financing, initiate construction and complete construction. Of course, for
many tasks deadlines for some of these stages were never specified.
The computer printout from which the following data was drawn
was dated October 12, 1971 and predicted noncomplying sources as of
December 15, 1971 based on the assumption that no source would comply
between those dates. An examination of the data for the 106 interstate
sources and the 36 UMREC sources reveals that the interstate sources
were under schedules to perform 193 tasks, while the UMREC sources
had 44 tasks. If no source complied between October 12 and December
15, 1971, by the latter date, 80 of the interstate sources would have been
delinquent in 126 tasks, while 23 of the UMREC sources would have
been delinquent in 29 tasks.
A more thorough analysis of the interstate source data concerning
three of the seven stages indicates the following:
Stage
# sources delinquent in # tasks
(1. Assuming all reports had been submitted, as of October 12
the following were actually delinquent.)
Engineering report
30
38
Final plans
15
16
Complete construction
16
"
16
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must take into account two factors which operate to magnify
the number of significant delinquencies. First, despite the reporting requirements embodied in the regulations, many measures taken by violators to comply with their schedules are not
reported to the PCA and so are not reflected in the computer
data. 297 Second, many delinquencies are minor or technical and
may be due to causes beyond the control of the violator.
E.

ADVANTAGES OF IwFoRmAL ENFORCEMENT

Informal enforcement procedures offer several advantages
to the PCA. A simple letter to a polluter pointing out the violation and requesting that corrective measures be taken is clearly much cheaper and consumes less time than formal hearings.
The time and money saved may be used to pursue other more
difficult cases. Moreover, the lack of publicity involved in informal enforcement also helps to preserve the good will of the
business community 298 and of local political forces.20 0
Similarly, from the standpoint of the polluter, informal
processes are superior. First, they avoid the costs of formal
hearings and litigation. Second, quiet enforcement reduces the
unfavorable publicity harmful to reputation, an extremely important factor in many business enterprises. Finally, a polluter
might gain some concessions from a busy agency through the
negotiation process. This tendency will be most common with
an agency which is grossly understaffed and underfunded, since
(2. If nothing changed before December 15, 1971, the following
additional sources were delinquent.)
Engineering report
9
12
Final plans
Complete construction

24
4

"
"

38

Engineering report

39

"

50

Complete construction

20

"

21

5
(3. Total delinquencies by December 15, 1971, assuming that
nothing changed and assuming full reporting.)
Final plans

39

54

Because these figures include a mix of all compliance schedules, not just
stipulated schedules, the precise applicability of any conclusions to an
assessment of the success of stipulations as an enforcement tool can not
be determined.
297. See note 266 supra.
298.

Of course, if the good will of the business community is ob-

tained only by forsaking the interests of the public by the agency issuing
stipulation orders that deviate substantially from its rules, it is questionable whether the net effect will be a positive benefit to the public.
299.

See F.

CooPER, THE LAWYER

AND ADmmTRA=EVE

AGENCIES

136-40, 147-51, 160-65 (1957). 'Many tasks call for round tables and
unbuttoned vests, not for witness chairs and courtroom trappings." 1 K.
DAvis, supra note 252 § 4.12 at 284 (1958).
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the polluter would not be seriously concerned about the threat
of formal legal proceedings. 30 0

F. EVALUATION OF INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
As long as violations of the PCA regulations occur it seems
that some sort of informal enforcement process must remain
available. Formal legal action is not always the most efficient
method of conducting an enforcement effort. However, it is
equally true that informal enforcement methods will be most
effective only if stipulations are enforced and if sufficient examples are made of recalcitrant polluters so that the option of
voluntary compliance will afford a distinctly more pleasant alternative. At present most violated compliance schedules remain unenforced. Stipulations and orders embodying such
schedules have never been directly enforced by the courts in
Minnesota.

30 1

The informal enforcement measures of the PCA apparently
have remained free of the sort of abuses of violators' rights often
associated with such discretionary powers. 302 Therefore, it
seems unnecessary at this time for the PCA to develop rules
governing its present informal enforcement procedures. 30 3 Fur300. See F. COOPER, supra note 299. Further, acts performed pursuant to a stipulation agreement are exempt from suits brought under
the ERA, MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (1971). But the stipulations themselves may be challenged under the new Act. Id. at § 116B.10.
301. See text accompanying notes 347-48 infra. See also Hines, supra
note 250, at 227 (enforcement has been the major weakness in state
pollution regulation).
302. In the 1970 Supplement to his administrative law treatise,
Professor Davis said that he would call his fourth chapter "Discretionary
Power Unprotected by Hearing Safeguards" rather than "Supervising,
Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating", if he had
it to do over again. K. DAVIS, supra note 252 § 4.13 at 206. See also Id.
at ch. 4; 1 F. CooPER, supra note 252, at 125-27, 292.
303. Both Davis and Cooper recommend formalization of informal
enforcement processes, at least to the extent of putting them in writing.
See K. DAVIs, supra note 252, § 4.08 at 191, § 4.13 at 213, § 6.14 at 279;
1 F. COOPER, supra note 252 at 292, 316-21. Accordingly, Professor
Davis summed up his 1970 comments on administrative discretion as
follows:
American administrative law during the twentieth century has
moved through three stages-constitutional law of separation and
delegation of powers, judicial review, and formal proceduresand it has to go on into the fourth stage, which will involve
control of discretionary power without the safeguards of formal
hearings and without judicial review, because the first three
stages fail to reach eighty or ninety per cent of the administrative process.
K. DAVIS, supra note 252, § 4.22 at 242.
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thermore, to require more formality of the informal procedures
would inhibit the useful flexibility such procedures provide the
embattled agency. Formalization will remain unnecessary until
it appears that the public interest is not being served or that private rights are being violated in practice. It must be remembered, however, that it is always the violator's decision whether
or not to exercise his formal procedural rights before a stipulation waiving hearing rights is presented him for signing.
Clearly, if he does not like the agency's informal offers, he may
submit to formal procedures and eventually take his appeal to
the courts.
III.

THE FORMAL ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

A. DIsCONTINUANCE AND ABATEMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PCA
A potentially important function of the PCA is the issuance
of discontinuance and abatement orders when a violation of a
rule or regulation is found. Statutory authority to issue such
orders under Chapter 115 can be found in its power to issue discontinuance orders 304 and orders to prevent, control or abate
Still it is true, as Professor Davis wrote in 1958, that "lack of formality need not be the same as lack of safeguards." K. DAVIS, supra
note 252, § 4.11 at 281. Likewise, Professors Gellhorn and Byse have
written:
Procedural forms are not fetishes. They are means to ends.
The ends are correct determinations of disputable questions,
with safeguards against abusive exercises of governmental authority.
: : : There is no reason to suppose that public administration
through official agencies is incapable of developing professional
traditions and standards comparable with those developed by
public administration through the courts. [Footnote omittedJ.
... The emergence of new problems or new manifestations
of old problems calls for continued, courageous experimentation with new procedures, to discover those which are fair
and efficient in varying circumstances. It is here that the experience of life offers lessons: The formalized hearing is a
method of getting at the truth and of assuring justice: but it
is only one of many methods. No particular means is invariably synonymous with the fair result. No one device can properly assert a monopoly over the procedural virtues, and thus
debar efforts to build new, perhaps more direct roads to justice.
W. GEnoRN & C. BYsE, supra note 252, at 684-85. See also Public
Utilities Comm. v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966), where the FCC's use of informal negotiated
settlements was upheld against a claim that it denied due process in
rate cases.
304. The PCA has the authority to:
make and alter reasonable orders requiring the discontinuance
of the discharge of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes into
any waters of the state resulting in pollution in excess of the
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pollution.305 However, either through legislative oversight or
the assumption that Section 116.02 subd. 5300 would confer cease
and desist authority on the PCA with respect to air, land and
solid waste pollution, Chapter 116 contains no grant of discontinuance and abatement authority. This defect should be remedied by the legislature. Until it is, proceedings for discontinuance and abatement are limited to matters involving discharges
into the water.
Unless the issuance constitutes an emergency order, 0 7 a
hearing is first required. 30 8 In general, agency proceedings are
applicable pollution standard established under this subdivision.
MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969).
305. The PCA has the authority to
issue, modify, or revoke orders after due notice and hearing for
the following purposes when deemed necessary to prevent, control, or abate pollution:
(1) Prohibiting or directing the abatement of any discharge
of sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes, into any waters of
the state or the deposit thereof where the same is likely to get
into any waters of the state in accordance with the provisions
of Laws 1963, Chapter 874 and specifying the conditions and
time within which such prohibition or abatement must be accomplished;
(2) Prohibiting the storage of any liquid in a manner
which does not reasonably assure proper retention against entry
into any waters of the state that would be likely to pollute
any waters of the state;
(3) Requiring the construction, installation, maintenance,
and operation by any municipality of any disposal system or
any part thereof or the reconstruction, alteration, or enlargement
of its existing disposal system or any part thereof, or the adoption of other remedial measures to prevent, control or abate
pollution or to prevent, control or abate any discharge or deposit of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes by any municipality;
(4) Except as otherwise provided herein in the case of
municipalities, the provisions of section 115.05 shall apply to
proceedings under Laws 1963, Chapter 874.
MiNN. STAT. § 115.43 subd. 3 (1969).
306. MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969):
The pollution control agency is the successor of the water pollution control commission and all powers and duties now vested
in or imposed upon said commission by chapter 115, or any act
amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, are hereby
transferred to, imposed upon, and vested in the Minnesota pollution control agency. ...
This section merely confers upon the PCA the duties and powers of
the WPCC only with respect to water pollution, the subject area of the
commission's jurisdiction. The general powers contained in Chapter 115
were not conferred upon the PCA with respect to air, land, and solid
waste pollution. See note 346 infra.
307. MINN. STAT. §§ 115.05 subd. 2 (water pollution); 116.11 (air,
land or water pollution) (1969). Emergency orders are discussed in
text accompanying notes 368-74 infra.
308. bnlu.
STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969) requires a hearing prior to
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not governed by the same strict legal rules applied in a court of
law.30 9 Rather they are measured against the standards of the
"rudimentary requirements of fair play.13 1 0 That enforcement
hearings are more trial-like than rule making hearings 3 11 (yet
not as formal as court proceedings) is reflected in the applicable
rules of procedure.

Notice requirements,3 1 2 rights to submit

evidence and to cross examine,31 3 the right to counsel,3 1' rules
of privilege 15 and evidence, 310 rules of discovery,3 17 rights of intervention 318 and rules for findings and records31 9 all approach
but are not identical to those analogous rules in formal litigation. These procedures, as required under Chapter 115320 and
under the APA, 32 1 are identical to those required in licensing
3 22
proceedings discussed above.

B.

JvDiciAL ENFORCEMENT

When a polluter fails to comply with a stipulation or final
order or even in the absence of any such stipulations or orders,
the effectiveness of a final order. Except where an emergency order is
appropriate, due process will require a hearing prior to the effectiveness of an enforcement order since such orders are likely to concern one
individual whose procedural rights to present his own view will outweigh the public interest in summary action. See 1 F. CooPER, STATE
AZVusmTATP=rv LAw 135-60 (1968); 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 252, 407-512
(1958); K. DAvis, An1DrNaSrRAT E LAw TnSATISE 300-69 (Supp. 1971).
See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (trial-like hearing required prior to termination of welfare benefits of an individual). Since
both MVnm. STvT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969) and due process will require
a hearing except in emergency cases, discontinuance and abatement proceedings are "contested cases." See lwN. STAT. § 15.0411 subd. 4
(1969).
309. See, e.g., State v. Duluth, llissabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 246
Minn. 383, 75 N.W.2d 398 (1956) (Railroad and Warehouse Comm'n);
State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Ed., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942)
(local board of education); State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Ed.,
213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251 (1942) (State Board of Education).
310. State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Ed., 213 Minn. 184, 192,
6 N.W.2d 251, 258 (1942).
311. Interview with Robert J. Lindall, Special Asst. Attorney General, in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb. 1, 1972.
312. See text accompanying notes 161-70 supra.
313. See text accompanying notes 171-77 supra.
314. See text accompanying notes 178-80 supra.
315. See text accompanying notes 181-92 supra.
316. See text accompanying notes 193-204 supra
317. See text accompanying notes 205-13 supra.
318. See text accompanying notes 214-17 supra.
319. See text accompanying notes 218-26 supra.
320. MINN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969).
321. MInN. STAT. §§ 15.0418-15.0422 (1969).
322. See text accompanying notes 62-226 supra.
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the PCA may enforce the pollution control statutes and regulations in the courts. Although criminal proceedings may be
brought, the PCA, through the Attorney General and county
attorneys, have generally been content to pursue civil action.
1.

Civil Actions

The legal work of the PCA is performed by several attorneys from the Attorney General's office3 23 since the enforcement provisions of the state pollution control laws provide that
the Attorney General at the request of the PCA "shall bring"
civil actions as specified in the statutes.3 24 County attorneys of
the county of original venue are also statutorily required to
bring actions concerning air, land and noise pollution if so requested by the PCA. 325 The power of the PCA to require either
the Attorney General or a county attorney to bring civil enforcement actions is needed if for no other reason than that it
enables the Agency better to fulfill the responsibility to supervise the enforcement of pollution control laws. 320 Generally the
PCA relies on the legal staff of the Attorney General's office,
323.

Lindall Interview, supra note 260.

324.

MINN.

STAT.

2 (air and land)

MINN. STAT.

§ 8.06 (1969).

§§ 115.47 subd. 1 (water pollution); 116.08 subd.

(1969); Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727, § 7, amending

§ 116.08 subd. 2 (1969).

That the duty is mandatory is
clear from the use of the word "shall." MINN. STAT. § 645.44(16) (1969).
As a rule the Attorney General has the duty to appear for the state
"whenever, in his opinion, the interests of the state require it." Id.
at § 8.01.
325. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727, § 7, amending MINN. STAT. § 116.08
subd. 2 (1969). The Attorney General may assign such duties to county
attorneys as regards water pollution law enforcement under MINN. STAT.
§ 8.06 (1969).
326. See MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1; § 116.01 (1969). Interests of
MINN. STAT.

uniformity and of the most efficient utilization of expertise are also

important.

Morover, if the PCA requests the Attorney General to

take action, the expense is charged to the PCA budget, whereas if the
Attorney General acts independently, he pays the bill. Lindall Inter-

view, supra note 257. When county attorneys bring suits enforcing
PCA regulations, the same arrangement exists, although the Agency
may help defray the expenses of the local officials anyway. For example, the PCA granted $700 to one city for a suit against a tar company.
PCA Minutes, supra note 270 (meeting of April 19, 1971).

The min-

utes from January to August 1971 show that the PCA authorized the
Attorney General to bring suit against at least six violators. Id.
During the interim between state administrations after the November
1970 elections, the Attorney General brought suit on his own initiative
against a landfill which was violating PCA regulations. The PCA issued

a permit to the violator, however, before the case could come to trial.
Lindall Interview, supra note 257; PCA Minutes, supra note 270 (meeting of August 9, 1971).
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since county attorneys are not likely to have the expertise to
handle pollution suits and because the Agency and the Attorney
General's staff are accustomed to working together. 32 7 While
the Attorney General must bring an original action upon request, he has discretion concerning whether to8 appeal a trial
32
court decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
If the PCA does not act, the Attorney General apparently
can still bring civil actions on his own to abate water, air, land
and noise pollution. There are several bases for this conclusion.
First, the Attorney General is given the power by statute to
appear in state district court when in his judgment the "interests of the state require it." '3

29

Second, the Minnesota Supreme

Court has repeatedly ruled that the Attorney General is vested
with extensive common law powers beyond those specified by
statute.330 Third, the pollution control laws declare that pollution in violation of any provision is a public nuisance and the
Attorney General has been declared to have the power to bring
actions to abate public nuisances. 33 1 Finally, the Environmental
327. Lindall Interview, supra notes 257 & 260.
328. See MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (1969) (Attorney General's discretion
to appeal in general). It is currently the policy of the Attorney General's office, however, to seek PCA approval in important or unusual
situations. See Comments of Solicitor General John Mason to PCA
Members, Minutes of Meeting on April 19, 1971 (regarding the aupeal
in the Reserve Mining case) [Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, No. 05011, Minn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15,
1970, appeal filed, No. 43117, Apr. 22, 1972J.

329.

MrNx.

STAT.

§ 8.01 (1969).

330. See State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W.
269 (1907) where the court stated:
The office of attorney general has existed from an early period,
both in England and in this country, and is vested by the
common law with a great variety of duties in the administration
of the government. The duties are so numerous and varied that
it has not been the policy of the legislatures of the states of
this country to attempt specifically to enumerate them. Where
the question has come up for consideration, it is generally held
that the office is clothed, in addition to the duties expressly
defined by statute, with all the power pertaining thereto at the
common law. [Citations omitted.] From this it follows that, as
the chief law officer of the state, he may, in the absence of
some express legislative restriction to the contrary, exercise
all such power and authority as public interests may from
time to time require. He may institute, conduct, and maintain
all such suits and proceedings as he deems necessary for the
enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order,
and the protection of public rights. We have no statutory restrictions in this state.
Id. at 288-89, 112 N.W. at 272. See also Head v. Special School Dist.,
288 Minn. 496, 182 N.W.2d 887 (1970); Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn.
303, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Dunn v. Schmid, 239 Minn. 559, 60 N.W.2d 14
(1953).
331. See State ex rel. Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d
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Rights Act of 1971 gives the Attorney General authority to
maintain civil actions for declaratory or equitable relief in order
32
to protect air, land, water and other resources.
There are several situations in which the Attorney General
might take a position adverse to the PCA in a court action. This
could result if the Attorney General takes an appeal from an
Agency order, rule, regulation or other final decision, or if he
intervenes in another party's appeal in the name of the state. 8331
Theoretically it also could occur under the ERA which provides
that the Attorney General may bring a civil suit challenging
any action of the PCA. 334 Of course, should the Attorney General's staff ever assume a position adverse to the PCA, other
335
attorneys would be provided for the agency.
Civil actions are brought only infrequently by the PCA acting through the Attorney General or the county attorneys.
When litigation does occur, the remedy inevitably sought is an
injunction. However, other remedies arguably are available,
such as damages 336 and, in water pollution cases, the enforce33 7
ment of orders and stipulations.
Injunctions are issued pursuant to a number of statutory authorizations. Water pollution in violation of laws, regulations,
standards or orders, and air, land or noise pollution in violation
of laws, regulations or standards, are declared to be public nuisances and as such may be enjoined and abated. 338 Elsewhere
the statutes provide, without mentioning public nuisance, that
the various pollution control provisions are enforceable by injunction, actions to compel specific performance, or "other ap1 (1961); Goff v. O'Neill, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N.W. 316 (1939); State
ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269 (1907).

The

statutory public nuisance declarations are found at MINN. STAT. §§
115.04 subd. 4, 115.45 subd. 2 (water), § 116.08 subd. 2 (1969) (air and
land); Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727, § 7, amending MINN. STAT. § 116.08
subd. 2 (1969) (noise). To say that the law is clear on this point is not
to say that there would not be serious political and governmental
problems should the PCA and the Attorney General's office disagree
on a major policy question.
332. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 subd. 1 (1971).
333. MINN. STAT. §§ 115.95 subd. 3, 4 (1969). See MINN. STAT. §§
116B.03, .09, .10 (1971).

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.09, .10
MINN. STAT. § 8.06 (1969).

(1971).
See MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 349-351 infra.
See text accompanying notes 343-48 infra.
MINN. STAT. §§ 115.07 subd. 4, 115.45 subd. 2, 115.47 subd. I

(water), § 116.08 subd. 2 (air and land) (1969), Minn. Laws 1971, ch.
727, § 7, amending MINN.STAT. § 116.08 subd. 2 (1969) (noise).
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propriate action." 33 9 In addition, the ERA provides for civil actions for declaratory or equitable relief when any person violates or is likely to violate a standard, limitation, regulation,
rule, order, license, stipulation agreement or permit.340 An injunction requested by the PCA usually requires the violator to
comply with all applicable laws and regulations and to construct
appropriate abatement facilities.3 4 1 The PCA commences few
civil actions against violators and even fewer ever get to trial.

For example, during 1970 the legal staff of the PCA began approximately 14 actions for injunctive relief, of which only one

case actually went to trial (the state won).

Similarly during

1971 the state took only one case to trial, although several other

34 2
suits were filed.

When a polluter refuses to comply with a final order of the
PCA concerning the discontinuance and abatement of water pollution and does not appeal the agency action within the statutory time limit, the PCA may specifically enforce the order in
court without judicial inquiry into its validity. 34 3 In some of
the more complex cases this procedure should save time since
the PCA would not have to prove a violation of general regulations or standards as in a suit for an injunction brought under
the general enforcement provisions. Of course, failure to obey
the Agency order must be proved, but this should be more or
less a matter of easily measured technical criteria and deadlines
339. Mnu. STAT. §§ 115.47 subd. 1 & 2, 116.08 subd. 2 (1969).
340. Mlnm. STAT. § 116B.02 subd. 5, 116.03 subd. 1 (1971).
341. Lindall Interview, supra note 260. The same claim may be
made by the state in a counterclaim to an appeal from a PCA order,
rule, regulation or other final decision under 1INx. STAT. § 115.05 subd.
3 (1969). Lindall Interview, supra note 260.
342. Lindall Interview, supra note 257. At least in the cases which
did not go to trial, the initiation of formal enforcement steps proved
to be an encouragement to informal settlement. See Progress Report, supra note 266, at 21.
343. Mn'mN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 1 (1969) provides in part that if no
appeal is taken from an order, the action of the Agency "shall be deemed
conclusive, and the validity and reasonableness thereof shall not be
questioned in any other action or proceeding ..... " The usual period
within which an adversely affected party may appeal an Agency order
is 30 days from receipt of a copy of the order. Id- at § 115.05 subd.
3 & § 15.0424 subd. 2. The court is authorized to require the defendant in an action to compel performance to do all things necessary
to accomplish the purpose of the order. Id. at § 115.47 subd. 2. In the
case of an appeal within the statutory time limit the order is "prima
facie reasonable and valid." Id. at § 115.05 subd. 9. However the
court in an appeal has discretion to take additional evidence or to try
all issues de novo. Id. at § 115.05 subd. 7. See text accompanying
notes 103-06 infram
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which could be determined without difficulty on the pleadings.
Furthermore, the compliance schedule specified in the order
eliminates the need for judicial inquiry into the matter of proper
344
abatement.
Water pollution stipulations which have been violated probably could be enforced in the same manner as discontinuance
and abatement orders. Yet, conceivably it could be argued to
the contrary that since stipulations are phrased in terms of an
agreement they cannot be enforced as consent orders which are
phrased in mandatory language. In fact, however, stipulations
are essentially consent orders approved by the nine Agency
members in which the violator admits his violation and agrees
to take certain well-defined steps at the demand of the PCA
in order to comply with regulations and standards. 34 5 Moreover, by enforcing stipulations directly in court as consent orders, the PCA would avoid the task of proving the violation of
regulations in a de novo trial in district court. Furthermore,
since a significant part of the enforcement activity of the PCA
is directed toward encouraging industrial and municipal polluters to agree to a program of pollution abatement specified
by stipulation, the entire enforcement program probably would
be more successful if violators knew that the stipulations would
be enforced to the letter in the courts. Of course, in most cases
where violations of water pollution stipulations are minor, inadvertant or technical, the current practice of granting time
extensions or stipulation amendments is probably the most appropriate response.
Air and land pollution stipulations probably could not be
enforced as consent orders since only the water pollution control statutes provide authority for the PCA to issue and enforce
orders. 34 6 However, the air and land stipulations are admis344. But cf. MINN. STAT. § 115.047 subd. 2 (1969) which authorizes
the court to require the defendant to "do and perform any and all
acts and things within his or its power which are reasonably necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the order."
345. See text accompanying notes 272-97 supra.
346. Power to issue water pollution control orders is provided in
MNN. STAT. §§ 115.03, 115.43 subd. 3 (1969); power to enforce them is
provided in MINN. STAT. §§ 115.07 subd. 4, 115.45 subd. 2, 115.47 subd. 1,
2. The only exception to this monopoly of the order power held by the
water pollution control authorities is the power to issue emergency orders for air and land pollution provided in Section 116.11. See text
accompanying notes 159-63 supra. Whether the omission of reference to
orders in the general provisions regarding air, land and noise pollution
was purposeful is difficult to determine. In making its recommenda-
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sions of past violations and should be considered as evidence
in court actions when acted upon under the general enforcement
powers.
In practice the PCA has never sought direct enforcement of
stipulations or orders. 347 Rather, the PCA's standard procedure
is to seek compliance with the stipulation as amended. Should
this fail, the Agency either will proceed to hold hearings for the
purpose of issuing an order or will request the Attorney General to move for an injunction under the general enforcement
provisions.3 48 This procedure requires the state attorneys to
prove in court the violation which the defendant already will
have acknowledged in the stipulation. Since few actions have
in fact been brought, however, this clumsy method of formal
enforcement has not become a substantial burden.
Minnesota's pollution control laws do not provide an explicit civil penalty, nor do they specify any right to damages for
tions to the legislature, several months before the 1967 session con-

vened, the Governor's Committee on Air Resources discussed the enforcement of standards and regulations as follows:
Discharges into the atmosphere from any source in violation of
rules, regulations, standards or orders of the agency should be
prohibited. Civil and/or criminal penalties for violations should
be provided for. (emphasis added)
MinNESOTA Gov or's Comnrr=s oN Am REsouRcEs, MINNEsOTA Am
POLLUTION 27 (1966). However, the report next listed four conditions
under which the agency should be empowered to enforce "air pollution
rules, regulations, and standards", with the notable omission of orders.
Id. It may be argued that the variance provision of Section 116.07
subd. 5 and the emergency order provision of Section 116.11 allow the
implication that the PCA may issue orders in regard to air, land and
noise pollution as well. Additionally, Section 115.47(1) & (2) provides that the Attorney General shall enforce orders issued under the
water pollution control act (Mn-n. STAT. §§ 115.01-.09), or under
"any other" pollution law in force in 1963 or thereafter enacted. But
see the definition of '"pollution" in Section 115.01 subd. 5 which is
apparently confined to the contamination of water. It is interesting to
note that the ERA implies a power vested in someone to issue orders
concerning odors in the air where it provides that
"pollution, impairment, or destruction" shall not include conduct
which violates, or is likely to violate any...

order ... solely

because of the introduction of an odor into the air.
MnIN. STAT. § 116B.02 subd. 5 (1971). At the present time the PCA
has regulations concerning the "Control of Odors in the Ambient Air"
(Minn. Reg. APC 9 (1969) ) and the "Control of Odors from Processing
of Animal Matter" (Minn. Reg. APC 10 (1969) ). Should it be determined that air, land, and noise pollution orders may also be issued,
their enforcement presumably would be similar to that of water
pollution orders, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 343-45
supra.

347. Lindall Interview, supranotes 257, 260.
348. Id.
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past pollution. However, it should be noted that the general
enforcement provisions authorize enforcement of the pollution
0
control laws in district court by "other appropriate action"'
in addition to injunctions and actions to compel specific performance. The possibility that this language envisions a damages remedy for violation of pollution provisions should be considered by PCA enforcement personnel and the Attorney General. Although the PCA has never sought either compensatory
or punitive damages, 3 50 the addition of these remedies to the enforcement arsenal of the PCA would benefit the entire enforcement program by attaching financial penalties to delays in compliance with the relevant laws, regulations and orders.835
349. MiNN. STAT. §§ 115.47 subd. 1, 116.08 subd. 2. The language
"other appropriate relief" in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was held to contemplate injunctive relief in a case involving the fiduciary responsibility of union officers. Nelson v. Johnson,
212 F. Supp. 233, 288 (D. Minn. 1963). No case was discovered which
held such language either to allow or to exclude the damages remedy.
350. Lindall Interview, supra note 257.
351. Arguably, a suit for damages could be maintained under present Minnesota pollution control provisions. Violation of water pollution
laws, standards, regulations or orders constitutes a public nuisance.
MINN. STAT. §§ 115.07 subd. 4, 115.45 subd. 2 (1969).
Air, land or
noise pollution in violation of laws, regulations or standards is likewise
declared to be a public nuisance. Id. at § 116.08 subd. 2. There are
normally three common law remedies once a nuisance has been established: an action for damages suffered, equitable relief by injunction
and abatement by self-help. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 623-27 (3d
ed. 1964). Obviously self-help is inapplicable to enforcement by the
state; however the other two remedies should be applicable. Injunctions to forbid pollution and to compel performance of abatement
measures are specifically authorized by statute. See text accompanying notes 338-42 supra. The language of the enforcement statutes
referring to "other appropriate action" logically seems to comprehend
an action for damages. Even without this broad language, common
law nuisance actions for damages are appropriate to compensate for
loss arising in several types of cases relevant to the area of pollution
damage to the state's resources. For example, such a remedy would be
appropriate where the use and enjoyment of property has been deprived, where personal discomfort or inconvenience has been suffered,
and where expenses have been incurred on account of the nuisance.
W. PROssER, supra at 623-24. Clearly the plaintiff must be the injured
party for there to be a successful claim for damages. This final element
is provided by the parens patriae theory which holds that a state should
be allowed to sue for injuries to its quasi-sovereign interests such as
the health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights,
pollution free interstate waters, pollution free air and earth and the
general economy of the state. See Note, State Protection of its

Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6
& Soc. PROB. 411, 412-13 (1970) and cases cited therein.
The policy of such a damage action by the Attorney General and the
PCA makes sense for the reason that it is clear that a continued vioCOLUM. J.L.

1972]
2.

MINNESOTA PCA

1057

CriminalProsecutions

Despite statutory authorization, the area of criminal prosecutions for the violation of pollution control laws and regulations remains largely unexplored in Minnesota. While the penalties for violating the law are clear, the allocation of responsibility for the enforcement of criminal laws in the pollution
field and the extent of the powers and responsibilities of the
various officials are not so clearly defined.
Violation of pollution laws is a misdemeanor for which the
maximum penalty is 90 days imprisonment or a $300 fine or

both. 352 The air, land and noise pollution criminal provision
states that each day of the violation is to be considered a separate offense.353 In contrast, the corresponding water pollution
penalty is silent on this point,3 5 4 leading to the possible conclusion that a continuing course of pollution is only a single offense if it occurs in the water.
The statutes provide that "all county attorneys, sheriffs and
lation by a large polluter or a group of polluters, particularly in an area
of heavily concentrated population, may result in serious injury to the
health and welfare of a substantial part of the populace. However,
because the harm is a generalized one, the people would be unable to
get compensation for their injuries, under traditional public nuisance
doctrine. See W. PnossER, supra at 608-09. Even though the harm is
generalized, the harm to the population at large may still be great.
What more appropriate situation could exist for the representatives of
the people to be able to bring an action for damages for the injury to this
interest of the state in the health and welfare of its people? Additionally, the state as a whole may have suffered from the effects on the
pollution, and it may have had to incur great expense in fighting the
problem. It seems a sound policy that these invasions of the quasisovereign interests of the state should support an action for damages
provided that the proceeds of judgments awarded go to the state acting on behalf of all its citizens in continuing a program to prevent, control and abate pollution.
352. Regarding water pollution, MAub. STAT. § 115.07 subd. 6 (1969)
provides that it is a misdemeanor to violate any provision of Mnwr.
STAT. ch. 115, or of any regulation, order or permit. Regarding air, land
and noise pollution, MrnN. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 1 (1969) and Minn.
Laws 1971, ch. 727, § 6, amending it, provide that it is a misdemeanor
to violate any provision of Mmw. STAT. §§ 116.01-.09, or any provision
of any regulation or standard. Mmx. STAT. § 609.03 subd. 3 (1969) provides the penalty for misdemeanors. Prior to the enactment of a revisor's bill during the 1971 legislative session (Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 23,
§ 11) MInn. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 1 provided for a penalty of $100 or
90 days. The language was without effect after 1969 because of MiMN.
STAT. § 609.031 (1969) which deemed such provisions to provide for a
penalty of $300, or 90 days, or both.
353. MbNN. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 1 (1969).
354. Id. at § 115.07 subd. 6.
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other peace officers, and other officers having authority in the
enforcement of the general criminal laws" have a duty to enforce the criminal provisions to the extent of their authority. 55
Although this provision applies only to air, land and noise pollution violations, leaving responsibility for the enforcement of
criminal penalties for water pollution unspecified, all types of
35 6
violations should be similarly handled.
Several questions concerning the responsibilities of officials
are raised by these criminal provisions, but will remain largely
academic until efforts are made to enforce the criminal penalties for pollution. 357 First, there is a problem as to which officials have the authority to prosecute. Apparently, municipal
attorneys have the authority to prosecute violations involving
noise, air and solid waste occurring within their municipalities. 358 County attorneys have the authority to prosecute violations of all pollution laws occurring outside any municipality,
or within a municipality not having an attorney. 350
A second question concerns whether it is within the authority of the PCA to demand that the proper prosecuting authority initiate criminal actions against a polluter. 360 On one
355. Id. at § 116.08 subd. 1.
356. The statute concerning the enforcement of criminal violations
of air, land and noise pollution provisions does not alter the general
duties of enforcement authorities to enforce the criminal laws. Id.
See notes 358-59 infra.
357. There has been only one criminal prosecution at this time.
Lindall Interview, supra note 257.
358. Municipal attorneys are not mentioned in either criminal statute. MINN. STAT. §§ 115.07 subd. 6, 116.08 subd. 1 (1969). However, as
to air, land and noise pollution MINN. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 1 (1969)
mentions "other officers" having authority to prosecute violations of
general criminal laws. For statutes giving municipal attorneys the duty
to prosecute misdemeanor cases occurring in their municipalities, see
MINN. STAT. §§ 488.17 subd. 9, 488A.10 subd. 11 (1969); Minn. Laws
1971, ch. 951, § 25 subd. 1.
359. This provision does not apply to counties containing cities of the
first class. MINN. STAT. § 488.17 subd. 9 (1969). For provisions giving
county attorneys the residual duty to prosecute in other counties, see
MINN. STAT. § 488.17 subd. 9 (1969); Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 951, § 25
subd. 10. See 1960 Op. ATTY. GEN. 306b-13 (Minn.).
360. That the problems here are not entirely academic is apparent
from the recent PCA dealings with prosecuting authorities in Hennepin
County. In April 1971 the Executive Director of the PCA, Grant J.
Merritt, recommended that Agency members consider taking action
against the municipality of Brooklyn Park for flushing thousands of
gallons of raw sewage into the Mississippi River. At its May meeting,
the Agency voted to allow the Director to place the matter before the
Hennepin County Attorney for criminal prosecution. At the June meeting of the Agency, it was reported that the Hennepin County Attorney
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hand, a provision in the water pollution statutes requires municipalities and counties to cooperate with the PCA in obtaining
compliance and enforcing all standards, orders, regulations and
permit requirements. 361 Read broadly, in combination with the
general principle that the PCA should have supervision of the
enforcement of pollution control laws, 362 this provision supports
the argument that prosecutors have an inescapable duty to obey
a PCA request to initiate criminal prosecutions against violators.
The case with respect to air, land and noise pollution is somewhat weaker, but surely governmental subdivisions have a commensurate duty to obey these pollution control laws. 0 3 On the
other hand, there is no explicit mention in the relevant statutes
of a power vested in the PCA to direct the actions of local prosecutors. Furthermore, such direction would surely be regarded
as an infringement on the traditional prosecutorial discretion. 30 4
Whether or not local prosecutors have a duty to act at the
request of the PCA, the Attorney General, as the state's chief
legal officer, clearly has the authority to require lesser prosewould not act since the violation occurred within the jurisdiction of the
Brooklyn Park Attorney; he in turn declined to prosecute his fellow
officials. PCA Minutes (April, May & June 1971); Lindall Interview,
supra note 257. The Attorney General was apparently not approached
in the matter. Id.
361. Mum. STAT. § 115.06 subd. 3 (1969).
362. MINN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969) provides in part that
the PCA has the power and duty to "administer and enforce all laws
relating to the pollution of any of the waters of the state." While this
provision refers only to water pollution, surely the authority of the
PCA in regard to air, land and noise pollution is no less. See id.
at §§ 116.01 &116.05 subd. 1.
363. MINN. STAT. § 116.05 (1969) specifies no duty to cooperate on
the part of local governmental officials, other than pursuant to an
agreement to exercise powers jointly. Id. at § 116.05 subd. 3.
364. See Olsen v. State, 287 Minn. 536, 177 N.W.2d 424 (1970), which
provides that reasonable discretion in initiating prosecutions must be
accorded prosecuting authorities. Professor Davis questions the assumptions underlying prosecutorial discretion and deplores the lack of control
over city and county prosecutors by attorneys general and governors.
Davis suggests that findings or reasons for the use or non-use of the
prosecutorial power might be required and that rules be issued to guide
prosecution. K. DAvis, supra note 252, § 4.08 at 189-91, 196.
There is some feeling within the PCA that local prosecuting attorneys should be taking more polluters to court for criminal violations.
Lindall Interview, supra note 257. See Comment, Water Pollution Control in Washington, 43 WASH. L. Rsv. 425, 446 (1967) (argued that a
$100 per day penalty, if vigorously enforced, would secure compliance
from smaller polluters, but noted that the Wisconsin penalty's severity
(up to $5000) makes courts reluctant to apply it). See also Carmichael,
Forty Years of Water PollutionControl in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967
Wisc. L. REv. 350, 389-95.
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cutors to take action in cases instituted by his office. 805

Failing

that, he could act himself in their stead.3 66 The power of the
Attorney General in this regard is necessary to guarantee that
strong local economic and political forces will not have their
way with local officials when the proper enforcement of pollu3 67
tion laws is at stake.
C.

EMERGENCY AND EXTRAORDINARY ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

In time of emergency involving public health, the preservation of game, fish and other natural resources, or the conservaMINN. STAT. § 388.05 (1969) provides in part:
[W]hen requested by the attorney general [the county attorney] shall appear for the state in any case instituted by the
attorney general in his county....
The reference to "any case" would seem to include criminal cases.
Since the county attorney must act at the direction of the Attorney
General, a fortiori municipal attorneys must also act. See also, Id.
at § 8.01. Note that the Attorney General's common law powers come
into play here since the office of Attorney General existed at common law whereas the office of local prosecutor did not. NATIONAL

365.

AsSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS

GENERAL,

COMMITTEE

ON THE OFCE OF

ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
51 (1971).
366. State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269
(1907); Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1961):
The attorney general is the chief law officer of the state. His
powers are not limited to those granted by statute but include
extensive common-law powers inherent in his office. He may
institute, conduct, and maintain all such actions and proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of
the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public
rights.
Id. at 308, 110 N.W.2d at 5. See DeLong, Powers and Duties of the
State Attorney General in Criminal Prosecutions, 25 J. CRM'. L. 358,
371-72 (1934). It is uncertain whether the Attorney General has a duty
to prosecute criminal cases at the request of the PCA, as he has a
duty to initiate civil suits. However, the general language in MINN.
STAT. § 115.47(1) (1969) does create a mandatory duty on the part of
the Attorney General to bring actions necessary to abate pollution.
367. See State ex tel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 285,
112 N.W.269, 271 (1907):
It [the state] is charged with the duty of enforcing all laws designed for the public welfare, and its obligation to the people can
neither be surrendered nor contracted away ....
Essential
to the complete performance of this duty is the unrestricted control and authority over all officers who are charged with the
enforcement of the laws. This control necessarily includes
power of removal for official misconduct ....
Its command
to the local officers to proceed with the enforcement of the
law might or might not be complied with, depending upon the
nature of the law sought to be enforced and the temper and disposition toward it of the local removing power. This would result in the enforcement or the nonenforcement of wholesale
regulations for the public weal, as suited the notions of those in
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tion of waters, the PCA is empowered to make final orders
without following the usual provisions concerning notice and
hearing.36 8 Such an order would then be enforceable in the
courts by the Attorney General at the request of the PCA under the general enforcement powers. 30
Similarly, when there is "imminent danger to the health
or welfare of the people of the state ...

as a result of the pollu-

tion" of air, land, or water, the PCA may order an abatement
without notice or hearing.37 0 Because of certain technicalities
of statutory wording, the enforceability of orders issued pursuant to this language was in some doubt3 7 ' until the recent
enactment of the ERA which provides inter alia for the enforcement by the PCA or the Attorney General of any environmental
quality order except those regarding odors.37 2 The emergency
order power has been exercised only once. On February 10,
1972, an air pollution "alert" was declared and 37 users of sullocal power. The fundamental principles of law will not justify
a decision which would result in an indifferent administration

of our laws naturally to follow from such a doctrine.
368. MuN. STT.§ 115.05 subd. 2 (1969).

369. Id. at §§ 115.45, 115.47 subd. 1 & 2 (civil), 115.07 subd. 6
(criminal). See text accompanying notes 338-39 (civil) and 352-53
(criminal) supra.
370. MoNN. STAT. § 116.11 (1969).
371. As discussed in note 346 supra, there is no statutory authority
for the issuance of non-emergency final orders in the provisions concerning air, land and noise pollution. The enforcement provisions of
Mm. STAT. § 116.08 (1969) authorize enforcement actions for the violation of laws, regulations, or standards provided for in Sections 116.01.09, which was the extent of the original 1967 enactment. The emergency power provision, Section 116.11, was added in 1969, but the enforcement provision in Section 116.08 was not expanded to include it.
The 1971 session of the Minnesota Legislature enacted substantial
amendments to Chapter 116, but did nothing to expand the scope of
Section 116.08.
The water pollution law enforcement provisions are not so restrictive. In addition to the general power to "administer and enforce all
laws relating to the pollution of any waters of the state" (Id. at §
115.03) both Section 115.45 subd. 2 and Section 115.47 contain general
language authorizing the enforcement of laws enacted to prevent, control
and abate water pollution. However, both Section 115.07(4) & (6) and
Section 115A5(1) seem to be restricted to actions of the PCA under
the original water pollution control act. MmN. STAT. §§ 115.01-.09
(1969). Of course, any problems which might have occurred because of
these technicalities regarding water pollution were purely academic because of the existence of the emergency order provision in the original
water pollution control act of 1945. Mmx. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 2
(1969). See text accompanying notes 368-69 supra.
372. Mmx. STAT. §§ 116B.02 subd. 5, 116B.03 subd. 1 (1971). Of
course, there is no authority in MhNN. STAT. ch. 116 for issuing orders
concerning odors (air pollution) anyway.
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phur content fuels in the Twin City metropolitan area were ordered to reduce their fuel consumption or substitute non-sulphur fuels. 3 73 It should be remembered that conduct toward
which the emergency order is addressed may also violate an
existing regulation or law and thereby be enjoined by the attorneys for the PCA in court 374 regardless of the emergency

procedures.
373. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Report on Air Pollution
Alert-February 10-11, 1972. (Office Memorandum, Edward M. Wiik,
Director, Division of Air Quality, PCA, Minneapolis, February 14, 1972).
The Air Division has filed regulations establishing an implementation
plan for the control of air pollution emergencies under the emergency
powers of MINN. STAT. § 116.11 (1969). The regulations establish four
stages of air pollution "episodes" with corresponding technical criteria,
three of which involve enforcement action. The first stage, "forecast",
occurs when an "air stagnation advisory" is issued by the National
Weather Service. No formal action is taken when such an advisory is
issued. The second stage, "alert", involves "pollutant concentrations
approaching levels at which short-term health effects can be expected."
The regulations provide that an alert will be declared when any one
of six pollutant concentrations (sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, the
product of these two, carbon monoxide, oxidant or nitrogen dioxide) is
reached at any one monitoring site when meteorological conditions
are such that such concentrations of pollutants can be expected to remain above the trigger levels for 12 hours. The third stage is termed a
"warning" and occurs when the situation becomes worse yet. Higher
levels of the various pollutant concentrations are specified in the regulations. The fourth stage is termed an "emergency," and occurs when
even higher specified concentrations are reached. In the event of an air
pollution episode, the regulations provide for the notification of all major point sources of air pollutants, various public officials and the news
media. Voluntary action to decrease emissions may be requested by
the PCA before the alert level is reached. Increasingly stringent abatement measures are provided for each level after "forecast." These include first a prohibition of open burning and a limitation on soot blowing, then a requirement that commuters use car pools and public transportation, and finally the prohibition of construction work, certain mining operations, the closing of non-essential government offices, businesses
and schools, and an absolute ban on motor vehicle use except in emergency situations. The regulations also require that point sources emitting
100 tons per year of pollutants of the type determining emergency
stages establish detailed emission reduction plans; an interim plan
is provided until detailed plans are formulated by the sources. Interview with Dr. John Olin, Chief of Technical Services Section, PCA, Minneapolis, Feb. 25, 1972. See MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY,
AI QUALITY DIVISION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN-To ACHIEVE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR STANDARDS 143-78 (P-42106, Oct. 1971, revised Jan. 30, 1972).
The Water Division is currently planning to draw up contingency
plans for water pollution abatement particularly in the event of a
spill of a large amount of oil or other dangerous liquids. Such regulations would not be as detailed as the emergency air pollution regulations. Interview with Lovell Ritchie, Assistant Director, Division of
Water Quality, PCA, Minneapolis, Feb. 25, 1972.
374. See text accompanying notes 338-42 supra (general enforcement
powers).

1972]

MINNESOTA PCA

When a municipality fails to comply with an Agency order
concerning the construction or operation of a disposal system,
the PCA, after notice and hearing, may assume the legislative
powers of the municipality relating to the disposal system and
may issue bonds and levy taxes necessary to finance the disposal system. 75 In the eight years since its enactment, this
provision has never been used,378 probably because of its rather
drastic nature and because the PCA has been satisfied with
progress made by more conventional methods of enforcement.
Perhaps its very existence on the books serves to convince potentially obstreperous municipalities to choose the milder alternative of negotiated settlement.
Part 3--Public and Private Conirol

of the PCA
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, as other state
agencies, is subject to control by the other branches of government.

This section will focus upon the potential and actual

control exerted by the courts, the legislature and the Governor.
In addition, the attempts of several public-interest groups to influence PCA affairs will be examined.

I. JUDICIAL CONTROL
Control over the PCA is exerted by the courts through the
process of judicial review. An aggrieved person may obtain
judicial review of PCA actions in one of three ways: 1) by statute, in the majority of cases, 2) by means of extraordinary
writ, action for declaratory or equitable relief and 3) by defending a civil or criminal proceeding instituted by the agency to
enforce its orders. 37 7 The availability and form of judicial review, regardless of which method is used, may be controlled by
the legislature, subject only to constitutional restrictions.3 78
375. MnINN. STAT. § 115.48, subd. 1 (1969). This procedure is in lieu
of enforcement under Section 115.47 pursuant to which the court may
order a municipality to use its governmental powers to raise taxes,
borrow money, let contracts, etc., in order to accomplish the purposes
of a PCA water pollution order.
376. Lindall Interview, supra note 257.
377. Judicial review is also available in tort actions brought against
agency officials. This method of review is not discussed here since it
is not a significant technique in PCA actions.
378. State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, 236 Minn. 452,
457-58, 54 N.W.2d 122, 126 (1952). Statutory language prescribing the
form of judicial review or attempting to eliminate it altogether has not
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THE STATUTORY BASES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw

Three bodies of statutory law govern judicial review of
PCA actions: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),819 the
Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) 880 and the newly enacted
Environmental Rights Act (ERA). 381 Each statute provides its
own procedure for review and its own rules of standing, timing
and scope of review. While together they govern most appeals
from PCA actions, it is not always clear which statute governs
in specific situations.
1. Standing to Secure JudicialReview
Standing analysis is directed at the question of who may
secure judicial review of a specific agency action. 88 2 In spite of
the fact that standing is the subject of considerable confusion,
it is suggested that both on the doctrinal and on the practical
level these differences are minimal, so that regardless of which,
if any, statute applies, the test of standing is the same.
The specific type of standing depends on which, if any,
statute governs the appeal. The ERA applies in two situations
that encompass a large number of appeals. First, Section 10 of
been a reliable indicator
history of ignoring such
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
Trainmen v. Central of

of what courts in fact will do. They have a
statutory language. See 4 K. DAvis, ADMIN28.01 (1958). See also Brotherhood of Railroad
Georgia Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 413-14 (5th Cir.

1969), which contains a collection of cases that construe very narrowly
or reject statutory language limiting the availability of judicial review.
379. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.0426 (1969).
Sections 15.0411-.0422
were enacted in 1957; Sections 15.0423-.0426 were enacted in 1963.
The attempt at a systematic approach to administrative procedure in
Minnesota is therefore comparatively recent. The Minnesota APA is
based on the 1946 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure

Act.

HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 202-17 (1946). The revised model act of 1961
was not incorporated into the Minnesota APA. HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS

199-223 (1961).
380. MINN. STAT. §§ 115.01-.09 (1969).
The WPCA was enacted
in 1945.
381. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 952, coded therein as §§ 116B.01-.14,
hereinafter cited as MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14 (1971).
For a detailed
history of the enactment of the ERA see Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1972).
382.

See 3 K.

DAvs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.01

(1958).

Davis notes that standing often overlaps the other doctrines of judicial
review. For example, if no one has standing to contest an agency action, the action is in effect unreviewable; or if a person is not yet
"aggrieved" by an agency action and as a result does not have standing,
the decision in effect says that the timing of his appeal is premature.
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the ERA provides that any natural person residing in Minnesota or legal entity with shareholders residing in Minnesota
may challenge a PCA action "for which the applicable
statutory appeal period has elapsed,"38 3 where the purpose of
the appeal is to contest the PCA actions for failure to adequately
protect the environment.38 4 The WPCA provides an appeal
period of from 30 days to six months for all actions involving
water 38 5 and the APA provides a 30 day period for "contested

cases," 38 6 -but contains no provision for appeals of "rules."381

The ERA will therefore apply to all cases involving water after
the 30 day to six month period.3 8 8 The ERA will also apply to
"contested cases" 3 89 under the APA after the 30 day period. It
may not, however, apply to "rules" 39 0 under the APA because
the APA does not provide a statutory time limit for the appeal

of "rules."39 '

Since the ERA clearly will not apply unless an

383. MnVmm. STAT. § 116B.1O subd. 1 (1971). "[A]ny natural person
residing within the state; the attorney general; any political subdivision
of the state; any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political
subdivision thereof; or any partnership, corporation, association, organization, or other legal entity having shareholders, members, partners
or employees residing within the state may maintain a civil action ...
[to challenge an agency action] for which the applicable statutory appeal period has elapsed."
384. Mnvx. STAT. § 116B.10 subd. 2 (1971).
385. Mm-q. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 3 (1969).
386. AN=. STAT. § 15.0424 subd. 2(a) (1969).
387. See note 391 infra.
388. If, however, the APA rather than the WPCA applies to actions
involving water that can be classified as either "rules" or "contested
cases," then the ERA will not govern until the appeal period under the
APA has lapsed. See note 393 infra.
389. The following will be classified as "contested cases": the revocation or modification of permits involving water (see text accompanying
notes 109-111 supra); the modification or revocation of variances involving water (see text accompanying notes 109-111 supra); the revocation of permits and variances involving air, noise and solid waste (see
text accompanying note 132 supra); and all formal discontinuance and
abatement orders (see text accompanying note 308 supra). For actions
classified as neither "rules" nor "contested cases," see note 400 infra.
390. The promulgation of regulations and standards will be classifled as "rules." See text accompanying note 147 supra.
391. "The [model] act contains no provision for judicial review of
rules, which is left to pre-existing procedures . ..

."

Fuchs, Rule-

Making and Contested Cases, 33 IowA L. Rzv. 210, 220 (1948). Since
there is no pre-existing procedure for appeals involving air, noise and
solid waste, it is not clear if there is any statute of limitations governing the appeal of "rules." It is desirable for a rule to be appealable at
any time. See text accompanying notes 412-14 infra. It therefore can
be argued that statutory silence should allow unlimited appeal, governed
in extreme cases only by laches. Such an interpretation, however, does
not provide an answer to what materials should be forwarded to the
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applicable statutory appeal period has lapsed, it should not apply in cases where there is no applicable statute or an unlimited
statutory appeal period which can never lapse.3 9 2 This interpretation is desirable from a policy viewpoint, because dual review systems create needless complications. It should be noted,
however, that despite the statute's clear language, the legislative history of the ERA indicates that the legislature intended
this provision to apply to "rules." 39 3 Finally, the ERA will not
apply to actions involving air, noise, or solid waste, which are
neither "rules" nor "contested cases" under the APA since there
39 4
is no applicable statutory appeal period.
Second, the ERA also will govern standing in cases in which
a proceeding for judicial review has already been commenced.
Section 9 provides that "in any action for judicial review [of
an administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding] which
is made available by law, any natural person residing within the
state," or legal entity may intervene as a party to assert that
the conduct at issue will cause pollution. 3 5 In order for this
provision to apply there must be an ongoing proceeding for
reviewing court as part of the record or how the reviewing court should
use such materials.
It also can be argued that the provisions of the WPCA should be
applied to air, noise and solid waste where the APA is silent. MINN.
STAT. § 116.05 subd. 5 (1969) provides that "[t]he pollution control
agency is the successor of the water pollution control commission, and
all powers and duties now vested in or imposed upon said commission
by Chapter

115 . . . are hereby transferred to, imposed upon, and

vested in" the PCA. On the basis of this language it can be argued that
Chapter 115 can be applied to the Chapter 116 activities of the PCA.
Such an argument is not strong as a matter of statutory construction, and
it is even weaker as a matter of policy because it is undesirable to import the obsolete procedures of the WPCA into more areas than absolutely necessary. The best solution would be a uniform legislative provision for the appeal of rules.
392. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1969) provides:
When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the
law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.
393. For the argument that the ERA applies to the appeal on
"rules", see Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN.
L. REv. 575 (1972).
394. Here, too, it can be argued that the WPCA ought to apply.
See note 391 supra. If the WPCA governs these appeals, the ERA will
apply after the 30 day to six month appeal period. Since most of the
PCA's permits involving air, noise or solid waste fit into this category, it would be desirable to have an applicable review statute to
eliminate the uncertainty and labor involved in developing a courtmade review procedure.
395. MINN. STAT. § 116B.09 subd. 1 (1971).
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judicial review brought by persons already having standing under another statute or body of law.300
In those cases in which a person or group asserts a position
in favor of environmental protection, the requirements of standing set out in the ERA are met by any natural person "residing
within the state" or any "partnership, corporation, association,
organization or other legal entity" that has "shareholders, members, partners, or employees residing within the state." Under
the ERA, therefore, standing depends solely on residence and
point of view.
In those cases in which the applicable statutory appeal period has not lapsed and in which the person seeking review has
not intervened in a judicial review proceeding, standing is governed in all but one case by the APA or the WPCA. The APA
clearly governs standing in appeals of "rules"39 17 and "contested cases"39 8 involving air, noise and solid waste, and it may
also be held to govern standing in appeals of "rules" and "contested cases" involving water.399 The single case in which there
is no clearly applicable statute concerns the appeal of PCA actions involving air, noise or solid waste that are classified neither as "rules" nor "contested cases."40 0 This is a significant
area because many permit proceedings fall within it. 4 0 1 Legislative resolution of this difficulty would be, of course, desirable,
but in the absence of legislative action the best solution may
396. Mu . STAT. § 116B.09 subd. 1 (1971) also provides that any
natural person residing in Minnesota may intervene as a party into any
agency proceeding. The effect of this provision on standing is unclear.
It can be argued that a person who is a party in a "contested case"
should be aggrieved if he does not like the outcome and thus has
standing; but it is not conceptually clear what a party to a rulemaking hearing is and whether he is sufficiently different from any
other person testifying such that a different rule on standing will apply to him. It is therefore probable that the standing of a person who
has intervened under Section 9 will be determined in the same manner
as that of any other person involved in the same agency process.
397. MwNi. STAT. § 15.0417 (1969) contains a provision governing
standing, even though it does not set out specific appeal procedures.
For the scope of its coverage, see text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
398. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
399. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
400. The following activities are neither "rules" nor "contested
cases" under the APA: the denial or modification of permits and variances involving air, noise and solid waste (see text accompanying notes
155-56 supra); the denial of variances involving water (see text accompanying note 158 supra); and informal enforcement activities (see text
accompanying notes 252-303 supra). For the list of activities classified
as "rules" or "contested cases" see notes 389 & 390 supra.
401. See note 400 supra.
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be for the courts to apply standing rules identical to those
40 2
formulated in the "contested case" provision of the APA.
This would simplify the law and reduce uncertainty since there
are well articulated rules of standing under the APA.
Once the applicable body of law has been determined, the
relevant rule of standing can be ascertained. Under the APA
a "rule" may be contested by any person "when it appears that
the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal I Ights
or privileges of the petitioner; ' 40 3 a "contested case" may be
appealed by "[a] ny person aggrieved; ' 40 4 and under the WPCA,
an appeal may be taken "by any person who is or may be adversely affected. 4 0 5 No distinction should be made between a
"person aggrieved" in a "contested case" under the APA and a
"person adversely affected" under the WPCA. 40° If "aggrieved"
and "adversely affected" are the same standard, then the rules
governing standing are the same for all appeals under the
WPCA (water) and "contested cases" under the APA (air, noise
and solid waste).
The standard also should be identical when a person wishes
to challenge a "rule" involving air, noise or solid waste, despite
the statutory requirement that he show that his "legal rights or
privileges" have been affected. The term "legal rights" on its
face arguably invites that the federal concept of a "legal wrong"
be read into the APA. Such a reading, however, would be undesirable for several reasons. First, the federal law of standing
based on the concept of "legal wrong" is confused and highly
technical in contrast to the simpler state doctrines. 40 7 In the absence of some compelling need to introduce the more complex
402. See note 408 infra.
403. MIrNN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1969).
404. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424 subd. 1 (1969).
405. MI N. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 3 (1969).
Any person "affected"
may intervene in a proceeding for judicial review.
VINN. STAT.
§ 115.05 subd. 4 (1969).
406. Since there has been no distinction between "aggrieved" and
"adversely affected" on either the state or federal level, and since the
terms themselves do not suggest such a distinction, the terms should be
read as establishing the same test. See, e.g., Simmons v. FCC, 145
F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1944) and King v. Stark Co., 72 N.D. 717, 10
N.W.2d 877 (1943).
407.

2 F. CooPER, STATE ADrNmsTRATVE

LAW

538 (1965).

See also

K. DAVIs, 1970 Supplement, supra note 382, at § 22 where the author
observes that "the law of the subject is currently in turmoil. The Supreme Court has attempted to lay down guidelines, but its attempts
have been largely unsuccessful."
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doctrine into state law, no such change should be made. Moreover, the trend in federal doctrine is toward the simplified test
4 08
suggested by the terms "aggrieved" and "adversely affected,"
so that importing federal complexity into state law at a time
when the federal doctrine is undergoing this process of simplification is unwise.
If the federal concept of "legal wrong" is not incorporated
into state law, then the "legal rights or privileges" test should
be the same as the "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" test. In
general, courts and legislatures have broadened both the concept of injury to the environment and the class of persons aggrieved by such an injury. 40 9 It is thus becoming progressively
easier to establish that any discharge that adversely affects the
environment also violates the person's right to a clean environment. The Minnesota legislature, through the ERA, declared
"that each person is entitled by right to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land and other natural
resources . ...

"410

Since this statute explicitly established a

legal right in every person to the enhancement of the environment, a reasonable allegation that an agency rule either injures
or is ineffective to enhance the environment should constitute
408. In Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the

court set out a two-fold test: 1) whether a person suffered an injury

in fact and 2) whether the injury claimed was arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the statute. In environmental litigation,
particularly in light of the ERA, the zone of interest appears to include
every person residing in a jurisdiction. Justices Brennan and White in
their dissent in the companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
167 (1970) argued that only the first half of the test be required. It
has been suggested that this is the preferable view and will eventually prevail. 3 K. DAVIs, AIMISTRATIVE LAw TtFATISE § 22.02, 1958;
K. DAvis, 1970 SUPPLEmENT, supra note 382, at § 22.
The Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Hickel, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S.
April 18, 1972) held that the Sierra Club did not have standing to contest the despoilation of a wilderness area because no injury to a member
was claimed. It rejected the notion developed in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that a showing of organizational interest without individual interest is sufficient to
grant standing.
409. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1971), Environmental Defense

Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Corp. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

A number of

states have enacted environmental rights legislation. See, e.g., McH.
CoMI' LAws § 691.1201 et seq. (1972); MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14
(1971). For a proposed common law expansion of environmental protection, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:

Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MIcH. L. Rrv. 473 (1970).
410.
fmN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1971).
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an injury to a person's "legal rights or privileges" sufficient to
confer standing. 411 The relevant inquiry is then what degree
of injury is sufficient to grant standing. This is the same inquiry as under the "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" test, so
that despite their different phrasing, the three tests in effect
provide a uniform, liberal test of standing.
Although under the WPCA and APA a plaintiff must show
injury while under the ERA he need not, in most cases there
will probably be no difference in practice. A person should
have little difficulty establishing injury to himself for pollution
of Lake Superior, for example, since it is at least a state-wide
resource. Similarly, any pollution of air or flowing water will
also probably injure any resident of the state. It can also be
argued that many parts of the state (the Boundary Waters lakes,
for example) are state-wide resources that belong as much to a
person living in the southern part of the state as the northern.
The difference between the rule under the ERA and the uniform, liberal rule under the APA and WPCA should be apparent only in cases such as the pollution of a pond without
public access, which can hardly be said to injure a person living
in a distant part of the state, or cases involving noise pollution
which cannot be heard more than a few blocks away.
2.

Timing of Judicial Review
a. The Maximum Amount of Time Available for an Appeal

With the passage of the ERA there is no limitation on the
time any PCA action may be challenged by environmentalists,
since Section 10 authorizes a natural person or group to challenge "an environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit ...
'41 2
for which the applicable statutory appeal period has elapsed.
This provision of the ERA has both beneficial and detrimental effects. It has the desirable effect of limiting the WPCA
requirement that appeals of rules be filed within 30 days of
their receipt, since in some cases the 30 day period is unreason411. Under the Data Processing test the effect of the ERA, MINN.
§ 116B.01 (1971), is to expand the zone of interest protected by
the APA, so that in environmental questions the only inquiry relevant
in attempting to determine questions of standing is whether a person
has in fact been injured.
412. MINN. STAT. § 116B.10 subd. 1 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 385-90 supra for a breakdown of when the various statutory appeal
periods lapse.
STAT.
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ably short. For example, under the WPCA an environmentalist
who routinely receives copies of the rules and standards from
the Secretary of State,413 or a person who receives a copy of a
rule that only later affects him adversely may find that his
30 day appeal period has lapsed before he can reasonably be
expected to challenge the rule. This was particularly difficult
for environmental groups, both for the practical reason that
such groups are often informally organized and thus not able to
effect speedy appeals, and because such groups may not wish
to challenge rules for several years, until new knowledge and
increased public awareness show them to be inadequate. Prior
to the enactment of the ERA the short appeal period under the
WPCA also provided an incentive for premature appeals.
Where a person requested or received a copy of the rule, but
was not certain whether his activities would bring him into
conflict with it, he was forced nevertheless to challenge the
rule immediately. This problem continues in the case of those
who discharge into water 414 because the ERA does not apply to
415

them.

Unfortunately, however, since the scope of review under the
ERA may be different from that under the APA,4 1 Section 10
allows an aggrieved person to shop for review under the statute
most favorable to his position. For instance, a person wishing
to overturn a decision in a "contested case" will prefer the
broader scope of review under the ERA and will therefore wish
to wait beyond the 30 day period. A person who wishes the
decision upheld, however, will desire the narrower scope of the
413. This is done pursuant to MrNN. STAT. § 15.0413 (1969).
414. This problem is one of the issues in the Reserve Mining litigation. See note 447 infra. The state argued that notice of appeal was
filed too late. Brief for respondent at 209, Reserve Mining Co. v.
MPCA, No. 05011 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970) appeal
filed No. 43117, April 22, 1971. Reserve has argued on various grounds
that the 30 day period did not begin to run at the time the rule was
filed with the Commissioner of Administration. Brief for appellant at
16-19.
415. The only way to eliminate this anomaly and bring the appeal
procedure for actions involving water into harmony with those involving air, noise and solid waste is to apply the APA to appeals involving
water instead of the WPCA. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
416. Section 10 of ERA provides that when an agency action attached by an environmentalist has been remitted to the agency and
then appealed again under the Act, the agency must show that its action is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. It is not clear,
however, whether this will be significantly different from the usual
scope of review. See text accompanying notes 497-99 infra.
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APA and favor a challenge within the 30 day period. The result
may be a contrived or unnecessary suit, a confusion of the real
issues, and an unnatural procedural posture. Even if such
jockeying does not occur, the scope and method of reviewing
rules should not depend on the chance factors of when review is
sought and what part of the environment is involved.
b. The Earliest Point at Which a Court Should Intervene
The earliest point at which a reviewing court should intervene in an agency proceeding is determined by the related doctrines of primary jurisdiction, finality, ripeness and exhaustion.
These doctrines are generally referred to as doctrines of timing.
They do not constitute an inflexible set of rules, but are largely
discretionary, based on the principle that the courts and the
agencies are related instruments of government whose activities
4 17
should be harmonized in pursuit of particular statutory goals.
Although analytically distinct concepts, these doctrines must be
examined together to determine the appropriate time a particular agency action becomes subject to judicial review. 418
(1.)

The Doctrines of Timing

(a.)

Primary Jurisdiction

Primary jurisdiction assumes that both the court and the
agency have jurisdiction over a particular question. The doctrine is used to determine whether a court or an agency should
first hear the question 4 19 and focuses attention upon whether
the agency is better equipped than the court to deal with the
issue in the first instance, and whether orderly administration
and efficient regulation of the area within the agency's jurisdiction is best served by requiring persons to request agency
2
it
relief at the outset. 4 20 Since the doctrine is discretionary,'
417. See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); 2 F. CooPE,
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 561-602 (1965); 3 K. DAVIS, supra note
382, at 5.

418. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz,
443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for an example of the interrelation of the
doctrines in practice.
419. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 382, at 2.

See also United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963), where the Court noted
that as a result of the application of this doctrine that "[c]ourt jurisdiction is not thereby ousted, but only postponed." See also Best v.
Humbolt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Corstvet v. Bank of Deerfield,
220 Wis. 209, 263 N.W. 687 (1935).

420.

See generally Best v. Humbolt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963);
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can be tailored to particular cases to prevent needless resort to
an agency and can be adapted to particular agencies, depending
on their competence, fairness and public trust.
(b.)

Finality

The requirement of finality is largely statutory.

The

APA 422 in "contested cases" and the WPCA4 23 provide that only

"final" actions are appealable. There is no specific statutory requirement of finality in the case of "rules" appealed under the
APA, nor in the case of actions that are neither "rules" nor
"contested cases," unless it is held that the WPCA governs
these cases. 4 24

These actions, however, are also subject to the

common law requirement of finality. 425 The doctrine focuses
inquiry on whether the agency action is subject to any authoritative reconsideration -26 before compliance with the rule or decision is demanded. 427 If the agency action is subject to reconsideration, it is not final.
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Federal
Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481 (1938). The only statement
of Minnesota law is an early Eighth Circuit decision, Bakus-Brooks Co.
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 21 F.2d 4, 21 (8th Cir. 1927). Here the court
spoke in terms of jurisdiction.
421. The doctrine does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, but
rather assumes that the court has jurisdiction and is deferring the
exercise of that jurisdiction.
422. Mhnmi. STAT. § 15.0424 subd. 1 (1969).
423. MmN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 3 (1969).
424. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.

425. In Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Mlnn. 1, 6, 60 N.W.2d 18, 21 (1953),
the court noted that in the absence of a specific statute "usually only
final administrative orders and decisions are subject to review... the
reason being that absent a final order or decision there usually can be
no irreparable harm." The question of harm to the person aggrieved is
usually analyzed under the rubric of ripeness. See also Quest Foundry
Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union, 216 Minn. 436,
13 N.W.2d 32 (1944).
426. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz,
443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Morey v. School Bd., 268 Minn. 110,
113, 128 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1964), in a case involving the finality of a
lower court's action, the supreme court said "[t]he word 'final'...
means that the matter is conclusively terminated as far as the court
issuing the order is concerned."
427. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In Port
of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Trans-Atlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970) the Court ruled that the relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process of administrative
decision making has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether the rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the
agency action. Applying the test to the facts of the case the court said
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Ripeness

The doctrine of ripeness is applicable to matters in which
there has been a final agency decision. The doctrine focuses
attention on the dispute between the agency and the aggrieved
person and determines whether a dispute has reached the point
at which the interests of judicial economy and orderly procedure
dictate that the court intervene. 428 The principle behind the
doctrine is that the judicial machinery should be saved for real
problems, rather than those still hypothetical or remote. 429 The
courts generally use a balancing test to weigh the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision against the hardship to the parties
430
that would result from delay.
(d.)

Exhaustion

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
closely related to ripeness. Here the question is whether any
further agency procedures are available to an aggrieved party,
and if so whether the aggrieved person should be required to
that the action was final because "there was no possible disruption of
the administrative process; there was nothing else for the Commission
to do. And certainly the Commission's action was expected to and did
have legal consequences." See also Koochiching County v. Franson,
91 Minn. 404, 405, 98 N.W. 98, 99 (1904) where the court held that a
final order "puts an end to the proceedings, [and] affects substantial
rights. .. ."
428. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 382, at 116-207.
429. See Beatty v. Winona Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 277
Minn. 76, 151 N.W.2d 584 (1967); Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 46, 144 N.W.2d 789 (1966); Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers
v. Board of Ed., 238 Minn. 154, 56 N.W.2d 203 (1952); Quest Foundry
Co. v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers Union, 216 Minn.
436, 13 N.W.2d 32 (1944). Some of these cases speak in terms of standing, but they apply the tests of ripeness. See also 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 382, at 116.
430. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
The facts of this case are illustrative. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations requiring that labels and advertisements for drugs using their proprietary names also carry the corresponding "established name" designated by the Secretary. The Secretary argued on the grounds of ripeness that the drug companies could
not challenge this rule until he attempted to enforce it; the court ruled
the drug companies could seek pre-enforcement review of this rule. In
reaching its decision it considered the following factors: the issue was
purely legal, so it would not be sharpened by waiting for the attempted
enforcement; the action of the Secretary was final; the action had a direct impact on the drug companies; they were vulnerable to injury
since they were in a sensitive industry; and pre-enforcement review
would not delay the agency.
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The doctrine is

designed to prevent undue delay and piecemeal actions.43 2 The
PCA is not explicitly required by statute to apply the doctrine
of exhaustion. 433 In general it is largely a judge-made rule in
43 4
Minnesota.
431. State courts generally apply a less stringent test of exhaustion
than do the federal courts. 3 K. DAvIS, supra note 382, at § 20.01.
The excuses for failure to exhaust administrative remedies frequently allowed by state courts as set forth in 2 F. COOPER, supra note 417, at
574-81 include the following: lack of agency jurisdiction over the subject at issue; an agency order that is void on its face; an issue in which
a question of law or constitutional provision is controlling; an administrative remedy that is inadequate to prevent irreparable harm; and,
a few courts in extreme cases have granted an exception where there is
a clear indication that the agency will render an adverse decision.
Few Minnesota cases have considered the exceptions to the rule,
and those that have recognize more limited exceptions than Cooper.
In State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court, 259 Minn. 228, 238, 107
N.W.2d 307, 314 (1960), the court said that the only exceptions to the
rule of exhaustion "are in case of a showing of the imminence of actual
irreparable harm from action beyond the agency's jurisdiction or contrary to constitutional principles." See also Thomas v. Ramberg, 240
Minn. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18 (1953). Two other cases have applied additional
exceptions. Regan v. Babcock, 188 Minn. 192, 247 N.W. 12 (1933) (no
demand upon state officials was required because the same officials
were members of the conspiracy perpetrating the wrong that was
appealed); State ex rel. Currie v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426, 40 N.W. 561
(1888) (in a mandamus action, it was held unnecessary to demand that
public officials perform a ministerial duty plainly required by statute).
432. See generally 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 382, at 56-115; 2 F. CooPR,
supra note 417, at 572-85; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress From
ErroneousAdministrativeAction, 25 MiNN. L. Rsv. 560 (1941).
433. The original Model State Administrative Procedure Act contains no mention of exhaustion, NATIONAL CONFERE cE or CONMMSSIONERS ON UNIFOR.i
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK, 202 (1946); but the Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act allows judicial review of a
"contested case" only to "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency... ." NATIONAL CONFERENcE
OF CoarnvssioumNs ON UNiFoRM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK, 220 (1961).
The APA specifically deals with exhaustion in only one situation.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0424 subd. 2(a) (3) (1969) provides that "nothing
herein shall be construed as requiring that an application for rehearing
or reconsideration be filed with and disposed of by the agency as a
prerequisite to the institution of a review proceeding under this section." This provision applies only to "contested cases" involving air,
noise and solid waste (unless the APA is held to govern appeals involving water as well). The effect of the provision is that where a PCA
rule provides for a mandatory rehearing upon request, a person aggrieved need not exhaust that remedy before appealing to the courts unless it is required by another statute or judicial decision.
434. In Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18 (1953) the
court noted "the long-settled rule that no one is entitled to injunctive
protection against the actual or threatened acts of an administrative
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Application of the Timing Doctrines to Specific PCA
Activities

The PCA engages in a number of activities requiring application of the timing doctrines. The bulk of the PCA's enforcement activity consists of informal actions. 4 33 The initial step is
often a letter to an offender requesting voluntary compliance.
These letters involve the application of some of the timing doctrines. In cases of minor violations they are sent to inform the
person of the violation and suggest that it be corrected. In the
case of serious violations they serve simply as the first step in
an escalating process of informal enforcement. In the former
instance the requirements of finality are not met because, even
though the PCA expects compliance, the letter is simply a request for compliance that does not indicate that the agency will
in fact prosecute or institute formal proceedings. The finality
test is not met in the second case because the letter contemplates further agency action. 436 As a result no judicial appeal
will ordinarily be available at this point.
Similarly, the informal meetings with the agency staff and
informal appearances before the agency should not, in most
cases, be considered final. The meetings with the staff are
usually for the purpose of drafting stipulation agreements. If
discussions break down at this point, the agency still must determine whether to bring a court action, hold an enforcement
hearing, or allow the conduct to continue. 43 7 Since any subseagency until the prescribed statutory remedy ... has been exhausted
.... " See also State ex rel. Turnbladh v. Dist. Court, 259 Minn. 228,

107 N.W.2d 307 (1960); State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn.,
236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952); Stevens v. Federal Cartridge
Corp., 226 Minn. 148, 32 N.W.2d 312 (1948), judgment affirmed 229
Minn. 597, 26 N.W.2d 154 (1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 942 (1950);
Reliance Elevator Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 139

Minn. 69, 165 N.W. 867 (1917). See also note 431 supra.
435. For the complete discussion of informal enforcement activities, see text accompanying notes 252-303 supra.
436. In Quest Foundry Co. v. International Molders &Foundry Workers Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N.W.2d 32 (1944) the court ruled that the

calling of an election to determine what union should represent a group
of workers was not final and therefore not appealable because it was
"but an intermediate step in a pending and undetermined investigation."
The same may be said of the informal letters.
437. The distinction between formal and informal action was drawn
in Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943). There
the petitioner informed the Commissioner of Food and Drugs that he
planned to dye white poppy seeds blue and ship them in interstate
commerce. He was told that the agency considered this an illegal shipment of an adulterated product. Petitioner then requested the Attorney
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quent action is subject to authoritative reconsideration the requirement of finality is not met. During informal appearances
before the agency, violators often request time extensions. If
such a request is refused, again the action probably will not be
final because no order is involved. If, however, at the informal
hearing the polluter is granted a time extension in which to
comply with PCA orders or stipulation agreements, an environmentalist may wish to challenge the extension. 438 If so he
must satisfy the same conditions for judicial review as the polluter. The requirements of finality probably will be met because the decision was made by the agency and will not be subject to authoritative reconsideration. If the single issue between the environmental group and the PCA is the question of
whether the extension of time should have been granted, the requirements of ripeness may also be met because the legal issue
will be clearly defined and fit for review. If, however, the extension of time is only one of several issues between the PCA
and the environmentalist, then ripeness analysis may dictate
that the appeal be taken at a later time when the other issues
are also clearly defined. In addition, if the continued discharge
causes serious damage to the environment there will be a stronger case for review under the ripeness analysis than if the damage to the environment is slight. If the ripeness requirement
is satisfied, the exhaustion question should not arise because
exhaustion assumes a remedy to exhaust; where the agency itself
has granted the extension an environmentalist can only look to
the courts for relief.
The stipulation order is the culmination of the informal enforcement process. Since it is contractual in nature 430 and the
discharger has agreed to it, he probably is barred from seeking
its review. 440 However, the environmentalist may wish to do
General to tell him whether he would prosecute, but the Attorney General declined to do so. In an action for declaratory judgment, the
court refused to entertain the suit on the ground that "the declaration
of the Commissioner is several steps removed from a threat of prosecution." 137 F.2d at 683.
438. The decision to grant an extension of time may not be revievrable under the APA if it is viewed as an agency decision not to prosecute a violator. If the environmentalist wished to compel agency action,
he would have to use a writ of mandamus. He could also sue the
polluter directly under Section 3 of the ERA.
439. See text accompanying notes 292-97.
440. The signatory may be banned on several grounds. He may be
estopped from contesting the validity of the stipulation; he may be considered to have waived his right to do so; or he may be barred by the
terms of his contract.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1078

[Vol. 56:997

so. 441 The stipulation agreement should be considered final
because, as the end result of the informal enforcement process, it
will not be reconsidered. It should meet the requirements of
ripeness because, if the reasonableness of the agreement is attacked, the legal issue between the agency and the environmentalist will be clearly defined. Even if the injury to the
environment is not major, nothing will be gained by waiting for
review at a later time because the issue is probably as clearly
framed as it ever will be.
In addition to the informal enforcement proceedings, the
PCA may issue discontinuance and abatement orders in cases
involving water. 442 These orders should be considered final
since they will not be reconsidered and their violation is a misdemeanor. 44 3 Notice of the decision must be served regardless
of whether the APC or WPCA governs, 444 so these orders should
usually be considered final when the parties receive notice.
In addition to formal discontinuance and abatement orders
involving water, the PCA also has authority to issue permits,
rules and variances. 44 5 There is no statutory requirement of
finality before the appeal of actions for permits and variances
involving air, noise and solid waste; but a court should still require finality in these actions because of the valid policy interests in refusing access to the courts until an agency has
completed its decision. 446 Permit and variance actions should
normally be considered final when the parties receive notice.
In most cases rules will probably be considered final for the purposes of review only when they are filed with the Commissioner
of Administration, 447 because until they are so filed they do not
441. It may be argued that the stipulation agreement is not appealable. Since the PCA has discretion whether or not to prosecute, it can
be argued that a stipulation agreement is in effect a decision not to
prosecute.

A stipulation agreement, however, is more than a decision

not to prosecute because it indicates agency approval of the polluter's
action and provides a defense against private suits under Section 3(1)
of the ERA.
442. IhNN. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969). See text accompanying
note 304 supra.
443. MINN. STAT. § 115.07 subd. 6 (1969).
444.
(1969).

MMN. STAT.

§ 15.0422

(1969);

MINN.

STAT.

§ 115.05 subd. 1

445. See text at notes 18-20 and 62-85 supra.
446. See National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v.
Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1971) where the question of finality
was analyzed independently of any statutory requirement.
447.

In National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Schultz,

443 F.2d 689, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1971) the court noted that in the hypotheti-
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have the force of law.448
The application of the doctrines of ripeness and exhaustion
to the appeal of PCA rules is illustrated in North Suburban
Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. WPCC.44 9 Here the Sewer District appealed under the WPCA from a pollution standard set by the
Water Pollution Control Commission 4" 0 prohibiting the discharge of any sewage effluent into the Mississippi River in
certain zones. The Commission defended partially on the
ground that the action was not final. 4 5 1 However, the action was
clearly final for purposes of review because the Commission
had formally promulgated the rule before the Sewer District
sought judicial review and there was no possibility of reconsideration before conformity to the rule was expected.
Under the rubric of finality, however, the Commission argued that judicial review could not be granted until a permit
and variance had been requested. These arguments are best analyzed as issues of ripeness. Since the rule in question contained provisions requiring a permit and providing for a variance,452 the Commission argued in effect that the issue was not
ripe for review until the Sewer District had been denied a
variance and a permit. This is too restrictive a view of ripeness
when viewed in light of the balancing test-weighing the fitness
of the issue for judicial decision against the hardship to the
453
District in withholding court consideration.
The court in this case was not entertaining a hypothetical
cal situation in which the head of an agency issues a signed, interpretative ruling, this ruling should be considered final for the purposes of
review, even though such a ruling does not yet have the force of law.
On the other hand Reserve Mining has suggested that the PCA Rule
WPC-15 was not final until it was approved by the Department of the
Interior, even though it had been filed previously. Reply for Respondent Memorandum at 16-19, Reserve Mining Co. v. W.P.C.A., No. 05011
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970), appeal filed No. 43117,
April 22, 1971.
448. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0413 subd. 3 & 4 (1969). These provisions
apply to all rules and regulations promulgated before passage of the
APA as well as to all those promulgated under the act. The act does
not specifically require the filing of rules involving water, but a reasonable reading of the statute suggests that this was the intent.
449. 281 Minn. 524, 162 N.W.2d 242 (1968). See also Annot., 32
A.L.R.3d 199 where the case is reported as part of an annotation on
water anti-pollution statutes.
450. The Water Pollution Control Commission was abolished in 1967
and the PCA created in its place by Mnm. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 5 (1969).
451. 281 Minn. at 534, 162 N.W.2d at 256.
452. 281 Minn. at 531-35, 162 N.W.2d at 255-56.
453. See text accompanying note 430 supra.
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question. The reasonableness of the rule4" 4 was at issue and,
since the District wished to build a treatment plant that would
empty into the zone covered by the rule, the interests of the
parties were adverse. Moreover, since the District wished to
begin construction of a new treatment facility, it would have suffered some hardship because of delay. The court was therefore
clearly correct in rejecting any objection on the grounds of
ripeness.
The North Suburban case also dealt with an exhaustion
issue. Since the rule in question provided for variances, the
District arguably should have been required to seek a variance
and permit before appealing to the court. If it had done so
and its request had been denied, the reviewing court would
have had before it a record and clearly defined issues; if it had
been granted a variance, several years of litigation and great expense would have been avoided and the court would not have
needed to step into the agency process. The court dealt indirectly with the exhaustion question in holding that the District was not required to seek a variance because the Commission already had indicated that it would not grant one. 4 5
In
454. The lower court confused the issue and held the entire rule,
regardless of to whom it was applied, invalid.
455. The court's reasoning is open to criticism. The court stated
it was not persuaded that the Commission "would have doggedly supported its findings and standards through months of litigation in the
district and supreme courts if, as it now suggests, it was from the inception agreeable to issuing a variance . . . ." 281 Minn. at 535, 162
N.W.2d at 256. This is not necessarily so. The Commission, for example, may have been willing to grant a variance to a discharger that
would construct technically sound facilities and operate them in a manner consistent with the public interest (as one would expect of a public
body) while at the same time being unwilling to allow a judicial
declaration that the rule was invalid as to all dischargers (which is
what the district court did).
Another objection to the court's reasoning is that even if it was
likely that the agency would have denied the variance, exhaustion
should probably not have been excused. Prior Minnesota cases have
not recognized such an exception. See State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court, 259 Minn. 228, 238, 107 N.W.2d 307, 314 (1960). See also
note 434 supra. Other states also have not recognized this exception
when the indication of adversity is only inferential. See 2 F. COOPER,
supra note 417, at 580-81. If, however, there had been a clearer indication that the variance would not have been granted (there may have
been better grounds not reflected in the opinions or briefs) then the exemption would have been reasonable since the Agency need not go to
the added expense of preparing a mere pro forma request.
Finally, reliance on the New Jersey case of Glen Rock Realty Co.
v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 79, 88, 192 A.2d 865, 870 (1963) is
inapposite. There the court held that the power to grant a variance

"is neither a crutch to support the sagging frame of an unconstitutional
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view of previous Minnesota cases 4" 6 and the policy considerations that underlie the exhaustion doctrine, this was probably
an overly broad exception.
The case of Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency

457

illustrates both the problems of exhaustion

in the rule-making process and of finality in discontinuance and
abatement actions. This case involved a challenge by the Reserve MAning Company 458 to the validity of a PCA rule governing water quality.459 This challenge was filed after the PCA
was ordered by a Hennepin County district court in a writ of
mandamus to conduct a formal hearing to determine whether
Reserve was in violation of the PCA rule issued under Section
115.03 (1) and the original permit allowed it to discharge water
and crushed rock into Lake Superior. 40o The district court for
Lake County enjoined the PCA from holding the scheduled
hearings, 461 declared the regulation invalid as applied to Reserve and retained jurisdiction to approve alternative disposal
plans. 462 The case is now on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme
Court.

4 63

The procedural posture of the case is confused, but initially
it involved a forced PCA decision to hold a formal hearing
zoning ordinance nor a panacea for the cure of its fatal illness." Since
the ordinance in this case was unconstitutional, the case stands for the
general proposition that administrative remedies need not be exhausted
when an agency action was unconstitutional. See note 431 supra.
The case does not stand for the proposition that exhaustion need not
apply to unreasonable actions that are not unconstitutional.
456. See note 431 supra.
457. No. 05011 (Arlnn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970), appeal
filed No. 43117, April 22, 1971.
458. The Reserve Mining Co. processes low grade iron ore called
taconite into pellets suitable for use in smelting. The process involves the use of about 600,000,000 gallons of water daily and the daily
discharge of 68,000 tons of crushed rock into Lake Superior. Some
of the crushed rock is ground finely enough to remain suspended in
water for extensive periods of time. The processing plant is located
on the shore of Lake Superior and it draws water from and discharges
the water and crushed rock into Lake Superior. The company was
granted permits (permits No. 112 and P.A. 47-12) to discharge the
crushed rock into Lake Superior by the Water Pollution Control Commission on December 16, 1947.
459. Pollution Control Agency Rule WPC-15 (filed June 30, 1969).
460. No. 662008, Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st Dist., filed Sept. 19, 1969.
461. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, No.
05011, Order for Temporary Injunction and Stay of Proceedings (Minn.
Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., April 30, 1970).
462. Id. at Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment, at 14-15 filed Dec. 15, 1970.
463. No. 43117, filed April 22, 1971.
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(a prelude to a discontinuance and abatement order) and a
nearly simultaneous decision by Reserve to contest the validity
of the applicable rules. 46 4 The appeal of the rule was characterized by the district court as an "application to this Court for
relief in the form of a variance. ' '465 As such the appeal did not
involve a challenge to the general validity of the rule, 40 0 but
rather to the rule as applied to Reserve. Since the PCA does
have authority to grant variances, Reserve should have been required under the exhaustion doctrine to seek a variance from
the PCA before contesting the validity of the application of the
rule. Had the request been granted, several years of litigation
may have been avoided; if it had been refused, the reviewing
court would have been presented with clearly framed issues and
a factual record on which to base its findings.
The court's action in enjoining the formal PCA hearing is
also subject to analysis under the finality doctrine since the
agency action has already begun. Since there was no order to
review, the court should not have intervened. Also, on simple
ground of comity 467 the court should not have intervened in the
discontinuance and abatement order process because it was completely independent from the judicial review of the rule.
The result of the premature intervention in the formal hearing and the rule contest was that the court assumed powers
464.

It was also argued that the court should not have heard the

appeal on the grounds of primary jurisdiction. Reply Memorandum for
Respondent at 26. This analysis is more appropriate where there is a
dispute between two private persons (Reserve Mining and the Sierra
Club, for example) who have the choice of taking their dispute to
either the court or the agency, than it is where the dispute is part of

an on-going proceeding
latter case the dispute
issue is clouded in the
hearings only after it

between an agency and an individual. In the
is, in effect, already before the agency. The
Reserve case because the PCA decided to hold
was ordered to do so in a mandamus action

brought by a private group.
465. Finding of Fact 27, filed Dec. 15, 1970.

466. Had the real challenge been to the over-all validity of the
rule, the administrative remedies probably would not need to have
been exhausted because the controlling question would have been constitutional or one of law. See note 431 supra. The stricter Minnesota
rule, however, may have required exhaustion even in this situation.
467. The principle was stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
State v. Taran, 253 Minn. 158, 91 N.W.2d 444 (1958) as "a court which
first asserted jurisdiction will not be interfered with in the continuance
of its assertion by another court of foreign jurisdiction until it is convenient and desirable that the one give way to the other. . . ." This
reasoning was applied to courts in different jurisdictions, but it is
equally applicable to the relationship between courts and administrative
agencies in the same jurisdiction.
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clearly delegated to the PCA and made the agency's task considerably more difficult. The court, in enjoining the PCA hearing, stated:
This court feels that the time has come to brush aside all legal
technicalities and procedures that may impede a resolution of
these questions without further delay by taking the problem out
of the public and political arena into the court for a full and
comprehensive judicial review, where the interests of 40both the
public and industry can be fully explored and protected. S
The determination of what constitutes pollution and the decision as to how the interests of different groups are to be
weighed, however, are clearly delegated to the agency,409 as is
the task of gathering factual information and approving plans
for remedial action. Questions of pollution and environmental
regulation are not technical questions as much as questions of
public policy and priorities,47 0 and it is desirable to have the
resolution of such questions in the quasi-public, political arena
of the agency where the public can exert direct influence in
public hearings and indirect influence through its elected representatives.
In addition, the case imposed on the judiciary a tremendous
471
fact-finding task for which it was admittedly not qualified.
The court's lack of qualification in this area is even more
dramatically indicated by the fact that the court ordered Reserve to find an alternative disposal method subject to the approval of both the PCA and the court. 47 2 This forces the court
to pass on various proposals without the necessary technical
expertise after a hearing in a forum which is unsuited for
468. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 1,
No. 05011 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970).
469. MnUx. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969). See also MINN. STAT.
§ 116.01 (1969), which provides that the PCA was set up
[t]o meet the variety and complexity of problems relating to
water, air and land pollution. .. and to achieve a reasonable
degree of purity of water, air and land resources of the state
consistent with the maximum enjoyment and use thereof in
furtherance of the welfare of the people of the state ....
470. In an industrial society a clean environment can only be
achieved at the cost of preventing contaminants from entering the environment, and the fewer contaminants one wishes to introduce into
the environment, the greater the cost. The public is thus faced with
the task of weighing the worth and cost of various degrees of environmental cleanliness.
471. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 7, No. 05011
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970).
472. Id. at 14-15.
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making scientific and technical determinations. The trial also
involved an enormous and needless expenditure of resources,
because the issues had not been narrowly defined in an administrative proceeding and because the PCA felt that for practical
reasons it was compelled to counterclaim on the issue of whether
Reserve was in fact polluting Lake Superior. Finally, the PCA
was forced to defend its position in a posture determined by the
court and the appellant in his complaint. Since the PCA is
charged with the protection of the public interest in the area
of waste discharge into water, it is desirable from a policy viewpoint for the courts to allow the PCA to determine the pro473
cedure as well as the substance of that protection. '
3.

Scope of Review

The scope of review of PCA decisions is governed by Sections 15.0417 and 15.0425 of the APA, Section 10 of the ERA,
and a large body of case law. After the recent case of Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse
Co.4 7 4 it is not always clear which provisions govern in specific
instances. In practice, however, the uncertainty does not pose
great difficulty because, with the possible exception of the ERA,
the different tests are nearly identical.
Minneapolis Van involved the applicability of Section 15.
0425. This section provides that a reviewing court may
remand . . . reverse or modify the decision if the substantial
rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the
administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
4 75
(f)

Arbitrary or capricious.

This provision was held to govern the scope of review in ap473. If the PCA had held the hearings and issued a final order to
the effect that Reserve was in violation of its permit or PCA Rule WPC15, there would have been an additional question of exhaustion. The
PCA could have argued that Reserve had not exhausted its administrative remedies until it had applied for and been denied a variance.
See text accompanying notes 454-56 infra.
474. 288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970). This case involved the
award of a common carrier permit.
475. If the action is appealed as a "contested case" under Section
15.0424, the reviewing court will be restricted to the record.
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peals of orders based on findings of fact by the Public Service
Commission. The court reasoned that the purpose of the APA
is "to make uniform the scope of review of the decisions of all
administrative fact-finding agencies ... .47 The court reached
its decision on several grounds. First, Section 15.0425 provides
that it governs "any proceedings for judicial review by any
court of decisions of any agency" (emphasis added), including
those agencies specifically excluded from the APA definition of
agency. 4 7

Second, the court noted that the legislature "un-

mistakably intended 4718 Section 15.0425 to make uniform the
scope of review of fact finding agencies, and third, the APA was
enacted subsequent to the substantive statute governing the
Public Service Commission.
Limited to the facts of the case, Minneapolis Van holds only
that Section 15.0425 governs the scope of review of actions involving adjudicatory agency fact-finding.4 0 This should include all "contested cases" 4 0 and actions that are neither "rules"
nor "contested cases," such as permits and other reviewable, informal proceedings since these too involve fact finding. Thus,
at a minimum, it will eliminate the distinction between water
on the one hand and air, noise and solid waste on the other in

cases involving fact finding.
The chief uncertainty is whether the reasoning in Minneapolis Van will expand the coverage of Section 15.0425 to in476.
477.

288 MAinn. at 297-98, 180 N.W.2d at 177.
mNw.STAT. § 15.0411 (1969).

478. 288 Minn.at 298, 180 N.W.2d at 177.
479. Literally interpreted the phrase "fact finding agencies" refers
to the agency rather than the action appealed. It suggests that agencies must be classified as either fact finding or non-fact finding, and that
Section 15.0425 applies to all that are classified as fact-finding, regardless
of the specific action involved in the appeal. Such a literal reading
makes no sense. The better reading is that the court was referring to
orders involving agency fact finding.
.480. The reviewing court's use of the record made before the agency
has an important, indirect bearing on the scope of review. If the reviewing court is restricted to the record, its discretion to overturn the
agency decision will be somewhat narrower than if it may hear the
matter de novo. In the review of "contested cases" involving air, noise
and solid waste (and those involving water if the APA is held to govern water) Section 15.0424 subd. 4, 5 and 6 provide that, unless procedural irregularities are alleged, the reviewing court is restricted to
the record made during the agency proceedings. If the reviewing
court wishes more evidence, or if additional evidence has come to light
between the agency proceeding and the appeal, the court must require
that the new evidence be presented to the agency, which then has the
opportunity to modify its action. Only then does the new evidence pass
to the court as part of the record.
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clude the scope of review of rule-making. It can be argued that
since the section applies to "any proceedings for judical review,"
it applies to proceedings for the review of rules. However,
the section also provides that it applies to "decisions," and that
term is not an apt description of the process involved in rulemaking. 48 ' The term is used throughout the APA in reference
to "contested cases," and nowhere is it used in reference to a
"rule." In addition, Section 15.0425 appears at the end of the
portion of the statute dealing with contested cases and was part
of a single section in the model act providing for judicial review
of contested cases. 48 2 Finally, if Section 15.0425 were expanded
to cover rule-making, Section 15.0417, which sets out a scope
of review for "rules," would be superfluous. It also may be
argued that since all rule-making proceedings involve a hearing, 48 3 they will involve some fact finding such that rulemaking comes within the class of "fact finding" activities as
described in Minneapolis Van. In using the phrase "fact-finding," however, the court probably had adjudicative facts in
mind,48 4 rather than the legislative facts 48 5 involved in rulemaking hearings.
If Section 15.0425 does not govern the scope of review of
rule-making, then Section 15.0417 will govern the scope of review of "rules" involving air, noise and solid waste. This section provides that the court, in a declaratory judgment action,
may declare a "rule" invalid "if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the
agency or was adopted without compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures. ' 486 In addition, an agency action may be
481.

In North Suburban Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control

Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524, 535, 162 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1968) the court
referred to an agency rule as a decision. Thus it may be argued that
the Supreme Court uses the word "decision" to include the rule-making
process. Strictly speaking, this case involved the application of a rule
to a specific person.
482. 1946 HANDBOOK, supra note 379, at 213-15.
483. IMN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969). The PCA, as a matter
of policy, also holds hearings in all rule-making activity involving
water.
484. Adjudicative facts are "those to which the law is applied in the
process of adjudication." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 15.03 (1958).

485.

Legislative facts are "the facts which help the tribunal deter-

mine . . . policy . . . whenever a tribunal engages in the creation of

law or of policy." Id. at § 15.03.
486. In the appeal of a "rule" involving air, noise or solid waste
(and water if the APA is held to govern water) the reviewing court
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declared invalid if an agency violates any of its own rule-making
487

procedures.

The technical difference between the scope of review under
Section 15.0417 and Section 15.0425 is that under the former
provision a rule may not be challenged for lack of reasonableness, arbitrariness or error of fact or law. In practice, however,
this is not a significant distinction, because the statutes granting
the PCA rule-making authority give it only the power to promulgate reasonable rules. In the case of air, noise and solid
waste,48 8 the PCA has authority only to adopt standards based
"on technically substantiated criteria and commonly accepted
practices"4 8 9 and it may provide only "for such action as may be
reasonable, feasible, and practical under the circumstances."4 90
Thus, if a PCA rule is unreasonable or arbitrary, a court may
modify it, restrict its application under Section 15.0417 or totally
reject it on the ground that to the extent it is unreasonable it
"exceeds the statutory authority of the agency." The same rationale can be used to modify rules predicated on erroneous interpretations of applicable law. Similarly, to the extent that a
rule is premised on a significant factual inaccuracy, it is probably ipso facto unreasonable and also can be modified.
If the APA is not expanded to govern actions involving
water, then the judicially developed scope of review will govern
the appeal of all actions involving water except those covered
by Section 15.0425 under Minneapolis Van.49 1

The appropriate

is not restricted to the record as it is in the appeal of a "contested case."

See note 480 supra. The rationale for this distinction is that no formal
record is required in rule-making proceedings. In addition, since there
is no time limit for the appeal of a "rule" under the APA, the information presented to the agency during the rule-making proceedings
may be out of date. It is probable, however, that whatever information
was presented to the agency during the rule-making proceeding will be
presented to and considered by the court.
487. "Even though the adoption of the rule was a discretionary function, once it is adopted the agency does not have the discretion to disregard it." Springberg v. Wilson & Co., 245 Minn. 489, 493, 73 N.W.2d
433, 435 (1955); State ex rel. Independent School Dist. No. 6 v. Johnson,
242 Minn. 539, 65 N.W.2d 668 (1954).

488. If the APA is held to govern appeals of rules involving water,
the rules may also be challenged on reasonableness grounds because
VNine. STAT. § 115.03 subd. 1 (1969) provides that the PCA only has
authority to "establish and alter ... reasonable pollution standards."
489. MliNN. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 2 (1969).
490. MiwN. STAT. § 116.08 subd. 6 (1969).
491. The WPCA will determine the scope of review in all appeals
involving water in the unlikely event that Section 15.0425 does not

govern at least those involving fact finding under the reasoning of
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test was described in the North Suburban case as "limiting the
court's determination to whether or not the decision of the Commission was lawful and reasonable and warranted by the evidence. '492 Since this formulation is similar to both this test
and to that in Section 15.0425 and to the actual test under
Section 15.0417, it is to be expected that the judicially developed
test will be the same 493 as that found in the statutes.
Section 10 of the ERA governs where "the applicable statutory appeal period has elapsed." This provision will govern despite conflicting statutes because it was enacted subsequent to
the other appeals provisions 494 and because the legislature
clearly intended such supremacy. 495 In those cases the reviewing court has an extremely broad scope of review. The person
appealing an administrative action has the burden of establishMinneapolis Van. If that case is read narrowly, the judicially developed scope of review will also govern appeals involving air, noise and
solid waste that are neither "rules" nor "contested cases" under the
APA.
492. North Suburban Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm'n,
281 Minn. 524, 535, 162 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1968).
Here the reviewing court is not restricted to the record made before
the agency. Under Section 115.05 subd. 6 the agency must forward to
the court "a statement of any findings of fact or rulings or conclusions
of law made by the commission in the matter . . . ." The court may
then "take additional evidence on any issue of fact or may try any or
all such issues de novo . . ." under Section 115.05 subd. 7. Under Section 115.05 subd. 9 the appealed action is prima facie correct, reasonable
and valid. This procedure is, for practical purposes, the same as the
procedure required in the appeal of "rules" under the APA. See note
486 supra. It differs from the procedure on appeal of "contested cases"
in that the reviewing court is not restricted to the record. Where a
formal record has been made before an agency, it is desirable to require
the reviewing court to restrict itself to the record (where a method of
taking new evidence for good cause is provided, and where the rule
does not apply in cases involving procedural irregularities). First, It
avoids the cost, duplication of effort and delay inherent in a de novo
proceeding and second, it gives the agency greater freedom of action
vis a vis the courts in those areas where the legislature has delegated
responsibility to the agency.
493. Another section of the WPCA has an indirect effect on the
scope of review. M1NN. STAT. § 115.44 subd. 8 (1969) provides that in
actions involving criteria and standards for water under the WPCA, an
agency action shall not be overturned under the judicial review provisions of the WPCA if the action was taken in order to "meet the
requirements of federal law." This provision is of limited application
and is designed to enable the state to take advantage of federally
funded programs.
494. The court in Minneapolis Van relied in part on the fact that
Section 15.0425 was enacted subsequent to the statute governing the
Public Service Commission.
495. Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L.
REv. 575, 577 (1972).
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ing a prima facie showing4 96 that the agency action involved
"is inadequate to protect the air, water, land, or other natural
resources . . . from pollution, impairment, or destruction." If
the person satisfies this burden, the matter then is remitted to
the agency for reconsideration. The court retains jurisdiction
for purposes of judicial review to determine whether the order
of the agency is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In this second judicial proceeding the original plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the agency action is unsupported
and a reviewing court must overturn any agency action it finds
4 7
unsupported by the "preponderance of the evidence."
It is clear that the ERA is designed to expand the discretion
of the courts vis-a-vis the PCA, but it is uncertain whether this
change in language will greatly alter the scope of review. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has in the past avoided semantic complexities and in effect has adopted a "substantial evidence"
test.498

In view of the tremendous difficulties that confront

courts when they assume responsibility for technical analysis
and the formulation and supervision of a regulatory system, the
courts probably will take a narrow view of the ERA test and
wind up in practice with a scope of review not much broader
499
than the substantial evidence test.

496. Id. at 635.

497. It is not clear from the statute whether the reviewing court
is restricted to the record; but since the statute requires a remission
of the proceeding to the agency and does not specifically provide for
the taking of new evidence by the court, the best construction would
restrict review to the record. The alternative would render remittitur
pointless in that all the evidence taken before the agency could be
ignored on review.
498. The usual scope of review was stated in Bryan v. Community
State Bank, 285 Minn. 226, 234, 172 N.W.2d 771, 776 (1969), where the
court ruled that
[it] will not interfere with an agency's conclusions unless it appears that the agency has violated a constitutional provision;
has not kept within its jurisdiction; has proceeded on an erroneous theory of law; has acted arbitrarily or capriciously so
that its determination represents its will and not its judgment;
or is without evidence to support its conclusions.
For a lengthy compilation of cases dealing with scope of review, see
DuNNELL's DIGEST § 397b (3rd ed. 1967).
499. Section 9 of the ERA also has an indirect effect on the scope of
review. Section 9 subd. 2 sets out agency duties where a person has
intervened in an agency action under Section 9 subd. 1: The agency must
(1) "consider the alleged impairment, pollution, or destruction of the air,
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state . . .,"
and (2) "no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is
likely to have such effect so long as there is a feasible and prudent
alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public
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B. REVIEW IN DEFENSE TO AGENCY PROSECUTION
Rather than taking the initiative in appealing an agency
action, the alleged violator may instead attempt to gain review
by defending an action brought by the agency. The PCA is
authorized to request the Attorney General to bring civil or
criminal actions to enforce its rules and decisions,, 00 and a defendant may wish to obtain judicial review of the agency action
at this point. Such review is available in actions involving air,
noise and solid waste; but it is doubtful whether such review
is available in cases involving water.
The WPCA provides that if no appeal is taken from an
agency action, then "the action of the commission in the matter shall be deemed conclusive, and the validity and reasonableness thereof shall not be questioned in any other action or
proceeding ....
501 This provision clearly prohibits any attack
on the agency action as a defense in an enforcement action. °2
Yet despite the clear statutory language, it is uncertain whether
the court, if confronted with flagrantly abusive agency action
or clear unconstitutionality, would not review the agency ac503
tion.
In actions involving air, noise and solid waste the chief
question is the applicable scope of review.50 4 In view of the

health, safety and welfare and the state's paramount concern for the

protection of its air, water, land, and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction."
If the agency fails to consider the factors listed in (1), or allows
conduct prohibited in (2), that constitutes grounds for a judicial reversal of the agency action. Strictly speaking this provision does not
define the scope of review; rather it defines permissible agency action.

If the PCA violates a provision of Section 9 (2), that action will be unreasonable, in excess of statutory authority or unlawful under the applicable scope of review.
500.

MINN. STAT. § 116.08 (1969); MINN. STAT. § 115.07 (1969).

501.

MINN. STAT. § 115.05 subd. 10 (1969).

502.

Presumably the only person who would wish to attack an

agency action in an enforcement proceeding would be the discharger.
Therefore Section 10 of the ERA, granting environmentalists the right
to appeal even after the appeal period under the WPCA has expired,
would not affect this provision.
503. See note 378 supra. This is an issue in the Reserve Mining
case because the PCA is claiming that the validity of the rule may not
be questioned. See note 447 supra.
504. Standing and timing should not be an issue, although the agency

could argue that the discharger cannot challenge the agency action
until he has exhausted his administrative remedies by seeking a vari-

ance. In the usual case, however, the fact that the agency is seeking
court enforcement of an order suggests that any further administrative
appeal would be futile. See note 431 supra. See also North Suburban
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broad applicability of Section 15.0425 and the similarity of all
the tests, the scope of review will probably be essentially the
substantial evidence rule.

C. APPEAL THROUGH THE USE OF EXTRAoRDINARY WRITS,
INJUNCTION Am DECLARATORY.JUDGMEN'r ACTIONS

Judicial review historically was obtained by means of extraordinary writs, injunctions and declaratory judgment actions. 50 5
When an action was challenged by means of a writ, those most
frequently used were mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo
warranto. The subsequent enactment of statutory methods of
judicial review has nearly curtailed the use of writs, although in
rare cases an aggrieved person still finds their use more desirable than appeal under a statute.50 6
Whether or to what extent these remedies are still available
to challenge PCA actions is uncertain. Under the WPCA, when
no appeal has been taken within a statutorily prescribed time
"the reasonableness and validity thereof shall not be questioned
in any other action or proceeding .... ,,5"7 Therefore, to the extent judicial review was available under the WPCA but not
sought it cannot be obtained through non-statutory proceedings. If, however, the WPCA provided no means of judicial
review, the statute itself does not preclude review by another
means. 508
Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524,
162 N.W.2d 249 (1968).
505. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEORGETOWN L.J. 287 (1948); Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 33 MINN. L. Rnv. 569, 685 (1949), 36 MxxN.
L. REyv. 435 (1952) [published in three parts].
506. Agency inaction, for example, is exceedingly difficult to challenge. It was this difficulty that led the Sierra Club in 1969 to obtain
the writ of mandamus ordering the PCA to hold hearings on the issue
of whether Reserve Mining had violated its permit. See text accompanying notes 459-60 supra.
507. M1qN.STAT. § 115.05 sub& 10 (1969). See text accompanying
notes 501-03 supra.
508. This reading of the statute explains why a writ of mandamus
was granted in the Reserve case. Since the WPCA did not clearly provide a means of challenging agency inaction, it did not prohibit
such a challenge by other means. It also explains why the trial court
that eventually tried the Reserve Mining case granted an injunction preventing the PCA from holding the hearings it had been ordered to
hold. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, Order for
Temporary Injunction and Stay of Proceedings, No. 05011 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., 6th Dist., filed April 30, 1970).
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The second restriction is contained in Waters v. Putnam,0""
where the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the writs of
certiorari and mandamus could not be used to take an appeal
that could have been made under the APA had not the statutory appeal period lapsed.51 0 The court based its decision regarding certiorari on prior case law holding that where the
time to appeal an order had lapsed, certiorariis not available; 5 '"
it premised its decision on mandamus on the statutory provision
that mandamus may not issue where another, adequate remedy
is available. 12 The reasoning of this case should apply equally
to the writs of quo warranto and prohibition because they are
also generally not available when there is, or was, an adequate
remedy available.

51 3

The unavailability of extraordinary remedies where a statutory appeal is available 514 is clearly desirable because the statutory provisions governing appeals periods would be rendered
nugatory if they could be readily avoided by resort to a writ.
The existence of parallel avenues of appeal would be a step
509. 289 Minn. 165, 183 N.W.2d 545 (1971).
510. Appeals of PCA actions should be distinguished from appeals
such as the one in Bryan v. Community State Bank, 285 Minn. 226,
172 N.W.2d 771 (1969) where the court held that review was available
both under the APA and by certiorari. In Bryan the statute governing
the Department of Commerce (MiNN. STAT. § 45.07 (1969) ) provided
specifically that review by certiorari was available. Thus the court
was not faced with the question of whether certiorari is available
when not specifically authorized by a statute.
511. State ex rel. Grobe v. Oak Center Creamery, 269 Minn. 505,
131 N.W.2d 621 (1964).
512. MINN. STAT. § 586.02 (1969).
513. Quo warranto: State ex rel. Burnquist v. Village of North
Pole, 213 Minn. 297, 6 N.W.2d 458 (1942); Dennistown v. Davis, 179
Minn. 373, 229 N.W. 353 (1930); State ex rel. Bell v. Moriarty, 82 Minn.
68, 84 N.W. 495 (1900). Prohibition: State ex tel. Sheehan v. District

Court, 253 Minn. 462, 93 N.W.2d 1 (1958), cert. denied sub nom., Standard
American Life v. Sheehan, 359 U.S. 909 (1959), State ex rel. Beede v.
Funck, 211 Minn. 27, 299 N.W. 684 (1941); State ex rel. Minnesota
Nat'l Bank of Duluth v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 262 N.W. 155
(1935). Injunction: Adelman v. Onischuk, 271 Minn. 216, 135 N.W.2d
670 (1965), cert. denied sub nom. Adelman v. Lower Minnesota River
Watershed Dist., 382 U.S. 108 (1965); AMF Pinspotters v. Harkins, 260
Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1961); Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101
N.W.2d 923 (1960).
514. These writs should be unavailable on the authority of Waters
despite the fact that Section 15.0424 of the APA provides that "nothing in
this section [judicial review of "contested cases"] shall be deemed to
prevent resort to other means of review . . . provided by law now or

hereafter enacted."

This provision provides that it does not itself pre-

clude other means of review; it does not provide that another statute
or judicial decision may not either preclude or limit judicial review.
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backward in the development of administrative procedure 515
and would encourage aggrieved parties to force their claims into
procedural postures that granted them the most favorable terms
of review, instead of those most conducive to the fair and
prompt disposition of the cases.

The statutes, however, have not completely preempted the
areas occupied by the writs and equity, as illustrated by the
Reserve Mining litigation.516 In 1969 environmental rights
groups found that the PCA was unwilling to make a formal

inquiry into the question of whether Reserve was violating any
permits or rules by dumping taconite tailings into Lake Superior.
In that situation the only judicial remedy was a writ of mandamus to compel the agency to hold hearings.
D.

CoNcLusIoN

On the basis of the statutes and cases governing appeals
from PCA actions, several general observations can be made.
First, the APA and its judicial construction have resulted in a
trend toward consolidating the law governing judicial review of
agency actions. This is a desirable trend, because it has greatly
simplified an extremely confused body of law. At the same
time, the courts have retained enough discretion under the APA
to meet the particular requirements of the various agencies.
This flexibility, combined with the fact that access to the courts
can also be controlled by the individual statute governing the
agency, has permitted the specific application of the APA's general principles to the specific needs of the PCA.
Second, whereas the judicial development of administrative
law in Minnesota has generally expanded the scope of agency
discretion, the courts have intervened too early in PCA activities. The desire of some courts to take a "problem out of the
public and political arena into the court for a full and comprehensive judicial review, where the interests of both the public
and industry can be fully explored and protected," 517 while well
515. Davis remarked that "[aln imaginary system cunningly planned
for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation would copy the major features of the extraordinary remedies."
3 K. DAvis, supra note 382, at 388. He also has suggested the abolition
of the extraordinary remedies as a means of judicial review as a basic
step in the development of orderly state administrative procedure. Id.
at 433.
516. See note 508 supra.
517. See text accompanying note 468 supra.
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motivated is undesirable for several reasons. First, the question of the use and protection of the enviroment is at root not
only a technical question but also a fundamental question of
public policy. As such it is most properly debated before an
agency which is more directly responsible to the public and provides a more open forum for debate than a court. Second, as
illustrated in the Reserve Mining litigation, the courts are not
well equipped to handle questions requiring a high degree of
technical expertise. And finally, an agency is better suited to
the development of a comprehensive, state-wide approach to
environmental regulation. Therefore the courts should restrict
their intervention into the judicial process to a later point by
adopting a more restrictive view of the timing doctrines. This
would allow agencies the discretion necessary to adequately
protect the environment while preserving the courts' ability to
prevent abuses of agency discretion at a later point.
II.

CONTROL BY THE LEGISLATURE

State legislatures, 515 acting as the elected representatives of
the people, are responsible for overseeing the administration of
law by the various agencies, as well as for creating the greater
part of that law. To this end, the legislature exercises numerous controls with respect to the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, these legislative controls include: A) within the committee system, the development by standing committees of a
significant portion of what eventually becomes the substantive
law which the agency will administer, the allocation of resources
to the PCA by appropriations committees, and the ad hoc review
of agency activities by watchdog committees; B) determination
of the amount of discretion to be given the agency by altering
the breadth of statutory authorization; C) utilization of the
power to confirm agency officers to direct agency policy; and
D) intercession in conflicts between constituents and the agency.

519

518. Minnesota has a bicameral legislature composed of a House of
Representatives of 135 members and a Senate of 67 members.
519. Throughout this section many authorities will be cited that
deal with the federal experience. This has been necessitated by the
paucity of material on state administrative law especially in the area
of the interaction between state agencies and the other branches of
state government.

The statements for which they are cited have been

verified as applicable to Minnesota and the PCA through discussions
with individuals having personal knowledge of that particular subject.
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While the substantive results of the legislative process are
important, so are the characteristics of the committee system
which originates the legislation. The degree of centralization of
agency policy-making in each house and the level of expertise
of the members of committees on developing these policies are
major determinants of the substance and adequacy of the legislation ultimately enacted and of the relationship between the
legislators and the agency. Legislative controls are mainly delegated to the standing committees which each house has established to guide environmental policy-making. However, as the
need arises, ad hoc committees-called "watchdog committees"
*-areformed to examine environmental problems of particular
concern and to evaluate the agency's activities in those matters.
1.

Standing Committees

Policy decisions with regard to the PCA are made by two
types of standing committees. First, each house has a committee
charged with subject-matter jurisdiction over environmental issues. Second, the appropriations or finance committees of each
house must pass on funding for PCA programs in the course of
which those programs inevitably come under scrutiny.
a. Subject-matter Committees
The primary purpose of legislative subject-matter committees is to develop the substantive legislation which the agency
is charged with administering and to define policy guidelines
for its implementation. The agency's ability to discern coherent
policy,520 is hampered by the diffusion of responsibility among
committees drafting the legislation.5 12 Therefore, one committee within each house should be given major responsibility for
determining the general policy for the entire area of its concern. To the extent possible, that committee also should as520. See 1 F. CoopER, STATE ADbINIsTRATivE LA'w 32 (1965). By
design an administrative agency acts interstitially. That is, it details
and gives effect to the general policy of the legislature as embodied in
the statutes.
521. Interview with members of the legislative research staffs of
each house of the Minnesota legislature on October 29, 1971 [hereinafter
cited Legislative Interview]. Obviously the committees' policy judgments are subject to final review by the legislature as a whole. Nevertheless, most policy decisions reached in the committees appear to
receive the legislature's final approval virtually unaltered.

1096

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:997

sume the duty of deciding specific policy questions raised by
particular bills. A more coordinated general policy comprised
of consistent, cohesive parts is more likely to be the result than
if such responsibility is fragmented.
In Minnesota, the Environmental Preservation Committee
exercises jurisdiction over PCA affairs in the House. Apparently
this committee, in conjunction with its PCA subcommittee,
serves the desired function of centralizing policy decisions. By
contrast, the Senate displays a far less centralized structure
than the House. While the Natural Resources Committee of the
Senate is designed to be the counterpart of the Environmental
Preservation Committee, 522 in practice it has not functioned as
such. Numerous environmental matters are referred to and
acted upon by other committees in the Senate having little nexus
with the subject matter. 5 23 Fragmented and potentially inconsistent policy guidelines that are likely to result tend to force
the PCA to synthesize an overall working policy and decrease
24
the likelihood that a given policy will in fact be effectuated.
Clearly, any policy developed by these committees will vary
in quality with the respective knowledge of its members concerning the specific problems and issues that have arisen or
may arise. 52 5 Committeemen in Minnesota generally lack technical expertise in matters of pollution control. 20 As a result
they have placed heavy reliance upon testimony and evidence
given by experts representing various public and private interests.5 27 Moreover, technical information supplied by the PCA
is usually treated as fact and most conflicts are resolved in the
agency's favor.52 8 The PCA thereby has an opportunity to in522.

There is no corresponding subcommittee dealing exclusively

with PCA matters. Legislative Interview, supra note 521.
523. Id. Most of this referral has been at the initiative of the
chairman of the Natural Resources Committee.
524. See Perkins, American Government and Politics, Congressional
Self-Improvement, 38 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 499 (1944).
525.

See generally Jones, "Oversight" Function of Congressional

Standing Committees, 34 A.B.A.J. 1018 (1948).
526. Legislative Interview, supra note 521. Interview with staff personnel of the PCA on November 1, 1971 [hereinafter cited as PCA Interview]. This is not to say that in the future committeemen may not
acquire expertise to some degree. Certainly this deficiency may be attributed in large measure to the undeveloped, dynamic nature of pollution control knowledge in general.
527. Legislative Interview, supra note 521; PCA Interview, supra
note 526.
528. PCA Interview, supranote 526.
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fluence significantly the policy-making process and to shape the
law that it will administer.
This lack of technical expertise has necessitated the development of a cooperative working relationship by the committees
with the PCA. The fact that committee meetings and hearings
rarely assume an adversary nature is a manifestation of this
cooperation. 529 The informality which prevails in at least these
public encounters is conducive to the effective assimilation of
information by the legislators. 530 The committees of both
houses are generally receptive to changes and innovations proposed by the PCA and advice is often solicited from the PCA
on legislative programs, independent of that which the PCA
offers of its own initiative. 53 1 An obvious advantage of the
rather continuous contact between the committees and the PCA
is that policy-makers become familiar with the daily operations
of the agency for which they must legislate. Consequently,
they are better able to mold legislation to fit the administrative
needs and capabilities of the PCA. However, the committees
must be cautious about developing a dependence on the PCA for
data and suggestions. A delicate balance must be maintained
between cooperation and reliance in order that the legislature
refrain from surrendering the ultimate decision-making power.
Certain factors mitigate the actual or potential influence of
the PCA over the inexpert legislators. First, the committeemen
in both houses endeavor to acquire the broad knowledge necessary to form objective judgments of their own with regard to
technical matters. For example, in the last legislative session
the House Environmental Preservation Committee devoted its
first three meetings exclusively to hearing testimony on the state
of the environment and on a desirable future course of action.532 Later committee hearings in both houses were also of53a
fact-finding tenor rather than investigations of PCA affairs. 3
529. Legislative Interview, supra note 521. This may be a function
of the committees' lack of expertise resulting in an inability to mount a
challenge to technical information presented.
530. Id. Apparently this relationship continues in the private contact between the PCA and members of these committees.
531. PCA Interview, supranote 526.
532. Both public and special interest groups in addition to the PCA
provided opinions at these hearings. Legislative Interview, supra note
521; PCA Interview, supra note 526.
533. Legislative Interview, supra note 521; PCA Interview, supra
note 526. But cf. Scher, Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study, 54 AM. Po. Scx. R v. 911,
914-15 (1960).
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However, concern for obtaining all the information often caused
legislative programs to be considered at a rather conservative
5 34
pace.
Second, closed committee meetings are occasionally used in
making final policy decisions,5 35 thereby effectively removing
those decisions from the influence of PCA technology and various special interests. However, this procedure cannot be condoned as a general practice since as a result the public is also
deprived of the information.
On balance, then, it would be incorrect to conclude that
the subject-matter committees "control" the PCA in fact, although they certainly possess the means for doing so through
their control over the final legislative product which the agency
must administer. A better appraisal of the relationship would
be that the committees and the agency maintain a harmonious
relationship of mutual cooperation, with the PCA exerting a
greater influence over the committees than the committees exert over the PCA.
b.

Appropriations

In addition to the substantive standing committees, the appropriations committee in each house also controls state agencies. Pursuant to their power to review and approve an agency's budget, these committees consider the policies and programs
to be furthered by the requested funds. Unfortunately, they
often exceed the optimal scope of this review and begin to effectuate their own policy decisions through an overzealous use
of their powers.
Since the aggregate of an agency's programs are seldom
reviewed as a whole except during the appropriations process,
the committees charged with this duty bear great responsibility
for ensuring that the programs represent a coordinated state
policy. Consequently, the ultimate decisions on substantive environmental programs are shifted from the subject-matter committees to those dealing with appropriations. In discharging
this duty, legislators tend to concentrate unduly on the details
534. This may be interpreted either as a policy of conservatism or
as a deliberate technique for stalling legislation, depending upon one's
viewpoint. Near the end of the session, frustration with the effects of
this policy became manifest in the public hearings and meetings. PCA
Interview, supranote 526.
535. Id.

1972]

MINNESOTA PCA

1099

of an agency's programs or internal operations.5 3 0 This tendency is particularly unfortunate since only a few appropriations committee members oversee a particular agency's budget
and since these members have less access to the relevant technical expertise than do members of subject-matter committees.
During appropriations a few committeemen have virtually
unrestricted power over the effectiveness of the agency and the
state's policy in a given area. 7 The process itself creates the
need for delegation of initial authority to small subcommittees
because of the volume of requests under review. In such a
system, review seemingly would be limited by time considerations. Frequently, however, this is not the case. In the Minnesota legislature, budget requests are considered by the subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee.538 Quite often these committees
unnecessarily review programs de novo that have already been
scrutinized by the subject-matter committees and by the legislature as a whole and which have been embodied in a budget
that has been examined by the Governor 30 and others.340 Then,
since budgets are lumped together in one omnibus appropriations bill, the subcommittees' decisions receive only limited review by the legislature as a whole."4 1 Whenever these subcommittees substitute their own judgments on the details of a program for those of a more representative sampling of views that
has preceded, the goal of maximum information in decisionmaking is necessarily frustrated.
The quality of the product of legislative appropriations also
suffers because those committeemen who concern themselves
with the minutiae of programs lack access to technical expertise.5 42 This is true both with respect to the substantive matters handled by the agency and its internal operations. Since
Minnesota legislators neither possess this expertise nor have the
536. Id. See generally White, Congressional Control of the Public
Service, 39 AzvL PoL. Smx Ruv. 1 (1945).
537. See Macmahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The
Power of the Purse-II,58 Pot.. ScL Q. 380-88 (1943).
538. Legislative Interview, supra note 521.
539. MAbN. STAT. § 16.15 subd. 1 (1969).
This is actually handled on a
STAT. § 16.14 (1969).
540. Afmx.
preliminary basis by the Department of Administration. For a more
detailed explanation of the procedure, see text accompanying notes 615-19
infra.
541. See Macmahon, supra note 537, at 386-88.
542. See text accompanying notes 526-28, supra. See generally
Perkins, supra note 524 at 508; but cf. Knapp Congressional Control of
AgriculturalConservationPolicy, 71 POL. SCx Q. 257, 258-59 (1956).
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time to acquire it during appropriations hearings,54 3 detrimental
reductions occur in crucial areas of PCA planning. For example, the PCA requested more than 200 new positions for the
1971-73 beiennium to meet growing pollution control demands
and added responsibilities expected from the current legislature.
The House Appropriations Committee recommended only 33 new
PCA positions before finally compromising at 64.54 4

This is

barely enough to maintain the status quo, especially when
federal requirements 545 and new state duties 5 4"

are consid-

ered. 547 Such decisions obviously were made without due regard for future manpower needs of the PCA and their immediate consequences will be felt in terms of forced replanning. 548
Ultimately such decisions will determine whether the PCA can
remain an effective force in pollution control.
In effectuating appropriations decisions, the legislature employs several distinct techniques to control the activities of an
agency. First, requested funds can be trimmed or eliminated
in a specific area of the agency's concern. Trimming of the
PCA's manpower request is one example of this technique. Another is the appropriation of only $145,000 in state funds for
special studies by the PCA, as compared with a request of
$355,000.49 Such reductions will force a reordering of priorities
543. PCA Interview, supra note 526.
544. PCA Interview, supra note 526. The House apparently has a
reputation for substantially paring budget requests of state agencies.
545. Proposed Biennial Budget, Detailed Estimates, 1971-1973. Presented by Governor Wendell R. Anderson to the Sixty-Seventh Legislature, Jan. 1, 1971, at F-287 to F-288.
546. PCA Interview, supra note 526. For example, the passage of
legislation bringing noise pollution within the PCA's jurisdiction and
authorizing the adoption of standards and rules will impose a great
burden on existing administrative and enforcement personnel. Minn.
Laws 1971, ch. 727. But cf. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 3, § 42 (2) extra session.
547. PCA Interview, supra note 526.
548. The PCA might have appealed to the Governor for additional
funds during the interim between sessions. M1NN. STAT. § 3.30 (1969).
However, in the actual appropriation the committees took care to
emphasize that they had accounted for all the contingent manpower
needs of the PCA during the next biennium. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 3,
§ 42(2) extra session. "The amounts provided in subdivisions 1 and 2
[total general appropriations], are sufficient to fulfill all duties imposed
upon the agency by the 1971 legislature." Id.
549. Proposed Biennial Budget, supra note 545, at F-289 to F-290.
Furthermore, these studies must include a study of solid waste control and disposal, including but not limited to the recycling and reuse
of solid and other waste materials to be reported to the legislature on
or before January 31, 1973. Thus, a certain part of these crucial research funds have been frozen into a particular topic which may or
may not reflect a proper priority.
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and substantial revisions in long-range and short-range planning. 550 Second, restrictions may be imposed on the uses to
which funds may be put. For example, funds totalling $800,000
for each year of the biennium were specifically allocated to an
automobile recycling project not even requested by the PCA-' 1
Without regard for the desirability of such a project, these
funds (in excess of 50% of the balance of the PCA's funding)
would probably be utilized differently if unrestricted. Third,
statutory controls may be found in the fine print of appropriations bills which are totally unrelated to the budget itself. For
example, a rider was attached to the PCA appropriation stating
that:
Prior to the holding of any public hearing, the purpose for which
being the establishment of odor control regulations which would
apply to agriculture, the agency shall notify the appropriate
committees of the legislature.5 2
This amendment grew out of a dispute during the 1971 session
between the House Agriculture Committee and the PCA regarding the PCA's proposed odor control regulations.5 3 Fourth,
the subtleties of verbal exchanges at committee hearings can
result in significant changes in agency programs. What is mentioned in hearings by way of suggestion or criticism does not
carry the force of law. However, the agency can ill-afford to ignore it completely because of potential sanctions when it seeks
funding during the following legislative session., 4
Obviously, the legislature possesses a powerful tool in the
appropriations process by which to control an agency-a tool
which has been utilized excessively with respect to the PCA.
In order adequately to control pollution, primary responsibility
for considering the details of the agency's operations and programs should be placed not in the appropriations committees
but in the subject-matter committees established for that purpose.
550.

Note, Air Pollution Control in Minnesota, 54 MwN. L. Rsv.

953 (1970). The PCA has requested both new testing and monitoring
equipment for its Air Quality Division which would cost $55,000 each.
However, the 1969 Minnesota legislature appropriated the sum of $44,380
for such equipment. Presumably this forced the PCA to reallocate its
own funds to provide for such equipment. Id.
551. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 3, § 42(3) extra session. For the substantive authorization of this project, see Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 734.
552. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 3, § 42 (2) extra session.
553. PCA Interview, supra note 526. The rider was watered down
from the original proposal that would have forbidden the PCA from
using any funds to enforce odor regulations, at least with regard to
farms.
554. M. KiRsT, GovPRNm r WiTouT PAssnG LAws 118 (1969).
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Watchdog Committees

The term "watchdog committee" is a generic name for a
group of legislators assembled ad hoc to investigate a special
subject of concern. 555 Their purpose is to take issue with procedures, actions or policies of agencies or departments of government. As such, they have occasion to oversee past, present and
future programs of these bodies.
Generalizations about watchdog committees are difficult to
make because no two are alike and they are usually short-lived.
Nonetheless, these committees can serve a useful function in
forcing an agency to account for its actions not only to the legislature, but also through the media to the public in general.
Furthermore, since these committees are normally non-statutory, they do not have at their disposal the statutory powers
granted standing committees.556 The tenor of an investigation
can vary from simple fact-finding to a demeaning inquisition
into personal affairs.5 57 However, if a standing committee performs the watchdog function in a given case, it retains its usual
powers of subpoena and citation for contempt to compel testi558
mony.
During the 1971 session of the Minnesota legislature, the
House Agriculture Committee was critical of the PCA's proposed feedlot regulations. An ad hoc investigation was initiated
by this committee into the justification for many of the reSpecial hearings
strictions imposed by these regulations.5 50
were held during which the regulations were scrutinized and
several changes were requested. 560 The net product of this committee's activities was a few minor changes in the regulations
555. The term is also meant to encompass an investigation of similar sorts by a standing committee of matters beyond the scope of that
committee's subject-matter responsibility. It also may refer to specially authorized committees or commissions charged with investigating a limited subject matter. For a description of Congressional
watchdog committees, see W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 87-88 (5th Ed. 1970).

556. E.g., the powers of subpoena and citation for contempt.

See

note 558 infra.

557. Scher, supra note 533. A person or group being considered must
be mindful of the fact that some of the individuals comprising the
watchdog committee must be dealt with in order contexts, e.g., as a
member of the appropriations committee.
558. All standing and interim committees are authorized by statute
to issue subpoenas. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 227, § 1.
559. PCA Interview, supra note 526.
560. A proposal was made to this committee

that a variance

granted by the regulations for natural odors be deleted. However the
committee clearly had no direct power in this regard.
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and an abundance of ill feeling.5 6 ' Such an investigation arguably was beyond the scope of the Agriculture Committee's jurisdiction. Moreover, since the PCA is required to hold public
hearings with regard to proposed regulations, 56 2 the ad hoc hearings were unnecessary, except to the extent that the Agriculture
Committee wanted to influence public opinion against the proposed regulations. 56 3 This is the only recent experience which
the PCA has had with a watchdog committee. 6 4 The results are
instructive of the potential pitfalls of a less-than-judicious use
of this technique.
B. BREADTH OF STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
The extent to which the legislature grants discretion to an
agency or retains control in itself is determined by the breadth
of language in statutes which the agency is charged with administering. While usually discussed in the context of the delegation doctrine, 565 precision in legislative drafting constitutes a
potent instrument of control over agency discretion. Since stat-

utory language cannot possibly encompass all the variant factual situations that may arise, some agency discretion is inevitable. 566 Neither a "broad" nor a "narrow" statute can be

condemned a priori since each serves a valid purpose. Among
the factors to be taken into account in arriving at the optimum
degree of specificity are: 1) the breadth of the statute's subject

matter, 567 2) the familiarity of the legislators with the subject
matter, and 3) the past record of the agency in adhering to
stated policies.
Broad statutory authorization allows the agency significant
discretion in interpreting and applying the legislative policy.
561. PCA Interview, supranote 526.
562. MAtNN. STAT. § 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969); Minn. Laws 1971, ch.
887.
563. In addition to this watchdog investigation, an interim committee
has been established to pursue this matter further.
564. However, general PCA policies will come under scrutiny during
a joint "investigation" to be conducted by the natural resources subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee beginning May 5, 1972.
The state senator whose efforts are primarily responsible for the organization of these meetings has asserted that the PCA's director is
subverting legislative intent by inappropriate allocation of manpower
and resources, and this will apparently be the focus of the investigation. Minneapolis Star, April 8, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 2.
565. See, e.g., F. COoPER, supra note 520, at 31-46; M. Merrill, STANDARs-A SAFEGUARD FOR THE EXERCISE OF DuELEcn") PowER, 47 NebP. L.
REv. 469 (1968).
566. See generally F. COOPER, supra note 520.
567. This assumes that the legislature is not simply lax in its duty
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In terms of the above factors, this type of statute may be the
result of: 1) inadequate knowledge with which to frame a specific policy (perhaps a function of the breadth of the problem),
2) a dearth of experience in the area so that the agency requires
discretion to fashion the law as specific needs become known 0"
or 3) a history of cooperation by the agency in effectuating the
legislative intent.
Broad discretion is especially valuable in developing areas
of law, such as environmental regulation, since it allows agencies to deal with problems as they arise with sensitivity to the
various facts and circumstances of individual cases. Given the
infrequent attention that a legislature can afford to give any
specific problem it is imperative the agency have this leeway.
On the other hand, it is sound policy for the legislature and
especially particular legislators to remain accountable to the
electorate for the consequences of decisions affecting them.
Moreover, a broad statute necessitates critical review of delegated discretion at frequent intervals which the legislature may
69
be unable to maintain.
The statute which originally created the PCA and authorized it to issue standards and regulations is an example of a
relatively broad delegation of discretion. 57 ° It reads in relevant
part:
The pollution control agency shall adopt standards of air quality, including maximum allowable standards of emission ...
from motor vehicles, recognizing that due to variable factors,
no single standard of purity of air is applicable to all areas of
the state ....
It shall take into consideration in this connection
such factors, including others which it may deem proper, as
existing physical conditions, zoning classifications, topography,
prevailing wind directions and velocities .... 571
This section gives the PCA flexibility in varying standards,
while reciting certain factors relevant to establishing such
standards. 572
to treat subjects as specifically as is feasible in a given situation. As a

practical matter state legislatures, often because of external pressures,
produce ill-defined legislation.
568. This is especially true in frontier areas of the law such as
pollution control.
569. F. CooPER, supra note 520, at 94. See also Perkins, supra note
524.
570.
INN. STAT. §§ 116.01-.09 (Supp. 1970).
571. MINN. STAT. § 116.07 subd. 2 (Supp. 1970).
572. The only general limitation on the PCA's discretion is contained in the following introduction to Ch. 116:
To meet the variety and complexity of problems relating to water, air, and land pollution in the areas of the state affected
thereby, and to achieve a reasonable degree of purity of water,
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At the other end of the spectrum, the statute may so describe the problem and solution in such detail that little, if any,
interpretation remains for the agency. Such language may be
the result of: 573 1) a narrowly defined problem with sufficient
evidence and objective standards of measurement to provide a
proper solution, 2) small probability that circumstances will
change markedly in the future or 3) distrust of the agency's interpretation of stated policies. Some of these factors are based
on premises of inherently doubtful validity. For example, there
is the ever-present difficulty of ensuring that the procedures
and standards set out in the statute are based on accurate evidence. When the agency discovers errors in these evidentiary
conclusions, it must resort to legislative reform to the extent
that statutory specificity has deprived it of discretion. Moreover, the assumption that neither the peculiar circumstances
precipitating the statute nor the general objectives of environmental legislation will change significantly before the next legislative session merits a strong caveat. Finally, a particular statute may be the product of pressure by special interests and consequently may be difficult to reconcile with the state's overall
environmental policy. 574 Assuming that these drawbacks are
overcome, a narrowly drawn statute does, of course, ensure that
the agency's legislative activity will be limited almost exclusively to an interstitial role. Moreover, the officials whose decisions affect the people are readily identifiable and properly
accountable for the results.
A statute passed by the 1971 legislature to control the concentration of nutrients in cleaning agents 57 5 is illustrative of the
"narrow" statute. The initial policy is stated as follows:
The legislature seeks to encourage the Minnesota pollution con-

trol agency. . . to set standards limiting the amount of nutrients in various cleaning agents and water conditioning agents
....
The nutrients contained in many of these products serve
a valuable purpose in increasing their overall effectiveness but
...
they overstimulate growth of aquatic life and eventually
lead to an acceleration of the natural eutrophication process.

. . .576

air, and land resources of the state consistent with the maximum enjoyment and use thereof ....
MiNw. STAT. § 116.01 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added).

573. This is in terms of the factors previously mentioned. See text
accompanying note 567, supra.
574. A fear of similar influence directed at an agency may itself
cause the legislature to restrict the agency's discretion in a certain area.
575. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 896.
576. Id. at § 1.
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This "encouragement" sets the specific subject matter of regulations, namely nutrients in certain products, with a specific
purpose in mind, namely stemming eutrophication. 77 The
PCA is authorized to act as follows:
The pollution control agency may make regulations: (a) prescribing for the purpose of [the section on prohibitions] nutrients and the maximum permissible concentration if any, of a
prescribed nutrient in any cleaning agent or chemical water con78
ditioner ....
Here the legislature has done everything except specifically
designate the nutrients and their concentrations, about which
there will likely be little disagreement, thereby narrowly restricting the PCA's discretion.
C.

CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT

Most appointees to state agencies must be confirmed by a
house of the legislature. This power of confirmation is usually
contained in the statute creating the agency. The manner in
which this power is exercised varies among different state legislatures or even within the same legislature with regard to different appointments.5 79 Clearly the legislature has here the potential power to affect the quality of agency activities. The goal of
obtaining the most qualified person for a given position may
be defeated by such factors as external pressures, political patronage, individual biases, or even apathy. 5 0 However, since
the legislature is rarely held accountable for the consequences
of confirmation or rejection of nominees, 581 it is less likely than
the Governor to be influenced by these external factors.
In Minnesota, the Senate must confirm the Governor's nominees for the PCA Director 58 2 and each of the nine members of
the board as their terms expire. 58 3 Hearings on PCA appoint577. A subsequent section of the statute prohibits the sale or importation of products exceeding maximum concentrations of the regulated nutrients. Id. at § 3.
578. Id. at § 4(a).
579. Since the great majority of a governor's nominees are confirmed, he holds the more important role in the process. Moreover, the
respective roles played by the legislature and governor are so related
that an extended discussion is reserved for the section on executive
control. However, certain features of the legislative function can be
briefly reviewed independently.
580. See generally, J. HARRIS, THE ADviCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 271-74 (1953).
581. Id. Harris also notes that legislators are not held as accountable
to their constituencies for their votes on legislative proposals.
582. MINN. STAT. § 116.03 subd. 1(a) (1969).
583. MINN. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 1 (1969).
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ments have on occasion become rather heated or have been
heavily flavored with political overtones. 584 However, only one
nominee has failed to receive confirmation and some observers
believe that most PCA confirmations were possibly decided beforehand in caucus. 58 5
D. INTERCESSION I PFMING MATTERS
Not all legislative control is exercised by committees or by
the houses as a whole. Constituents often request their legislators to intercede on their behalf with an agency. Intercession
on behalf of a constituent often may cut unnecessary red tape
and avoid injustice, if for no other reason than that the proceedings are accelerated. 58 6 This presupposes that a particular claim
is meritorious, however, and that the legislator is not merely
using his influence for whatever political spoils it may bring
him. Moreover, even if such actions are warranted, certain
methods are surely improper (e.g., threats and coercion) and
thereby damage the integrity of the governmental process. 58 7
Among state agencies, the PCA receives its aliquot share of
intercession by representatives. 58 8 Legislators frequently contact the PCA on an informal basis to advocate their constituents'
claims. While these matters often assume an adversary char5
acter, few are marked by coercive tactics.sO
From the PCA's
point of view, most such requests are legitimately grounded, and
they are usually given prompt consideration. 590 The PCA also
regularly receives letters from legislators requesting an analysis
584. PCA Interview, supra note 526.

In this regard, most ques-

585. Id.
586. P. DouG..As, ETmcs

85-88 (1952).

tions are concerned with special interests of the nominee and his past
organizational activities.
IN

GovE

zvr

587. Intercession usually takes the form of a telephone call or per-

sonal appearance by the legislator at the agency. Most matters are
referred to high-ranking staff personnel in the agency-person who, because of the nature of their positions, are sensitive to the complexities
of the political process.

PCA Interview, supra note 526.

588. PCA Interview, supra note 526. An interesting example which
does not fit strictly into this classification is that of an attorney who
wrote to complain about his client's treatment before the PCA on his
state representative's official stationery.
589. Id. Any pressure for a certain result is subtle and derives
more from the status of a legislator's position and title rather than from
that which he says or implies.
590. In this respect, legislators' requests are given greater priority
in order of consideration than are those coming directly from private
citizens. Accord, Andrews, Relationship Between Administrators and
the CaliforniaLegislator,44 CAIF. L. REv. 293, 301-02 (1956).
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of environmental legislation passed that session and its impact
upon a particular problem within their jurisdiction. As with
normal PCA casework, these inquiries are processed promptly,
usually taking the form of informal advisory opinions.' 9'
III.

CONTROL BY THE EXECUTIVE

As figurative head of the executive branch, the Governor
is at least the nominal chief executive of most state agencies
and thereby is ostensibly accountable to the electorate for the
actions of any agency. This is true not only with respect to
those agencies that function as governmental departments over
which a governor can exercise some control, but also with
respect to independent state agencies over which a governor
may have at most minimal authority.
As a consequence, those controls which a governor does exercise are of particular importance to him because of possible
political ramifications. He shares many of these powers with
the legislature 592 and generally even their separate functions
are closely related.5 93 Chief among these responsibilities are:
A) the appointment and removal of administrative officers, B)
direct influence upon agency policies, C) review of agency budget requests and D) control over rules and regulations of the
agency.
A.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL

As previously mentioned, 594 the Governor's power to appoint agency officers and the legislature's power to confirm or
reject them are inextricably related. However, the Governor's
function in selecting candidates is likely the dominant role in
the process and potentially his most powerful means of affecting
agency decisions. 595
Soon after he enters office, Minnesota's Governor appoints
the director of the PCA, who serves four years coterminously
591. PCA Interview, supra note 526.

Likewise, requests received

from private citizens were given considerably less consideration. Sce
note 590 supra.
592. E.g., determination of agency policies and review of budget
requests.
593. E.g., appointment and confirmation of agency executives.
594. See note 579 supra.

595.

The power to select subordinates and to terminate the ap-

pointment of those whose services are not acceptable is hypothetically

the executive's most powerful weapon of control.
BYSE, supra note 555, at 97-98.

W.

GELLHORN & C.
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with the Governor. 596 Through the director, the Governor can
begin to mold the PCA in accordance with his own designs, although clearly this does not firmly establish his control of the
agency.
The terms of the nine agency members who compose the
equivalent of the agency's board of directors are staggered in
order to achieve some continuity from governor to governor.
Notwithstanding this fact, each governor will fill all nine positions during his four years in office as follows: two each in the
first and second years, three the third, and two the fourth
year.597 However, not until the beginning of his third year in
office will he be assured of gaining "control" of this nine-member board.
By statute:
[t]he membership of the pollution control agency must be
broadly representative of the skills and experience necessary to
effectuate the policy [established in the authorizing statute]
except that no member appointed may be an officer or employee
of the state or federal government.5 98
Furthermore, it is required that "[o]ne of such members shall
be a person knowledgeable in the field of agriculture." 590
At least in theory, then, the Governor's selection is not totally
unrestrained but must reflect a broad representation of interest.
This is a valid limitation, but there seems no compelling reason
for singling out the agricultural interest for special treatment.
Obviously this is the result of strong pressure from special interest groups.6 0 0
The Senate must confirm the Governor's nominations for
the board60 ' and the position of director 0 2 in order to ensure
that these appointments do not become political plums without
regard to the qualifications of the individual nominated. Moreover, the confirmation process has the advantage of permitting
596. MIuN. STAT. § 116.03 subd. 1(a) (1969).
597. lnml. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 2 (1969).
598. M N. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 3 (1969).
599. M m.. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 1 (1969).
600. The legislature's agricultural committees are very powerful in
Minnesota. However, this clearly discriminates against other special
interests with an equal or greater stake in the PCA's activities than agriculture. This restriction has no place in the statutes. CrmzNs LEAGUE
Coinm1x=rrEE ON ENVIRONMENT, NEEDED: BETTER WAYS OF MAKUNG ENVIRONmENT=AL CHoICEs 22 (1971).

601. Mrnx. STAT. § 116.02 subd. 1 (1969). Vacancies on the board as
well as in the director's office are filled by the governor in like fashion
for the remainder of the term.
602. MnIN. STAT. § 116.03 subd. 1(a) (1969).
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a greater number of viewpoints to be expressed on the credentials of such persons. While only one nominee to the PCA has
in fact been rejected, 0 3 the specter of Senate rejection is a
strong check on the Governor's discretion in selecting his appointees.
Where the power of removal is also vested in the Governor,
the potency of the appointment weapon is significantly increased, although the removal power is limited. For example,
the legislature may place restrictions on the causes for which an
agency head may be removed; removal of a popular or influential individual may have dire political consequences for the Governor, and the courts have ruled that when an appointment is
for a fixed term, the appointee cannot be removed except for
cause, after due notice and hearing. 0 '0 Notwithstanding these
limitations, if the Governor is extremely displeased with a subordinate, a request to that person to resign will frequently be
successful. 60 5 Minnesota, by statute, grants the Governor the
power to "remove the director [of the PCA] at any time at his
pleasure." 600
Courts have interpreted similar provisions to
mean that he may be removed at the Governor's will, with or
60 7
without cause, notice or hearing.
On the other hand, the statute creating the nine-man board
does not provide for their removal. Absent an inconsistent
statute, Minnesota case law authorizes the Governor to remove
agency officials whose positions are subject to his appointment
only for cause 608 after due notice and hearing. 06 9 However,
since the Governor can probably pressure an unacceptable appointee to resign, the complications related to removal for cause
are really of minimal importance. The Governor's appointment
603. See text accompanying notes 584-85 supra.
604. For the Minnesota rule, see State ex rel. Rockwell v. State
Bd. of Ed., 213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251 (1942).

605. Moreover if state courts follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
doctrine of justiciability, there is some doubt whether such a court would

review the dismissal of an agency head by a governor for cause stated,
after notice and hearing. See Cushman, The ConstitutionalStatus of the
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 CORN. L.Q. 163, 185
606. MINN. STAT. § 116.03 subd. 1(a) (1969).

607.

(1939).

E.g., State ex rel. Stubben v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273

Minn. 361, 141 N.W.2d 499 (1966).

608.

See, State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Ed., 213 Minn. 184,

6 N.W.2d 251 (1942).

Cause means any reason substantially affecting

the individual's ability to perform his duties or the propriety of his performance. Jacobsen v. Nagel, 255 Minn. 300, 96 N.W.2d 569 (1959).
609. State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Ed., 213 Minn. 184,
6 N.W.2d 251 (1942).
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and removal powers therefore afford him substantial power, increasing during his term in office, to control PCA policies.
B. Poucy DmcTooN

Although all "executive powers" necesarily vest in the chief
executive officer of the state,6 10 a governor should not seek to
oversee the myriad details of everyday administration. As with
the appropriations committees of the legislature, clearly neither
he nor his staff have the time or expertise required to do so
properly. Whatever executive power is exercised by Minnesota's Governor vis-a-vis the PCA is channeled through his official liaison with the PCA. Unfortunately, this individual is also the Governor's representative to numerous other agencies,
and the consequent time constraint must hinder his effectiveness. Moreover, while this representative has had a significant
influence in developing and communicating executive policy in
other areas, the current Governor has placed great reliance on
PCA officials in determining his environmental policy.6 1'
Currently the Governor's power to direct agency policies
is atrophying from lack of use. If it is desirable that he have
a greater voice in environmental policy-making, the Governor's
liaison would be an effective instrument through which this
may be accomplished. To serve as a viable force in these decisions, however, the liaison must be given sufficient responsibility to speak for the Governor.
The Governor's own policy positions on various environmental issues lack a general coordination. 61 2 They are primarily a
product of PCA advice and a healthy respect for public opinion.61 3 One public interest group recommends that the Governor be required to regularly issue a detailed statement of ex610. Two arguments have been advanced as to the meaning and

significance of the executive power. The weak governor approach is
based upon the belief that the executive power vests no real power in
the governor in or of itself. Rather the governor's powers are only
those enumerated. The strong governor approach envisions the execu-

tive power includes all powers that follow by implication.

Note,

GubernatorialExecutive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control, 50 IowA L. Rsv. 78, 85 (1964). For purposes of this

section, the above controversy is academic, although the strong governor

approach is assumed for analysis.
611. PCA Interview, supranote 526.
612. CrnZs LEAGUE CoNacrrm oN ENVmoNmENT, supra note
600, at 19. Far from being statements of a policy, they appear rather to

be a series of unrelated goals or objectives.
613. PCA Interview, supra note 526.
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ecutive policies and priorities to guide and control PCA activities. 614 While such a "state of the environment" report would
be desirable, it is doubtful that it would give the Governor
any more effective control over the PCA.

C.

BUDGET

State agencies must submit their budgets to the Governor
for review and inclusion in the general state budget. This provides an occasion for a critical review of the agency's past,
present, and future programs as well as its internal operations.
It is here that the Governor's control over an agency is most
discernible.
In Minnesota, the Commissioner of Administration is "ex
officio the state budget director." 615 In this capacity, the Commissioner is charged with preparing a biennial budget "under
While the Governor
the supervision of the governor-elect." 061
has the power of final approval of the budget 61 7 prior to its submission with his recommendations to the legislature, the real
budgeting work is actually performed within the Department
of Administration.6 1 8 The Department's Division of Budget and
Management conducts hearings on budget requests and makes
the initial recommendations to the Governor.6 19
Upon the Governor's approval, the budget is sent to the
legislature. The Governor includes detailed statements describing the state's fiscal policy and explaining the relationship between anticipated expenditures and income. A similar, though
shorter statement accompanies the request for each agency or
6 20

department.

The following condensation of the PCA's budget request illustrates the control which the Governor can exert by this
method:
614.

20.

CIzENs

LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 600, at

615. MINN. STAT. § 16.01 (1969). The Commissioner is appointed
by the Governor for a term of two years.
616. MmNN. STAT. § 16.02 subd. 11 (1969).
617.

MINN. STAT.

§ 16.14 subd. 1 (1969).

618. Admittedly, much of the background work is done prior to the
Governor's election and assumption of office.

subd. 2 (1969).

See

MINN. STAT.

§ 16.14

However, it is quite clear that the Department is to

cooperate fully with the governor-elect. MINN. STAT. §§ 16.14 subd. 3,
16.15 subd. 4 (1969).
619. MINN. STAT. § 16.15 subd. 2, 3 (1969).
620. See text accompanying notes 536-54, supra, for discussion of the
legislature's role in funding programs.
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The Governor made several substantial cuts in the PCA's
budget. Primary among these was the reduction in funding for
new positions, amounting to more than 50% of the requested
increase.6 2 3 As mentioned previously, 24 the final allocation is
barely sufficient to maintain the status quo. Very likely the
Governor's initial reduction had some effect upon the final appropriation.
Other significant reductions in the budget reflect the Governor's opinion as to numerous PCA policies. Spending for educational and scientific capital and supplies is particularly important. As pollution technology continues to develop in the
near future, the PCA will require more refined equipment to
fulfill adequately its responsibility to society. Judging from his
budget cuts in these areas, apparently the Governor differs in
this view. Criticisms of certain legislative appropriations techniques, especially when the decision-maker lacks technical expertise, apply with equal force to similar actions by the Governor.6 2 5 The discretion with which the Governor, like the legislature, uses his budgetary power can cause or prevent a misallocation of the state's limited resources.
D.

APPROVAL OF RULES

Many states have procedures whereby rules and regulations promulgated by an agency are subjected to review within
the executive branch. 626 This power is clearly one means by
which the executive branch may control the procedures, if not
policies, of an agency. Such review is especially significant in
that it is removed from public knowledge. Therefore, the Governor is not openly accountable for the results, and thereby is
relieved of some of the related political pressures.
In Minnesota, all agency rules must be submitted to the Attorney General for review of form and legality. 627 This procedure presents a possibility for abuse in that the scope of review will be extended to the substantive merits of the rule.
623.

The Governor's recommendation was for 102 new positions to

be phased in at the rate of one-third in fiscal year 1972 and two-thirds in
fiscal year 1973. Proposed Biennial Budget, supra note 545, at F-289.
624. See text accompanying notes 545-48 supra.
625. See text accompanying notes 536-54 supra.
626. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.

627.

MINN. STAT.

§ 15.0412 subd. 4 (1969).

The proposed rule must

also be based on a showing of need, providing the Attorney General
additional discretion.
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However, during the PCA's short existence, it has found this requirement to be fairly administered in accordance with statute.628 So long as this power is used with discretion and attention to its purposes, these dangers will be effectively minimized.
IV. CONTROL BY PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
The word "control" may not accurately describe the objective for which the public interest groups are striving. Influence in the decision-making process and representation of the
interests of the public at large are the goals of most organizations. Certainly, the viewpoints of public interest groups
should be given considerable weight in policy decisions. Yet,
their efforts are often fragmented, discontinuous and uncoordinated and as a consequence are infrequently considered 2 However, efforts of these organizations have not gone entirely
unnoticed by the decision-makers. While they may not have
achieved the influence for which they strive, nevertheless public interest groups have served as a valuable input into environmental decisions. The principal techniques employed include:
A) proposing legislation, B) lobbying for particular measures or
changes and C) using the media to influence the decision-makers
and the public in general.
A.

PROPOSING LEGISLATION

In Minnesota, public interest groups have been concerned
not only with substantive environmental legislation, but also
with the procedures of decision-making. Furthermore, all
groups consulted maintain or are organizing committees to
study existing statutes and draft changes and new legislation.
The occasional successes of these organizations demonstrate that
they can and do provide valuable input into the system.
628. Substantive review obviously occurs with some frequency.
However, on only one occasion has the PCA been requested to make
changes in the content of a rule apart from its form and legality.
After an informal conference and some minor revisions, the rule was
passed. PCA Interview, supra note 526. On the other hand, there are
no means by which the degree of the substantive review can be measured. Empirical evidence indicates that agencies in other states having
some form of review have subverted the procedure by adopting fewer
formal regulations and more informal rulings or policy statements. F.
HEaDy, ADrmnsRAvE PROCEDURE LEGisLATioN IN THE STATES, 61 n.84
(1952).

629. PCA Interview, supra note 526.
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Among the legislative achievements of public interest
groups in Minnesota, the following are most notable. The Citizens League conducted a large-scale research project on the
procedures of environmental decision-making, which resulted
in a detailed report of findings and legislative recommendations. 630 While this report has not yet come to the attention
of legislators, it likely will be made available before the next
legislative session. Substantive legislative achievements of public interest groups include: 1) a model metroplitan ordinance on
air quality drafted by the Metro Clean Air Committee (MCAC)
and adopted by the PCA for statewide use; 63 1 2) legislation proposed by the Sierra Club 32 and Citizens League 33 for an Environmental Bill of Rights patterned after that passed in other
states, which was adopted with modification by the 1971 legislature; 634 and 3) the Citizens League proposal that the PCA's
authority should be expanded to cover noise pollution 35 was
approved in principle by the 1971 legislature. 630
Frequently, however, these groups have been far from effective in proposing legislation. Although their failures are not
03 T
publicized, between 30 and 40 measures died in committee
and presumably countless others never found sponsorship.
Most of the failures were attributable to a lack of expertise in
assessing a problem, poor drafting of a solution or lack of a
broad overview of environmental priorities. 638
These citizen
groups also were unaware of many proposals introduced by one
another or by the PCA, resulting in duplicated effort and inability to muster broad based support for individual measures.6 39 Many of the successes resulted in part from support
630. The research committee met 40 times over a period of 14 months
in compiling their data. CITIZENS LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 600, at 2.
631. Interview with member of the Metro Clean Air Committee,
October 25, 1971 [hereinafter cited as MCAC Interview].
632. Interview with the Legislative Chairwoman of the local chapter
of Sierra Club, October 20, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Sierra Club Inter-

view].
633.

CITIZENS LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, supra note 600,

at 6, 24.
634. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 952.
635. CITIZENS LEAGUE COMMITTEE

ON ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 600,

at 6, 24.
636. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727.
637. Legislative Interview, supra note 521.
638. PCA Interview, supra note 526. In addition to these internal
shortcomings, numerous failures also resulted from lack of support for
the substance of the proposals on pollution control in general. Id.

639. Id. Moreover, it often devolved on the PCA to solicit desired
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given by the PCA for the legislation or the Agency's assistance
in redrafting proposals. 640 This is especially true given the
great reliance placed on the PCA's opinions and technical expertise by the legislative subject-matter committees. 0 "* Nevertheless, these organizations are not devoid of influence in originating legislation.

B.

LOBBYING

Lobbying activities by these groups are partially in response
to the successful lobbying programs of special business interests.
The environmentalists' efforts are being channeled in two distinct, but related, directions-contacting individual legislators
directly and participation at hearings on legislative proposals.
The former method is considered in the following section on
communications. Participation by representatives of these or04 2
ganizations at committee hearings has been quite regular.
However, such participation has been limited by two factors:
1) the availability of people to testify on a volunteer basis and 2)
64 3
lack of knowledge about the subject-matter at issue.
Efforts at remedying these shortcomings are underway.
The Sierra Club is organizing a group of six to eight volunteers
0 44
into a committee to concern itself solely with PCA affairs.
Each member will acquaint himself with a particular aspect of
the PCA and related environmental matters and will testify at
hearings and meetings dealing with his area of knowledge.
The MCAC is involved in somewhat similar efforts. Federal
law requires each state to hold public hearings on plans for implementing air quality standards. In response to this requirement, the MCAC, in conjunction with other public interest
groups, sponsored a conference to inform citizens of the content
of the proposed Minnesota air quality regulations and to train
interested persons to testify at the PCA hearings held in Jan6
uary, 1972. 45
input from these groups, due to their lack of knowledge of current PCA
proposals. Id.
640. Id.
641. Id. The committees generally followed the PCA's recommendations on proposed legislation.
642. MCAC Interview, supra note 631; Sierra Club Interview, supra
note 632.
643. MCAC Interview, supra note 631; Sierra Club Interview, supra
note 632.
644. Sierra Club Interview, supra note 632.
645. MCAC mailing literature on file with MnNm. L. Rsv. Federal
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In the past, special interest groups possessing the expertise
and funds to influence proposed legislation have dominated this
area. However, public interest groups have initiated programs
to upgrade their efforts in presenting the position of the public
on environmental matters.6 46 Further efforts should be directed
toward intergroup cooperation and coordination in order to concentrate resources for maximum effect.
C.

COiMMUNICATIONS

A final method by which public interest groups exert their
influence is the dissemination of information and use of the
media. Activities of this sort are directed either at the public
in general, the PCA or the legislature.
Most groups indicated they were actively involved in informing the public of environmental problems and potential solutions. 617 This information takes numerous forms: newspaper
articles and editorials, radio and television interviews, mass
mailing, public meetings and campaigns. On the other hand,
efforts to inform the decision-makers have not assumed the
same proportions. While these organizations write letters and
send resolutions to those directly concerned with making environmental decisions, their impact cannot be measured.
In addition, the Sierra Club's proposed PCA committee does
a limited amount of field work. This consists of discovering
problems as they arise and informing the PCA, following up the
initial disclosure to ensure that they are being given attention,
and conducting interviews with citizens and groups around the
state to assess environmental attitudes.
CONCLUSION
The area of environmental control is relatively new and
rapidly developing. It is therefore to be expected that the PCA
will evoke criticism for being both too lax and misguidedly
strict until a public consensus on environmental control is
funds were provided to cover the costs of this conference at which

state and national experts spoke (notably the director of the PCA and
Professor Barry Commoner, nationally reknowned environmentalist).

646. Direct lobbying efforts must usually be restrained since many
of these public interest groups are tax exempt, and their efforts are
therefore curtailed by IRS regulations on permissible activities of tax
exempt organizations. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954 § 501 (c) (3); Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.501 (c) (3)-(1) (b) (3) (i) 1.501(c) (3) -1(c) (3) (ii).
647. Sierra Club Interview, supra note 632.
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forged. In addition the PCA, as many other government agencies, does not have the financial resources necessary to exercise
adequately its powers of rule-making, licensing, detection of
violations and enforcement.
However, in addition to these limitations, the PCA is hindered by two other problems. First, it is governed by ambiguous statutes that make the exercise of its substantive powers
unnecessarily difficult. The solution to these statutory difficulties must come from the legislature, since the courts are unable
to undertake a comprehensive reappraisal. At a minimum
Chapters 116 and 115 should be combined, so that the PCA is
governed by a single statute, and their relationship to the APA
and the ERA should be more clearly defined. In addition the
APA should be re-examined in light of a more recent model act
and the developments in administrative law since the passage of
various parts of the APA. And second, the PCA has been
hindered by an overzealous exercise of the courts' powers of
judicial review. Until the courts allow the PCA more discretion and the legislature clarifies the relevant statutory structure, the agency will be unable to effectuate its legislative mandate at peak efficiency.

